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STATEMENT 



OF 



GEN. FITZ JOHN PORTER. 



SERVICES 



OF THE 



FIFTH ARMY CORPS, 



IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 1862. 



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SpECiAii Ordebs, ) HEADQUAETERS OF THE ARMY, 

}■ Adjutant Genebal's Office, 

No. 78. ) Washington, April 12, 1878. 

The following order has been received from the War Department : 
An appeal has been made to the President, as follows : 

'•New Yobk, March 9, 1878. 
" To His Excellency Rxjthebfobd B. Hates, 

''President of the United States. 
"Sir : I most respectfully, but most urgently, renew my oft repeated appeal to have you 
review my case. I ask it as a matter of long delayed justice to myself. I renew it upon 
the ground heretotore stated, that public justice cannot be satisfied so long as my appeal 
remains unheard. My sentence is a continuing sentence, and made to follow my daily life. 
For this reason, if for no other, my case is ever within the reach of executive as well as leg- 
islative interference. 

•'I beg to present copies of papers heretofore presented, bearing upon my case, and trust 
that you will deem it a proper one for your prompt and favorable consideration. 

" If I do not make it plain that I have been wronged, I alone am the suflferer. If I do 
make it plain that great injustice has been done me, then I am sure that you, and all others 
who love truth and justice, will be glad that the opportunity for my vindication has not 
been denied. 

"Very respectfully yours, 

'* FiTz John Poeteb." 

In order that the President may be fully informed of the facts of the case of Fitz John 
Porter, late Major General of Volunteers, and be enabled to act advisedly upon his applica- 
tion for relief in said case, a Board is hereby convened, by order of the President, to ex- 
amine, in connection with the record of the trial by court martial of Major General Poeteb, 
such new evidence relating to the merits of said case as is now on file in the War Depart- 
ment, together with such other evidence as may be presented to said Board, and to report, 
with the reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in their opinion justice requires 
should be taken on said application by the President. 

Detail for the Board. 

Major General J. M. Soofield. 

Brigadier General A. H. Tebet. 

Colonel G. W. Getty, 3d Artillery. 

Major Asa B. Gabdneb, Judge Advocate, Recorder. 

The Board will convene at West Point, New York, on the 20th day of June, 1878, and is 
authorized to adjourn from time to time, and to sit in such place as may be deemed 
expedient. 
By Command op Genebaii Shbeman : 

E. D. TOWNSEND, 

Adjutant General. 



John C. Bullitt, Philadelphia, 1 

Joseph H. Choate, New York, )- Counsel Yor General Porter, 

Anson Maltb^, New York, J 



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To the Senate and House of Representatives • 

" I transmit herewith the 'proceedings and report' of the Board of officers, 
convened by special orders No. 78, headquarters of the army, Washing- 
ton, April 12, 1878, m the case of Fitz-John Porter. The report of the 
Board was made in March last, but the official record of the proceedings 
did not reach me until the 3d instant. 

" 1 have given to this report such examination as satisBes me that I 
ought to lay the proceedings and conclusions of the board before Congress. 

" As I am without power in the absence of legislation to act upon the 
recommendation of the report further than by submitting the same to 
Congress, the proceedings and conclusions of the board are transmitted for 
the information of Congress, and such action as in your wisdom shall seem 
expedient and just. 

"E. B. Hayes. 
"Executive Mansion, Washingtoo, June 5, 1879." 



STATEMENT, 

:o: — 

SUBJECTS. 

PAGE. 

Opening Address to the Board 1 

James Riyer to Warrenton Junction 3 

Warrenton Junction to Bristoe , 15 

Bristoe Towards Gainsville 18 

Order of 4:30 p. m., August 29th 29 

Chabges under 9th and 52nd Abticles op Wae 35 

General Pope's understanding of the situation 36 

New Evidence from Confederate Sources 39 

" •• Federal '« 42 

Ono Evidence on Kecord 43 

Disobedience of Joint Order 44 

Violation of 9th and 52nd Articles of War 45 

Second Battle of Bull Run 49 

Telegrams to General Burnside . , , . , 55 

Interview with General Pope at Fairfax Court House 56 

Telegrams and Orders relating to the Campaign 60 

Centreville to Antietam 83 



OPENING ADDRESS. 

WEST POINT, NEW YORK, JUNE 25tH, 1878. 

Mr. Peesident and Gentlemen : It has pleased the President of 
the United States to convene you, a board of military officers, to ex- 
amine into the merits of my case as they may appear in the light of the 
newly discovered evidence which will be presented to you. 

I am happy that I am to lay my statements and the proofs thereof 
before officers eminently fitted for the duty of luilitary judges; and that 
as a result of my unwearied efforts since my conviction and sentence, I 
at length stand innocent before a board of high officers prepared to 
prove to that board and through that board to the President and to my 
country, that I am innocent of the charges of which I was found guilty 
by my court-martial. 

As the past in a man's career indicates the probable future, I feel 
sure I shall be pardoned a cursory allusion to the events of my military 
life in the service of my country which tend to show how improbable 
was the commission of the offenses with which I was charged, and of 
which my being found guilty is the cause of my appearance before you 
to-day. 

Belonging to a family whose deeds had added somewhat to the mili- 
tary and naval records and renown of my country, I was trained for 
military life, and to sustain, if not add to the untarnished records of an 
honored name. 

Graduating with some degree of promise in an intelligent and unusu- 
ally large class at West Point, I entered in 1845 upon my career of 
arms as a brevet second lieutenant of the 4th Artillery, in a regiment 
which bore upon its roils names well calculated to excite the youthful 
mind to deeds of honor and bravery. Our wars have since added to 
those rolls new names of renown. 

I subsequently went into active service in the Mexican war, taking 
part in the battles of Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Molino del Key, the sieges 
of Vera Cruz and Chepultepec, and the capture of the City of Mexico. 

Twice breveted for my services in these battles, I was wounded in 
the last battle at the Garita of Belen, City of Mexico, being the only 
officer of my company who was not killed in that well-earned victory. 

In 1849 I was assigned to duty at this station, the records of which 
witness to the efficiency of my five years service. 

My next active duty was in Kansas, during the troubles therein 1856. 

In 1857, as chief of staff to General Albert Sidney Johnston, I served 
in Utah, through the campaign in the Rocky Mountains — memorable 
for its hardships. 

During the early days of our great political trouble, I successfully 
accomplished the duties assigned me of inspecting and reporting upon 



n 

the defenses of Charleston harbor and their need of repairs, supplies 
and men, and^of removing from seceeded Texas those troops which could 
be rescued from the peril of being overwhelmed by numbers. 

Satisfied with my efficiency, Mr. Cameron, then Secretary of War, and 
General Scott selected me for the important duty of protecting the Bal- 
timore & Harrisburg Railroad (Northern Central) from the Baltimore 
rioters. 

I obtained from Governor Curtin, at Harrisburg (Pennsylvania), a 
body of ninety days volunteers, whom I hastily armed, as best I could 
from all arsenals, under verbal authority from the Secretary of War and 
General Scott, to use their name for any good purpose. 

With these troops I checked the destruction of the bridges already 
begun, and prepared to reopen communication with Washington, when 
all the troops were ordered by the President back to York, Pennsylva- 
nia. 

It is well known that prompt action was at that time necessary in the 
disaffected States to prevent their secession. 

The action of the people of those States sometimes depended on the 
success of a comparatively small body of men in obtaining control of 
arms, munitions and fortifications. Such it was feared would be the 
case in Missouri. 

While at Harrisburg on the duty just set forth I became, through 
Governor Curtin, whose confidence and aid I enjoyed, cognizant of the 
necessity of prompt action on the part of the administration to protect 
the arsenal and other public property at St. Louis, and to prevent 
these buildings and supplies from falling into the hands of the seces- 
sionists. 

Those were anxious moments. A day — nay a few hours — of delay 
might suffice for the secessionists to gain posession of the government 
arms, stores and munitions, and Missouri might have been carried out 
of the Union. Of the effect this action would have had upon the war 
it is useless to speculate, but we know that the difficulties in the way 
of our success would have been greatly multiplied. 

Three days were at that time needed to get a reply from the Secreta- 
ry of War at Washington, then cut off from us — three days — every hour 
fraught with peril to our cause. 

I assumed the responsibility, and at once in the name of the Secretary 
of War or General-in-Chief, gave the necessary telegraphic orders and 
instructions to muster in the Missouri volunteers at St. Louis, to arm 
them, to place them under Capt. Lyon, and to protect the public prop- 
erty. 

The Secretary of War and General Scott warmly approved my action 
a few days after, upon my reporting in Washington. 

And subsequently General Blair thanked me for my prompt assump- 
ion of authority, and the great services thus rendered the State, which 
in his words, "helped to save Missouri to the Union." 

The value and effect of my action is known to one of your number, 
who was on duty in St. Louis. 

Military skill was not necessary for this act ; physical courage was not 
necessary for it. But zeal for the cause and love of my country were 
necessary, and that zeal and that love burned as brightly at Gaines 
Mill, at Malvern, at Antietam, and at the Second Bull Run as at Har- 
risburg, and shall die only with my life. 



Ill 

I was nest assigned as Chief of Staff to General Eobert Patter- 
son commanding the Department of Pennsylvania and engaged in 
organizing an army of volunteers to protect Maryland and to reinforce 
Washington City. Faithful and efficient services under General Patter- 
son and his successor General Banks were recognized by the government 
appointing me Colonel in the Eegular army and Brigadier General in 
the Volunteer service. 

After fulfilling the duty of organizing the raw recruits into brigades 
and divisions, to which I had been assigned at Washington, I was se- 
lected to command troops at Fort Corcoran, where I soon formed a 
division which was commended by the General-in-Chief to the army as 
a model for the army. 

Under General Heintzelman I went to the Peninsula, and was con- 
ductor of the siege of Yorktown, until it fell ; when I was placed in com- 
mand of the Fifth Army Corps, formed for my benefit. 

With this excellent body of troops placed as it was in positions of the 
greatest honor and danger, I served through the Peninsular campaign, 
fighting the battles of New Bridge, Hanover Court House, Mechanics- 
ville, Gaines Mill, Turkey Bridge and Malvern. 

Of the details of these battles it is needless to speak. They wiii be 
found recounted in the many histories of our war. 

Suffice it to say that at*the sanguinary battle of Gaines Mill, from my 
force of twenty-seven thousand men one-third were lost. 

At the glorious battle of Malvern Hill my corps was posted by my- 
self, anticipating a bloody struggle, and was joined on my appeal by 
portions of the commands of Generals Heintzelman, Keyes and Sum- 
ner, amounting with mine to some twenty-three or four thousand men. 

Attacked with utmost vigor by the enemy who fought most stub- 
bornly, my gallant corps and their comrades drove back their columns, 
persistently assaulting and reassaulting us in greatly superior numbers. 

For my services in this campaign, but at no solicitation of mine, I 
was promoted by the President to be major-general of volunteers and 
brevet brigadier-general of the regular army. 

Afterwards I hastened from the Peninsula with my corps to the as- 
sistance of General Pope, reporting to him from Bealeton, August 26, 
he being at Warrenton Junction, 

This march, and more especially the events of my few days' service 
under General Pope, will be dwelt upon hereafter. 

My actions during those days form the subject matter of your investi- 
gations. 

General Pope's campaign was unsuccessful ; the enemy crossed the 
Potomac into Maryland. 

First assigned to the duty of making safe the almost vacated defences 
of Washington from Fort Corcoran to Hunting creek, and afterwards 
marching my corps of 9,000 men to Antietam, I took an effective part 
in that battle, seconding the efforts of my commanding general and my 
brother generals in every possible way. 

On the 12th of November, 1862, two months after the battle of Bull 
Run, I was relieved from my command at Warrenton, Virginia, on the 
eve of most important movements. 

A court martial was convened and found me guilty of the charges 
and material specifications preferred against me, involving my motives 
and conduct during and preceding the second battle of Bull Bun. 



IV 

I was dismissed from the United States Army January 27, 1863, under 
a sentence whose gravity is only equalled by that of death ; convicted 
of wilfully refusing to obey orders ; of refraining from giving battle in 
aid of my brother soldiers ; of neglecting to aid in achieving a success, 
the failure to gain which caused the loss of the lives of thousands of 
men and of hundreds of my own corps on the next day, August BO, 
1862, with woful disaster to my country. 

Had such been in truth my conduct and had my motives been those 
charged upon me, the sentence of death would have been a light one 
and I would have deserved everlasting obloquy from my betrayed 
country. 

But I am concious of my innocence, conscious that my motives were 
for the best, that my conduct was, at least, not deserving of reproach. 

My court martial sat at a time of great public excitement when war 
was raging a few miles from us, when witnesses actively engaged in the 
army were unattainable, and when the names of many witnesses to im- 
portant facts were not known to me, when the facts set up on my side 
were regarded as fictions by my opponents, facts which are now capable 
of indisputable proof ; when the geography of the battle field was not 
well known, and when the court members, needed each moment in the 
field, could not sit with that calm necessary for a judicial deliberation. 

The sentence passed upon me could only have been passed from mis- 
apprehension of the truth of the whole facts by the court and by the 
witnesses for the Government. 

Since my sentence I have persistently striven for a reopening of my 
case so that my innocence might be shown forth in unmistakable colors 
to all beholders. The pamphlets I now submit to you show that I have 
not waited for time to dull the edge of memory or rust the scales of 
justice. Unfortunately some of the witnesses against me are no longer 
living. I regret it. It would afford me great pleasure to convince 
them also of their mistake. 

Fur the reopening of my case appeal was made in my behalf to Pres- 
ident Lincoln, by Hon. Edward Everett, Robert C. Winthrop, Amos A. 
Lawrence and Gardner Howland Shaw, in August, 1863. 

I appealed to President Johnson in 1867, my appeal being supported 
by Hon. Henry Wilson, Hon. John Sherman, Hon. Lafayette S. Foster, 
Hon. Ira Harris, Hon. N. P. Banks, Hon. Horace Greeley, Governor 
Curtin, and Ex-Presidents Fillmore and Pierce, and other prominent 
citizens. 

Again in 1869, I appealed to President Grant. 

Many private petitions were made by my friends; and in 1874, I again 
appealed to President Grant, that I might have a rehearing, and resolu- 
tions recommending this act of justice, were passed by the Legislatures 
of New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 

Eminent lawyers, among them Charles O'Conor, Daniel Lord, and 
Judge Wm. D. Shipman of New York; Sidney Bartlett, Judges Benja- 
min R. Curtis and J. G. Abbott, of Boston, "and Montgomery Blair of 
Washington City, had written their opinions of the justice of my case, 
and these were submitted to the President. 

Always have the good wishes and resolutions of my old Fifth Army 
Corps gone with me. 

My appeals were never refused, but were never granted. 

And now, in 1878, after fifteen years of undeserved suffering — under 



a sentence, which, founded upon mistaken evidence, has long caused 
the aim of my life to be the vindication of my military honor, President 
Hayes has granted me a rehearing. 

A third of a centary has rolled over my head, since as a boy I quitted 
these halls having demonstrated my fitness to serve my country. Now, 
a man struck down by an undeserved sentence in the height of my mil- 
itary career, while years of honorable service lay before me, I return to 
this spot, and shall demonstrate before you that I am not unworthy the 
name I was born to — the nourishment and education given me here, the 
trusts and rank bestowed upon me, nor of the rights and privileges of 
an American citizen. 

With these words of preface I pass to my statement of the facts, 
which I claim shows that I was improperly convicted and removed from 
the United States Armv. 



STATEMENT 



OF THE 



SERVICES OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS, 



IN 1863. 



IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA 



BY 



GENERAL FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 



WASHIIS^GTON: 

G-OYERNMENT PRINTINa OFFICE. 
1879. 



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Tt6 



GEI^. FITZ JOHN PORTEK'S STATEMENT OF THE SERVICES 
OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS, IN 1862, IN NORTHERN 
VIRGINIA. 



FROM JAMES RIYER TO WARRENTON JUNCTION. 

In August, 1862, my conimantl, the Fifth Army Corps, was at Har- 
rison's Landing, James River, and formed part of the Army of the 
Potomac, commanded by General McClellan. 

Early in the month I was informed by General McClellan that the 
Army of the Potomac would be moved to the Rai)pahannock to co- 
ojjerate with the Army of Virginia under General Pope. 

The new campaign was to be conducted by General McClellan. 

Though held ready to march when the Army should be relieved of 
the sick and other incumbrances to rajiid movements, large details from 
the Fifth Corps were kept on the south bank of the James River, com- 
pleting preparations for active operations in the direction of Petersburg. 

The corj)s was composed of the divisions of Morell, Sykes and Rey- 
nolds (Pennsylvania Reserves) and of Hunt's -'Reserve Artillery," each 
commanded by the accomplished general whose name distinguished it. 

Reynolds, at the last moment taken from the south bank of James 
River, embarked from Harrison's Landing at night on the 14th of Au- 
gust. He reported on the 23d to General Pope, and was assigned to 
General McDowell. 

Tyler's Artillery (Connecticut) and several ''Reserve batteries" also 
embarked from Harrison's Landing. The batteries joined General Burn- 
side opposite Fredericksburg. Tyler took x^ost within the southern de- 
fences of Washington City. 

The corps, further reduced in artillery and by details of infantry, and 
without cavalry, entered upon the campaign conducted by General Pope 
less than 9,000 strong. 

I received my orders at 5 p. M., on the 14th, and at 7 P. M. the corps 
was marching for Fort Monroe. At 8 A. M., on the 18th, though detained 
48 hours to guard bridges and trains, it encamped after a march of 
sixty miles, at Newport News and Hamilton — the department com- 
mander (General Dix) wishing it no nearer Fort Monroe till transports, 
yet to arrive, should be provided. 

To accomplish this it had made a night march all the night of August 
14th, and also a forced march of 45 miles from Williamsburg to Newport 
News, marching at daylight of the 17th, and camping at 8 A. M. on the 
18th. 

On the 16th, at Williamsburg, where I was ordered to wait the arrival 
and passage through me of the Army of the Potomac, in order to cover 
as rear guard its movements from any attack east of the Chickahominy^ 
I learned from intercepted letters and reliable sources that all of the 
Confederate available forces (even stripi^ing the defences for the purpose) 



had been sent from Eiclimoucl and its vicinity to crush General Pope^ 
then south of the Eappahannock, before he couhl be reinforced. 

I telegraphed the facts to General Halleck at Washington, and to 
General McOlellan on the Ohickahominy, adding to the latter that, as 
our army was withdrawing unmolested everywhere, I should, if not for- 
bidden, push to Fort Monroe and embark for Aquia creek, my purpose 
being to co-operate with General Pope in pursuance of the information 
previously given to me by General McOlellan, that the Army of the 
Potomac was to co-operate with the Army of Virginia under General 
Pope. I also telegraphed to Fort Monroe, and sent an officer to prepare 
for immediate and rapid embarkation. My action, approved by General 
McOlellan at Fort Monroe, expedited by at least two days the embarka- 
tion of the army, and my corps joined General Pope at least four days 
earlier than if I had conformed to orders. 

The following are my telegrams to Generals Halleck and McOlellan : 

[No. 1.] 

Williamsburg, Ya., August 16tli, 6 p. m. 
General McClellan : 

I sent you letters from people in Riclimoiid taken from negroes. They say troops are 
moving north against General Pope. The negroes confirm them, and another who 
left there on Thursday says it is true. Colonel Campbell reports there is no enemy 
"between us and Richmond. Unless you forbid I shall at day-break send everything 
to Fort Monroe and embark for Aquia Creek. I have asked that transports be in 
leadiness. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Majoi'- General. 
[No. 2.] 

United States Military Telegraph, 

TVar Department. 
Time received, 4:45 p. m., August 17th. 

Williamsburg, Va., August 16th, 1862. 
Major-General H. W. Halleck : 

Two negroes who left Richmond on Wednesday say Jackson's wounded arrived there 
on Tuesday. All admitted he had been badly whipped. He had asked for large re- 
inforcements and they had gone, and they comprised all cavalry and artillery which 
could be dispensed with about Richmond. All guns in Manchester, and one or two 
from those about Richmond, and eighteen thousand men, twelve thousand of which 
were from about Fort Randolph, had gone up. The cavalry in cars. He says this 
movement was known on Tuesday. I send this direct, not having immediate com- 
munication with General McClellan. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 
True copy. 

THO. T. ECKERT, 
Assist. Siqjt. Military Telegraph. 

General Halleck and the Secretary of War put no confidence in my 
report of the enemy marching on General Pope, and construed my mo- 
tive, as General Halleck afterwards said to me, to be '' the desire to retain 
the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, and General McClellan in 
command." It is true that the effect of my dispatch to General Halleck 
should liave been the turning of our steps towards Eichmond, iust*iad of 
continuing the march from that city. Such retention and advance of 
the arnjy on the Peninsula, would, it is fair to assume, probably, have 
recalled General Lee to Eichmond and have prevented, at that time, the 
unfortunate termination of General Pope's campaign. 

I willingly acknowledge that I was not among those who favored the 
removal of our army from before Eichmond — thus to relieve our oppo- 



nents' capital from the burdens and dangers of a siege and take them 
upon ourselves at Washington. But my opinion was never asked, and 
when the orders of my superiors reached me, I sought without discus- 
sion or hesitation how best to execute them. 

I did not hear from General McClellan in answer to my dispatch, be- 
cause he did not receive it until after I had marched from Williamsburg. 

From divers causes the transports at Fort Monroe were very few, and 
these unprepared for immediate use. The few vessels that were there 
were loaded with lumber, &c., and had no fresh water. Almost all the 
vessels had to be sent to ^Xorfolk for water. Those laden were dis- 
charged of their freight, cleaned, and the troops embarked for Aquia. 
Creek. The wharves were fully occupied by other necessarj^ work, and 
every facility for embarking had to be imi^rovised at Hampton and i^ew- 
X)ort News, x^ew wharves had to be built. These circumstances neces- 
sitated much laborious work. Night and day till midnight of the 20th,, 
when I sailed, I was iiersonally engaged in securing and preparing the 
vessels and embarking troops. By the authorized free use of General 
McClellan's name, and by the unremitted personal attention and assist- 
ance of the Hon. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, and Colonel 
Sawtelle, A. Q. M., transportation was secured. Through the continual 
exertions, night and day of the officers, sustained by the cheerful activity 
of the men, the corps was mainly embarked by midnight of the 20tlL 
August. 

Eeynolds, (Pennsylvania Eeserves,) of my command, had sailed as; 
before stated, on the night of the 14th from Harrison's Landing, and I 
had overtaken him at Newport News, and had hastened his departure by 
getting him a supj)ly of water for his boilers, for which he had stopped 
two days unable to obtain it. General Eejmolds and his force sailed the 
first of my troops to Aquia Creek. 

Of my eagerness to carry out the plans of the authorities, and that I 
hastened my junction with General Pope by iiersonal exertions and on 
my own responsibility, evidence was given at my trial by Generals. 
McClellan and Burnside and Assistant Secretary of War Tucker. 

Hunt's Eeserve Artillery arrived at Aquia Creek after me some time, 
and owing to difficulty of landing, and the fact that by the time they 
could have landed I was far away, and they could not overtake me, six 
batteries only of this and the di^dsion artillery joined me. The others 
sailed up to Alexandria, either direct or re-embarked after landing at 
Aquia Creek. 

I joined General Burnside, and reyjorted to him as my senior, at Fred- 
ericksbiu-g, late on the 21st, but in time to send that night Eeynolds' 
Division and Griffin's Brigade of Morell's Division, to the aid of General 
Pope. The other brigades of Morell, and the division of Sylies, were 
arriving all that night and the next day, the 22d. Morell marched the 
night of the 22d, Sykes the next morning, each as soon as pro\isioned ; 
both with orders to support Eeynolds, report to General Pope, and to 
join hitn, if advisable, or if called upon to do so. (Dispatch No. 3.) 

General Burnside was ordered by General Halleck to hold the fords of 
the Eappahannock, and to maintain communication with General Pope,, 
then on the north bank, at and above Eappabaiuiock Station. To this 
duty my command was assigned, and for my guidance, General Halleck 
furnished through General Burnside reports from General Pope, with 
whom he was in telegraphic communication. (No. 5.) 

It is proper here to state that the information transmitted by General 
Halleck, however correct originally, was so erroneous on receipt as to 
mislead and cause delay. I so reported at the time. (See Dispatches, 
Nos. 8 and 9.) 



IReynolds (Griffin supporting) relieved General Pope's troops on the 
22d, at Kelly's Ford, and reported by letter to General Pope. Morell 
{Sykes supporting) was in i)osition to aid Eeynolds and Griffin in an 
attack ordered by General Pope upon Culpepper Court House, within 
easy reach of which I then knew were the main forces of the Confed- 
erate Ai^my. A sudden rise of the river (^o. 5) i^revented this move- 
ment. General Pope, without notice to General Burnside or any of my 
command, severed connection, by removing Eeynolds, and all troops 
above him, at the fords. At the same time he destroyed the raikoad 
bridge aud buildings at Eappahannock Station and marched away, but 
whither, I being without cavalry, required some time to ascertain. 
(Dispatches, ^os. 4 to 15.) 

During my personal stay of three days at Falmouth, overcome by my 
continuous exertions, night and day, since the 14th, I was prostrated by 
dysentery, and directed my officers from my sick bed. The following 
dispatches contain some of these directions : 

[No. 3.1 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 

Falmouth, August 23, 1862. 
General Morell : 

Dispatcli received. Move ou at once to Kelly's Ford, aud occupy aud hold it. Re- 
lieve Griffiu when Sykes gets up to hiui. If you are called upon to go to Eappahan- 
nock Statiou move up to the support of the army there. 

Your artillerv is ou the road to you. Sykes will move up this morning and relieve 
Griffin. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major-General Commanding. 



Falmouth August 24th, 1862. 



[No. 4.] 

Generals Morell and Sykes: 

Keep your commands well in hand for any emergency, and, before advancing 
auother step, do your utmost to ascertain the position of Pope's forces and where the 
enemy is — what force is at Kelly's Ford, and has the enemy been seen on the opposite 
bank? Give me all the information you have, aud the location of your forces and 
amount of cavah\y at the fords. There is no more cavahy here to send you. If yon 
can push scouts over the fords do so as far as possible. What is the latest informa- 
tion ? 

Send your dispatches so that General Sykes can see them. Direct Griffin to fix the 
ground or woods at Baruett's Ford so that a small force with artillery can hold it. I 
am just informed that Pope is on the Rappahannock, at Warrenton Sjmngs, having 
attacked and whipped the enemy. I wish to hold Kelly's Ford to-morrow, and hope, 
by the time I join you, that you will be able to inform me what is at and opposite 
Rappahannock Station. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

[No. 5.] 

August 24th, 2 P. M. 
Generals Morell and Sykes : 

Push a scout to Rappahannock Station and find out if Pojie has pickets near there, 
and gain information of Pope or the enemy. Pope attacked the enemy yesterday, near 
Sulphur Springs, and the latter retreated. He was to renew the attack to-day, and it 
is probable Pope was pushing after him, knowing the river at Rappahannock was not 
fordable. 

General Halleck's orders are for us to hold the Rappahannock. 

Your artillery is en route ; also Sykes'. You will therefore carry out yomc former 
instructions. 
Reinforcements will push up to you. 
All goes right. 

F. J. PORTER. 

Major-GeneraJ. 



Late in the afternoon of the 24th I left Falmouth and joined my com- 
mand. I began then to send General Burnside the information of our 
forces and of the enemy which he required. 

[No. 6.] 

Near Morrisville, 
August 25tli, 1862, 11:45 a. m. 
To General Burnside : 

I find that last niglit Pope's cavalry was withdrawn by order, and Kelly's Ford aban- 
doned, without any notice to my command or the cavalry j)icketing the river. No 
enemy seen on opposite side of river, except what was moving up towards Sulphur 
Springs. A good ford about three miles above railroad bridge. Kearney is at War- 
renton Station picketing to Bealeton. No pickets extending from Pope this way, ^nd 
no efforts made to keep up communication. The removal of his cavalry diminishes the 
means. Morell is near Morrisville, with Griffin at Barnett's. Sykes two miles to the 
rear, with Warren at Barnett's, to take Griffin's place when he goes to Kelly's. I shall 
go to Barnett's, then Kelly's, and on return give such intelligence as I can gain. 
Water is very scarce on the road, insufficient for large commands. Regiments have 
forty rounds, two wagons each; brigade headquarters one; division headquarters two. 
Will give full report on return. Four companies of Ehode Island cavalry at Rappa- 
hannock Station last night. Telegrai)h advances very slowly, too slowly. More 
pickets are said to be wanted and wire. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 
[No. 7.] 

From Deep Creek, 

Received Aug. 25, 1862. 
To General Burnside : 

The report to me that all Pope's cavalry at Kelly's Ford was withdrawn is an error. 
He left a small company at the fords. I find, or think, the enemy is merely watching 
us at Barnett's, and was within striking distance of Kelly's. Sufficient force to resist 
crossing. The enemy has shown himself in small parties. I have decided to leave 
Griffin at Barnett's for a day longer, send the remainder of Morell to Kelly's and to- 
morrow, depending on information I get from a party I have sent to Rappahannock 
Station, to i^ush Sykes there or halt him in supporting distance of Morell, ready to 
push on to the Rapiiahannock Station. I find the river can be crossed almost any- 
where by cavalry and infantry, so that, with the excej)tion of the prominent fords, 
watching is all I can do. The special fords I can hold easily. At Rappahannock Sta- 
tion are four companies of Rhode Island cavalry, and Kearney's pickets are at Beale- 
ton. Reno and Reynolds I can hear nothing of. Reno's batteries have been with- 
drawn from Kelly's and Barnett's. The country is miserable, scarcely producing good 
telegraph poles, much less subsistence for man or beast for this army. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 
[No. 8.] 

From Advance, 
Received Aug. 25, 1862. 
To General Burnside : 

Have you received my despatches indicating my movements to-morrow ? You know 
that Rappahannock Station is imder fire from opposite hills, and the houses were de- 
stroyed by Pope. I do not like to direct movement on such uncertain data as that 
furnished by Gen. Halleck. I know lie is misinformed of the location of some of the corj;s 
mentioned in his dispatches. Reno has not been at Kelly's for three days, and there 
is only a picket at Rappahannock Station, and Kearney, not Banks, is at Bealeton. 
Reno and Reynolds are beyond my reach. I have directed Sykes to go to Rapiiahan- 
nock Station at 5 to-morrow, and will go there myself via Kelly's Ford. Does General 
McClellan approve ? About day-break my aid and scout will be in from Bealeton. 
Have you any orders ? I want cavalry to remain with me for a few days. For want 
of grain and provisions I have had to send home some who came up. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Afajor-General. 
[No. 9.] 

From Advance, 3:30 p. m.. 

Received Aug. 25, 1862. 
To General Burnside : 

Despatch of 10.30 received. General Halleck is misinformed in regard to Reno's loca- 
tion. He is not at Kelly's Ford, nor can I hear of him. No one bnt four companies 
of Rhode Island cavalry is at Rappahannock Station and Bealeton. This was the last 



8 

information I received. I have sent to Bealeton to get information, and sliall start 
Sykes at day-break for Rappahannock Station or its vicinity. The Sixth New York 
occnpy Barnett's and are on opposite bank. I tliink tliey can bold and watcb that 
point, with tbe addition of a Dutch battery ; but if there is a battalion of infantry 
available ^vithont breaking a brigade, think it vrell to pnt it there to-morrow ; shall 
leave Griffin there. Eeynolds has gone, and, like Reno, is beyond reach. Tliis portion 
of my corps icouJcl liave heen one day further forward had I any information of Pope's 
forces or the enemy. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Majoi'-Genei'al. 
[No. 10.] 

Advance, Aug. 25, 1862. 
To General A. E. Burnside: 

My aid has jnst returned from Bealeton. He says Birnej' is there with two regi- 
ments, one at Rappahannock Station. Pope's headquarters are at Warrenton; Kear- 
ney at Warrenton Junction. King went to Warrenton to-day. Hooker was to go. 
Reno is at Sulphur Springs. Reynolds is at Warrenton. Banks and Sigel are at Sul- 
phur Springs fighting to-day. A deserter came over to clay, arriving at Rappahannock 
Station ; said enemy moving his forces to our right. Those left down this way are their 
regiments which have been cut uj) in the battles. At Brandreth's Station are five hun- 
^ired wagons guarded by a small force of infantry and squadron of cavalry. At Rappa- 
hannock Station the river is fordable for all arms. Are my arrangements satisfactorv ? 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- General.. 
[No. 11.] 

Falmouth, Aug. 25. 
Major-General F. J. Porter : 

Until Sumner's trooiDS arrive it would be well to hold the fords with an ample force. 
You are now in connection with Pope, and, no doubt, can get what cavalry you want. 
When you can dispense with the three companies of Indiana cavalry, x)lease send 
them back. We will send up the forty wagons with provisions for Morel 1 and Griffin; 
have sent down to Acquia for wagon load of hospital stores ; will send them with 
supx)ly train if they arrive. The wagons and ambulances will be sent out as they 
arrive with the direction you request. All quiet here. Your desi^atches all received, 
and your disposition of troops is all right. You state that Reno is expected to pass 
to your left. To what point is he to go ? 

A. E. BURNSIDE, 

Major- G eneral . 
[No. 12.] 

Advance, Barnett's Ford, 

8 A.M., Aug. 26, 1862. 
All quiet at and on the Rappahannock during tbe night. At Kelly's Ford the im- 
pression exists that two brigades of infantry, with one regiment of cavalry, are oppo- 
site Rappahannock Station. A squadron was seen, last evening opposite Kelly's. A 
company from Bealeton to-day says Kearney is there with his whole division. I expect 
Sykes to halt about four miles short of Bealeton, at water, and until I can find a 
proper camp. Water is to be had only by going within range from opposite shore. 
I shall go through Rappahannock Station and Bealeton to Sykes, where my camp will 
be. Please have the telegraph run up that way by troops. Barnett's and Kelly's 
Fords will communicate with you by telegraph to-night. Many men are sick, and, 
for want of medicines and ambulances, will suffer. I have directed trains to be sent 
for grain. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- Geueral. 
[No. 13.] 
To General Burnside : 

Have been to Rappahannock Station. I find it in possession of General Kearney, 
whom I will relieve to-morrow. No enemy in front ; river fordable anywhere ; Sykes 
is here ; Morell, with two divisions, is at Kelly's, and Griffin at Bealeton ; Reno is ex- 
pected to pass to mv left. 

F. J. PORTER. 
From Bealeton Station, received August 23, '62. 

[No. 14.] 

From Bealeton, via Washington, 

Received Aiigust 26th, 1862. 
To General Burnside : 

Sykes is within three miles of this, in camp, and I will be up to-morrow to relieve 
Kearney. Reading your dispatch of last night, I expected to find Banks and Reno 



9 

here. I consider the fords below perfectly safe, with much less force; but for future 
movements I think they should remain. Sykes will get provision and grain here^ 
His w'agons can come up Avith ammunition and medical supplies. 

F. J. POETER, 

Major- General. 
[Xo. 15.] 

From Advance, six miles from Bealetox, 

Received August 26, 1862. 
To General Parke: 

I dispatched you from Bealetou, under the impression that Sykes was three miles, 
off. I went to Burnett's. All is well at the tirst two. Griffin is at tirst. Morell, with 
two divisions, at the second. I have decided to post Sykes at Bealeton, and ])icket, 
with strength from infantry and artillery, Rappahannock Station, and patrol with 
cavalry. The Rappahannock is fordable everywhere, and if the enemy desired to cross 
he could do so with a larger force than I have. Camp, for want of water, cannot be 
foiiiid nearer, except within gunshot. I have sent back cavalry as fast as I could, 
and ordered them from the divisions, and directed Morell to use those at the fords. 
This I had done before receiving your telegram. The one hundred and fifty cavalry 
will be a good thing. Send grain. Pro^i-sions can be brought to Bealeton from War- 
renton. Please send uj) the wagons and ambulances and have the drivers directed to 
pick up sick in a house about nine miles from Bealeton, on right-hand side, and bring 
them here. The supply train must go to Barnett's and Kelly's Fords ; ambulances, 
also, which belong to Morell's. Please have sent up to-morrow an operator and in- 
strument, for Bealeton, to work the other lines ; also the corjDs' mail. 

F. J. PORTER. 

Though, as stated, I liad been ill at Falmouth, I had hastened on the 
25th to join General Pope, some of whose troops 1 found on the 26th at 
Eappahannock Station. 

There I was informed hy General Kearney that on the 23d at Catlett's 
Station, on the railroad in General Pope's rear, the enemy's cavalry had 
captured General Pope's personal baggage and official papers contain- 
ing full information of his movements, strength, and anticipated rein- 
forcements J and that engaging General Pope's attention by displays at 
the crossings of the Eappahannock, the enemy had sent large forces up 
the river to General Pope's extreme right. My instructions confined me 
to the river below, but no force of the enemy being there, I deemed it 
my duty voluntarily to report to General Pope, then at Warrenton 
Junction, as to where my command would be most useful. This I did at 
11 a. m., by letter, by the hands of General Kearney. 

That night, 26th, Sykes was five miles east of Bealeton ; Morell was 
at Kelly's Ford and below. Both officers and men were greatly wearied 
by broken rest at night and constant travel or labor since the 14th. 

Eeynolds having joined McDowell, August 24, the corps entered upon 
his campaign, as heretofore stated, less than 9,000 strong. 

At 11 J), m., 26th, I received the following order from General Pope, 
given in reply to my report for duty. This I dispatched at once to Gen- 
eral Burnside. General Pope gave the supposed position of the enemy 
and of his own troops (McDowell, Sigel, Banks, Eeynolds, Eeno, Cox, 
and Sturgis), and announced his strengtli at 57,000, exclusive of Heint- 
zelman — then with him at AYarrenton Junction with 9,000 men — and of 
Cox, who did not join. 

TNo. 16.1 

Fro.ai Advance, 11.45 p. m., Aug. 26. 

Received August 27, 1862, 7 o'clock a. m. 
Ma.jor-Gexeral Burnside : 

Have just received orders from General Pope to move Sykes to within two miles of 
Warrenton, and to call uj) Morell to same point, leaving the fords guarded by the cav- 
ahy. He says the troops in rear should be brought up as rapidly as possible, leaving 
only a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station, and that he cannot see how a gen- 



10 

eral engagement can be put off more than a day or two. I sliall move np as ordered, 
but the want of grain and the necessity of receiving a su])ply of subsistence will 
cause some delay. Please hasten back the wagons sent down, and inform McClel- 
lan, that I may know I am doing right. Banks is at Fayettville ; McDowell, Sigel, 
and Ricketts at and immediately in front of Warrenton; Keno on his right ; Cox joins 
to-morrow, Sturgis next day, and Franklin is exxoeeted. So says General Pope. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Maior-General. 

HEADQUAPtTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, 

Warrenton Junction, August 26, 1852, 7 o'clock a. m. 

General. — Please move forward with Sykes' division to-morrow morning through 
Fayetteville, to a point two and a half miles of the town of Warrenton, and take po- 
sition where you can easily move to the front, with your right resting on the railroad. 
Call U13 Moreil tojoin you as speedily as possible, leaving only small cavahy forces to 
watch the fords. If there are any troops below, coming up, they should conie up rap- 
idly, leaving only a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station. You Avill find Gen 
eral Banks at Fayetteville. I append below the position of our forces, as also those of 
the enemy. I do not see how a general engagement can be postponed more than a 
day or two. 

McDowell, with his own corps, Sigel's, and three brigades of Reynolds' men, being 
about thirty-four thousand, are at and immediately in front of Warrenton; Reno 
joins him on his right and rear, with eight thousand men, at an early hour to-morrow; 
Cox, with seven thousand men, will move forward to join him in the afternoon of to- 
morrow ; Banks, with six thousand, is at Fayetteville ; Sturgis, about eight thoasand 
strong, will move forward by day after to-morrow ; Franklin, I hope, with his corps, 
will, by day after to-morrow night, occupy the point where the Manassas Gap Railroad 
intersects the turnpike from Warrenton to Washington City ; Heintzelman's corps 
will be held in reserve here at Warrenton Junction until it is ascertained that, the 
enemy has begun to cross Hedgeman's River. You will understand how necessary it 
is for our forces to be in position as soon as possible. The enemy's lines extend from 
a point a little east of Warrenton Sulphur Springs around to a jDoint a few miles 
north of the turnpike from Sperryville to Warrenton, with his front }3resented to the 
east, and his trains thrown around well behind him in the direction of Little Wash- 
ington and Sperryville.* Make your men cook three days' rations, and keej) at least 
two days' cooked rations constantly on hand. Hurry on Moreil as rapidly as possi- 
ble, as also the troops coming up in his rear. The enemy has a strong column still 
further to his left towards Manassas Gap Railroad, in the direction of Salem. 

JOHN POPE, 
Maior-General Commanding. 

Major-General Fitz John Porter, 

Commanding 5th Army Corps. 

[No. 16 a.] 

H'dq'rs 5th Army Corps, 
6 miles from BeaUton, Aug, 26 — 11 j;. m. 
Major-Gen'l John Pope, 

Com'd'g Army of Virginia, Warrenton Junction : 
General. — Your dispatch of 7 p. m. is at hand, and your instructions will be obeyed 
as rapidly as possible. My forces have been disi^osed of under instructions from the 
General-in-Chief, and owing to the fact that their wagons have been sent to Falmouth 
for pro^dsions (that on hand being expended), they may not move as rapidly as you 
may wish, but they will be there in time for effective service. 

No troops are in my rear, that I know of. Sumner is to land at Aquia, but I know 
nothing of him. I shall leave at the fords the cavalry force which has been guarding 
them. 

I have no cavalry. 

I am, general, very respectfuUv, vour ob'd't servant, 

F. J. PORTER, 
Maj. Genn Com'd'g. 

K 

I will thank you to direct grain for 800 animals for 3 days to be sent to Bealton 
early in the morning. I am out entirely, and there is none to be ha I in this country. 
I have very few wagons. • F. J. P. 

* General Pope was either ignorant of Jackson's movements to h right with some 

25,000 men, or unsuspicious of his purposes, as no steps were takei ) guard against 

his operations. This force comjiletely surprised General Po]3e neai dstoe about the 
hour he was writing the above dispatch. 



11 

None to carry subsistence or ammunition, and have only 40 rounds of the latter. 
The wagons have not come up, and we have been hastened forward to occupy posi- 
tions, and depend on the small transportation which General Burnside could provide. 
I have no ambulances, and no medical suj)plies. I mention these facts in the hope 
you may provide deficiencies. F. J. P. 

[No. 17.] 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 

August 27, 1862. 
Major-General Morell, 

Commanding Division : 
General. — The commanding general directs that you hurry up with your command, 
paars through Bealeton and Fayetteville, and join the commanding general in the vi- 
cinity of Warrenton. Smead will be directed to join and rex)ort to you with his bat- 
tery. 

When your command passes through Bealeton and Fayetteville, have your ranks 
well closed up, so that a good impression may be made by the apiiearance of our 
troops. Permit no straggling. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

FEED. T. LOCKE, A. A. G. 

P. S. — After getting to Bealeton, send all your men belonging to the cavalry back 
to their commands. If Griffin cannot get all the way up to-day, let him stop at Beale- 
ton. 

Try and keep three days' cooked rations always in possession of your men. 

General, lose no time in getting up. You will find me near Warrenton, and if you 
send forward an officer to me, will have you located. Do all you can to get up pro- 
visions, and i)ut &s much bread in haversacks as possible — three days. We go right 
to the railroad, and, with your cattle, will manage to get all that is wanted. Hurry 
up Griffin ; don't wait for him. Hope you are improving. 

F. J. PORTER. 

The enemy fell upon General Pope's rear that night, 26th, near Bristoe 
Station, and occupied his communications with Washington by numer- 
ous forces under Jackson and Stuart. 

At 9 A. M. on the 27th, on arriving at Bealeton, while en route to 
Warrenton, I was turned, in all haste, to Warrenton Junction, as shown 
by the following dispatch : 

[No. 18.] 

From Advance. 

Received. August 27, 1862. 

Bealeton, 9 a. m., Aug. 27th, 1862. 
To General Burnside : 

I am ordered to move direct to Warrenton Junction, and to push the command at 
Barnett, &c. The enemy have struck with their cavalry the railroad near Manassas ; 
I expect to be out Of reach of you, and you must keep back trains, &.c. If you can 
push up ambulances, I want them much ; your animals will have to rely on grassing ; 
there is no gj'ain. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Warrenton Junction, August 27, 1862, 4 o'clock a. m. 
General. — Your note of 11 a. m. yesterday is received. Major-General Pope directs 
me to say that, under the circumstances stated by you in rehation to your command, 
he desires you to march direct to this place as rapidly as possible. The troops behind 
you at Barnett's Ford will be directed by you to march at once direct to this place or 
Weaverville, without going to Rappahannock Station. Forage is hard to get, and 
you must graze your animals as far as you can do so. The enemy's cavalry have in- 
tercex^ted our raihvay communication near Manassas, and he seems to be advancing 
with a heavy force along the Manassas Gap Railroad. We will probably move to 
attack him to-morrow in the neighborhood of Gainesville, which may bring our line 



12 

further hack towards Washington. Of tills I will endeavor to notify you in time. Yon 
should get here as early In the day to-morrow as possible, in order to render assistance, 
should it he needed. 

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

GEO. D. EUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-Genera] F. J. Porter, 

Commanding Fifth Army Corps. 

This was five hours reaching me, five niiles from General Pope. 

My command arrived at Warrenton Junction at different hours — some 
after dark — all greatly fatigued by the hot and long march, made mainly 
without food or water. Till a late hour they were engaged in seeming 
food, of which they had none, and which was very scarce with General 
Pope's army, as appears hy the following dispatch : 

[No. 19.] 

To General Burnside : 

Morell left his medicine, ammunition, and baggage at Kelly's Ford. Can you have 
it hauled to Fredericksburgh and stored? His wagons were all sent to you for grain 
and ammunition. I have sent back to you every man of the First and Sixth New 
York cavalry, except what has been sent to Gainesville. I will get them to you after 
a while. Everything here is at sixes and sevens, and I find I am to take care of my- 
self in every respect. Our line of communication has taken care of itself, in compliance 
with orders. The army has not three days' provisions. The enemy cai)tured all Pope's- 
and other clothing, and from McDowell the same, including liquors ; no guard accom- 
panying the trains, and small ones guard bridges. The wagons are rolling on, and I 
shall be here to-morrow. Good-night ! 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

Between 10 and 11 A. m. I found General Pope at Warrenton Junction 
much disturbed by the untoward position in which he was then placed. 
He stated that, released by the withdrawal of the army of the Potomac 
from near Richmond, General Lee's whole army had come upon him, and 
it seemed inevitable that he would be compelled to withdraw toward 
Alexandria; indeed, he added, then sitting at the telegrax3h desk, '^He 
was then perfecting arrangements for that purpose with General Mc- 
Dowell at Warrenton." He expressed great dissatisfaction with some 
of his generals, and with the plan of the camj)aign he had been compelled 
against his will to adopt, and the way he was forced to carry it out. He 
said that the unfortunate position of the army was not due to him ; he 
had been pushed, contrary to his advice, beyond the Rappahannock, and 
there held to draw the enemy from Richmond in order ^' To save the 
army of the Potomac." '' If my wishes had prevailed," he added, '' In- 
stead of guarding the line of the Rappahannock, I should have been ere 
this near or behind Bull Run, where I could be reinforced quickly." 

General Pope seemed to accept the situation, and to be disposed to 
meet the emergency of retiring towards Washington, now forced upon 
him by the enemy in rear as well as in front. 

Uneasiness, arising in part fiom late serious disasters and from want 
of confidence in the plan and management of the campaign, existed at 
Warrianton Junction. It was vastly increased throughout the day by 
the rapid passing towards Alexandria of immense wagon trains, wliich 
manifested preparations for, if not the commencement of a hasty and 
compulsory retreat. 

I was ordered to remain at Warrenton Junction that night and until 
relieved by General Banks, when I was to march in the direction of 
Greenwich and Gainesville, and unite with the remainder of the army 
under Gene: a' McDowell. As late as 3 p. m. General Pope professed 



1^ 

ignorance of the number and character of the enemy's forces in his rear, 
and of the damage done to his raih'oads and depots. 

I became informed that the general policy of the campaign was to 
avoid a general action with the main forces of the enemy, till large rein- 
forcements from the Army of the Potomac should join us, but of the 
details of General Pope's plan of cami^aign or of his purposes beyond 
Avhat had been published in his orders, and what I have stated already, I 
was not informed. All that I did learn from General Pope at that time 
was given in the following dispatch from Warrenton Junction to General 
Burn side. 

This dispatch (Xo. 20) enclosing the subjoined order, was also written 
with sufticiently full information of the movements of the enemy to form 
an idea of their destination. 

[No. 20.] 

From Warrentox Juxctiox, 

August 27, 1862—4 P. M. 
General Burxside, Falmouth, Virginia : 

I send you the last order from General Pope, which indicates the future as well as 
the present. V^^agons are rolling along rapidly to the rear as if a mighty power was 
proiielling them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. McDowell is 
moving to Gainesville, where Sigel now is. The latter got to Buckland Bridge in 
time to put out the fire and kick the enemy, who is pursuing his route unmolested to 
the Shenandoah or Loudoun County. The forces are Longstreet's, A. P. Hill's, Jack- 
son's, Whiting's, Ewell's, and Anderson's (late Huger's) divisions. 

Longstreet is said by a deserter to be very strong. They have much artillery and 
long wagon trains. The raid on the railroad was near to Cedar Run, and made by 
a regiment of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a section of artillery. The i)lace 
was guarded by nearly three regiments of infantry and some cavalrj'. They routed 
the guard, captured a tram and many men, destroyed the bridge, and retired leisurely 
down the roads towards Manassas. It can easily be repaired. No troops are com- 
ing up except new troops that I can hear of. Sturgis is here with two regiments ;* 
four were cut off by the raid. The positions of the troops are given in this order. No 
enemy in our original front. A letter of General Lee, seized when Stuart's aid-de- 
camp was seized, directs Stuart to leave a squadron only to watch in front of Hanover 
Junction, &c. Everything has moved up north, I found a vast difference between 
these troops and ours, but I suppose they were new, as to-day they burned their 
clothes, &c., when there was not the least cause. I hear that they are much demoral- 
ized, and needed some good troops to give them heart, and, I think, head. We are 
working now to get behind Bull Run,t and I presume will be there in a few days if 
strategy don't use us up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the inverse pro- 
portion. I would like some of my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to 
return to Fredericksburgh to push towards Hanover, or, with a larger force, to push 
towards Orange Court-House. I wish Sumner \\ as at Washington, and up near the 
Monocacy, with good batteries. I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of sup- 
plies i^rovided for them, and I believe they have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. 
I wish myself aAvay from it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our com- 
panions. I was informed to-day by the best authority that, in opposition to General 
Pope's views, this army was pushed out to save the Army of the Potomac, an army 
that could take care of itself. Pope says he long since wanted to go behind the Occo- 
quan. I am in great need of ambulances, and the officers need medicines, which, for 
want of transportation, were left behind. I hear many of the sick of my corps are in 
houses on the road — very sick, I think. There is no fear of an enemy crossing the 
Rap])aliannock. The cavalry are all in the advance of the rebel army. At Kelly's 
and Barnett's fords much property was left, in consequence of the Avagons going down 
for grain, &c. If you can push uj) the grain to-night, please do so, direct to this 
place. There is no grain here or anywhere, and this army is wretchedly supplied in 
that line. Pope says he never could get enough. Most of this is private, but if you 
€an get me away, please do so. Make what use of this you choose, so it does oood. 

Don't let the alarm here; disturb you. If you had a good force you could go to Rich- 
mond. A force should at once be xmshed on to Manassas to open the road. Our pro- 
visions are verv short. 

F. J. PORTER. 

* Piatt's. t General Pope. 



14 

After telegraphing, this dispatch will be sent to General Bumside. 

Headquarters Army op Virginia, 

Warrenton Junction, August 27, 1862. 

General Orders, JVb. — . — The following movements of troops will be made, viz; 

Major-General McDowell with his own and Sigel's corps, and the division of Briga- 
dier-General Reynolds, will pursue the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville, if 
possible, to-night. 

The army corps of General Heintzelman, with the detachment of the ninth corps 
under Major-General Reno leading, will take the road from Catlett's Station to Green- 
wich, so as to reach there to-night or early in the morning. Major-General Reno will 
immediately communicate with Major-General McDowell, and liis command, as well 
as that of Major-General Heintzelman, will support Major-General McDowell in any 
operation against the enemy. 

Major-General Fitz John Porter will remain at Warrenton Junction till he is relieved 
by Major-General Banks, when he will immediately push forward with his corps in 
the direction of Greenwich and Gainesville, to assist the operations on the right wing. 

Major-General Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the 
charge of the trains, and cover their movement towards Manassas Junction. The 
train of his own corps, under escort of two regiments of infantry and a battery of 
artillery, will pursue the road south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of 
Manassas Junction. As soon as the trains have passed Warrenton Junction he will 
take j)ost behind Cedar Run, covering the fords and bridges of that stream, and holding 
the position as long as possible. He will cause all the railroad trains to be loaded 
with the public and private stores nowhere, and run them back towards Manassas 
Junction as far as the railroad is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burned so as to 
impede the further passage of the railroad trains he will assemble them all as near 
together as possible and protect them with his command until the bridges are rebuilt. 
If the enemy is too strong before him, before the bridges can be repaired, he will be 
careful to destroy entirely the train, locomotives, and stores, before he falls back in the 
direction of Manassas Junction. He is, however, to understand that he is to defend his 
position as long as possible, keeping himself in constant communication with Major- 
General Porter on his right. If any sick, now in hospital at Warrenton Junction, are 
not provided for and able to be transported, he will have them loaded into the wagon 
train of his own corxDs (even if this should necessitate the destruction of much baggage 
and regimental property) and carried to Manassas Junction. The very important 
duty devolved upon Major-General Banks, the Major-General commanding the Army 
of Virginia feels assured he will discharge with intelligence, courage, and fidelity. 

The General Headquarters will be with the corps of General Heintzelman until 
further notice. 

By command of Major-General Pope. 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

Col. and Chief of Staff. 

At 3 P. M., preceded some lioiirs by Hooker's Division of Heintzel- 
man's Corps, General Pope left Warrenton Junction in the direction of 
Manassas Junction, having first assigned to me two pieces of artillery 
and about 1,100* infantry, remnants of Piatt's Brigade of Sturgis' 
Di\ision. 

In the proceedings before the court-martial, the last- mentioned and 
other dispatches, which will hereafter be set out, sent by myself to 
General Burnside, were the subjects of severe animadversion, and were 
urged as the grounds upon which my conduct was to be regarded as 
sustaining the charges and specifications against me. It may be a 
question, perhaps, whether in my then relations to General Pope, I 
should, as a matter of taste, have spoken of the operations of the Army 
of Virginia as I did ; but 1 do not admit for a moment, that in sending 
them I was guilty of the charges made against me, or that they can be 
adduced as in the slightest degree proof that I was not ready to per- 
form my duty faithfully as a soldier, and that I was not, in every sense, 
true to the interests of my country. To understand why these dispatches 
were sent, my position must be thoroughly understood. 

Up to the time I joined General Pope, General Burnside had been my 
immediate commander after my arrival at Aquia Creek. 

' *846. 



15 

I had used extraordinary exertions to join General Pope, and to put 
myself under his command at the very earliest moment, because I 
learned of the enemy's intention to make the effort to crush his forces. 
I had still to maintain communication with General Burnside. I could 
do so while passing from the command of General Burnside to that of 
General Pope. 

This was necessary, because I was obliged to rely upon him more or 
less for supplies of provisions and grain, and in addition, was this neces- 
sary for the security and usefulness of his own command. I had also 
been requested by General Burnside to advise him as to the state of 
affairs, and, as an incentive to frequent communications, he stated that 
the President was without information, and deprived of all other 
means of hearing from the Army, and was often calling for information 
from me. 

I communicated to General Burnside the orders received by me from 
General Pope, and endeavored to give him as precise an account of the 
condition of affairs, from day to day, as my information enabled me to 
furnish. During all this period I was suffering from the disease that 
was upon me ; the dispatches were written hurriedly, and without time 
or opportunity for the correction, or the careful selection of language. 

My object was to convey to General Burnside the exact truth, and 
deeply impressed as I was with the fatal results likely to ensue from the 
mistakes which I thought were being made, I intended to convey those 
impressions to General Burnside, in order that the evils apprehended by 
me might be guarded against if possible. 

In this connection, it is proper that I should also refer to the allusions 
to General McClellan made in my dispatches. 

It must be remembered that General McGleUan had been my com- 
mander ; that when I passed from his immediate command to that of 
General Burnside, he was still my commander, as General Burnside was 
subordinate to him. I had joined General Pope on the 27th, and the 
last of these dispatches was written at 6 p. m. on the 29th, when in i)oint 
of fact my communications with General Burnside were still being main- 
tained, and on him I was dependent for my supplies. 

It apx)ears to me that it can hardly be charged as a crime that I should 
speak with respect and i>layful kindness of an old boyhood friend, under 
whose command I had served such a length of time, and to whom I was 
sincerely attached. 

While these communications were intended for the information of 
General Burnside, they were not of such a character as to preclude those 
expressions which are ordinary in a friendly and familiar correspondence 
between officers of the Army occupying the relations which then existed 
between General Burnside and myself. 

WARRENTON JUNCTION TO BRISTOE. 

To be prepared for an early march to Greenwich under the General 
Order (20) if required, I sent tliat afternoon (27th) two aids. Captain 
Montieth and Lieutenant McQuade, to be used as guides, to observe the 
character of the country, and find the road to Greenwich. They reported 
the road at Catlett's Station, where that to Greenwich branches off, and 
beyond toward Bristoe, blocked by over 2,000 wagons, which for hours 
had been rolling in from Warrenton. 

The road was narrow, through timber, was often crossed by the rail- 
road and numerous small streams, and so encumbered as to be almost 
impassable even by daylight. 



16 

The nig-ht came on so dark that it was impossible to move about ex- 
cept by groping. 

About 10 p. M.* I received this order from General Pope on the rail- 
road at Bristoe, 10 miles distant, again turning my line of march toward 
Washington : 

[No. 21.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Bristoe Station, August 27, 1862, 6.30 p. M. . 
General: The major-geueral commanding directs that you start at one o'clock to- 
night, and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so 
as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action 
with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. The enemy 
has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from 
Manassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell 
is. If Morell has not joined you, send word to him to push forward immediately. 
Also send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take your place at War- 
renton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight. 
I send an officer with this dispatch, who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to 
send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direction 
of Bealeton. Say to Banks also, that he had best run back the railroad trains to this 
side of Cedar Eun. If he is not with you, write him to that effect. 
By command of Major-General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-General F. J. Porter, 

Warrenton Junction. 

P. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction leave a regiment of infantry and two 
pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you imme- 
diately. If Banks is not at the junction instruct Colonel Cleary to run the trains 
back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery with it. 
By command of Major-General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

The order directed me to march at one o'clock that night to join Gen- 
eral Pope. It said ''the enemy has been driven hach^ but is retiring 
along the railroad." The object of my presence with him was to ^^ drive 
the enemy from Manassas" five miles beyond him '' and clear the country 
l)etween that x)lace and Gainesville, where McDowell is." 

At the time this order was received, that is, about ten o'clock at night, 
my command were busily engaged in securing rations and preparing 
their supper. Few, if any, had gone to bed -, no night march being an- 
ticipated. They had marched, part of them twelve miles, and most of 
them nineteen miles that day through the great heat and dust, mainly 
without food and water, and were greatly wearied by their incessant 
excertions since August 14th. 

On receipt of the order. Generals Morell, Sykes, and Butterfield, divis- 
ion and brigade commanders, whose judgment and zeal are undoubted, 
represented their men without food, and, after a long and fatiguing 
march extending into night, as in no condition to renew the march with- 
out some interval of rest. It was urged that, owing to the disorder 
which would ensue in the darkness and the delay and additional fatigue 
which would result from the obstructions along the road, any useful body 
of the command would reach Bristoe as early by starting at day-break 
as at one o'clock, and that on arrival all troops would be serviceable for 
the additional duty required "betwecD Manassas and Gainesville," which 
they would not be by marching at one o'clock. The letter of the order 
required the whole corps (artillery and infantry) at Bristoe by daylight. 
Its spirit required it in serviceable condition for a further and continued 

"^ * 9.50 p. M., Pope's report, Sept. 3d, 1862. 



17 

march of at least eigbt miles. The object of the order was stated, as if 
to authorize me to exercise my judgment how best to accomplish it. 
Literal executiou was physically imi)ossible. After careful considera- 
tion of all the circumstances, I felt sure that the spirit of the order 
would be best carried out and the best interests of the service promoted, 
and none endangered, by i)Ostponing the hour of march to three o'clock," 
soon after which daylight would lend aid to a rapid march. I believed 
then I was fully justified in exercising a discretion in a matter within 
"the i^rovince of a general commanding, when his superior, miles away, 
knew nothing of the circumstances in operation. 

I dispatched to General Pope the reasons for this departure from 
the letter of his orders. I had no cavalry (the only useful force to 
apply), and I asked him to aid my march by having cleared of Avagons 
the road near him, the officer who had brought the order stating 
that, on account of these obstructions, he had experienced great diffi- 
culty in getting to me. Events confirmed the wisdom of the delay. 
Officers of General Pope's staff, conducted by an experienced guide, left 
my camp at midnight for Bristoe. Forced from the road by obstructions 
they lost their way in the darkness and did not reach General Pope till 
near seven o'clock in the morning. At one o'clock the darkness was 
impenetrable. At three, when the column was put in motion, the road 
was discoverable only by the use of lights, and close to camp was found 
blocked by two batteries from General Banks. The railroad was occu- 
pied by running trains ; darkness and obstructions soon caused inextri- 
cable confusion and prevented real progress till daylight. Even then 
some time was required to free the commands so as to allow them to move. 
Seeing the command in motion and making every effort to clear the road 
of wagons, I hastened to join General Pope to whom I reported in per- 
son before eight o'clock, and from whom I learned the necessity for an 
earlier appearance of my corps had not existed. The iieadof my column 
soon arrived and was halted at Broad Run for the closing nj) of the com- 
mand, broken into and separated by unruly Avagon trains. About 10 A. 
M. the command crossed Broad Eun and took its place in line. 

I was charged with disobeying this order. 

General Pope testified on the trial that, as General Hooker had re- 
ported being short of ammunition, he feared Jackson at Manassas might 
learn of his weakness and retiu'n to unite "with Ewell to attack him; 
it was for the purpose of meeting this attack that he was anxious for my 
I)resence at daylight." 

It appears from the evidence that he did not know for an hour after" 
sending the order to me, that Hooker was short of ammnnition, and he 
never informed me. The cars containing ammunition I sent to General 
Pope early in the night. He took none from them and Hooker marched 
next day without replenishing. 

Two hours and a half after he dispatched the order to me, General 
Poi)e ordered Generals McDowell, Kearney, and Reno to march "at 
the earliest blush of dawn " to accomplish between Manassas and Gaines- 
ville exactly the same thing as I was to aid in doing, "to bag the whole 
crowd, Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill." He states to them no fear of 
attaclc, no lack of ammunition. He had the o.ie exultant thought in his 
mind and he needed efficient troops to execute it. Theii* commands had 
no obstructed roads to travel. Yet the last two — near Greenwich, less 
than five miles distant — did not join him earlier than I did, and the first 
not that day. 

Generals Morell, Sykes, Butterfleld, Griffin, Locke, Weld, and others 
testified to the impracticability of tlie march at one o'clock and three 



18 

o'clock when the corps attempted to move; and the difficulties and de- 
lays encountered after daylight, in x)art arising from starting in the dark- 
ness. To their evidence can be added much of an important character ; 
all showing my change in the hour of march was fully justified by the 
circumstances. 

On m}^ arrival at Bristoe, General Pope informed me that EwelFs di- 
vision of Jackson's corps, after a slight affair the previous day with 
Hooker, had retired early in the night of tlie 27th in the direction of 
Manassas, somewhere beyond which was the remainder of the corps and 
Stuart's cavalry ; that he had ordered upon Manassas from Gainesville, 
McDowell with his whole force, and should go himself with Heintzelman 
and Eeno, "to beat up the enemy" so soon as Eenoand Kearney, due 
since sunrise from Greenwich, should join him. With these forces he 
expected to " bag Jackson." He left after 11 A. m., on 28th. 

As guard to the sick and wounded and to trahis gathering there, I, 
not being needed with him, was left at Bristoe. Seeing occasional firing 
in the direction of Groveton and determined not to be left in a false po- 
sition, if I could avoid it, I sent aids-de-camp* twice that day to General 
Pope for orders and information. He expressed himself saiisfied with 
my position there. Each time I was instructed "to stay at I^ristoe;" 
" when wanted you will be sent for," and I was informed that rip to 5 p. 
M., when at Bull Run, he knew nothing of the enemy, thongh he believed 
them at Oentreville, where he had sent Heintzelman and would send 
Reno. Before and during the absence of my messenger-aids, and while 
one of them was in General Pope's presence, at his cauii^ on Bull Run, 
there was in plain sight and hearing of General Pope and of me, much 
artillery firing in the vicinity' of Groveton, between a part of McDowell's 
command and Jackson's corps, which had taken its stand there to await 
the arrival of General' Lee's main army under Longstreet, known to have 
been following Jackson, and to be now advancing rapidly by way of 
Thoroughfare Gap. 

The forces of the enemy which General Pope was searching for in the 
direction of Oentreville were then at Groveton. General Pope had been 
deceived into the belief they had gone to Centreville. 

FROM BRISTOE TO MANASSAS JUNCTION, AND THENCE TOWARDS 

GAINESVILLE. 

After sunrise^ August 29th, I received the following order : 

[No. 24.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Near Bull Run, August ^9, 1862, 3 a. m. 
General : McDowell has Intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately 
on the right of McDowell. Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at 
early dawn. Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the lirst 
dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very 
important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe en- 
gagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary. 
I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of jStaff. 
Major-General Porter. 

This order surprised me. It carried me from the field of action. I^o 
"severe engagement" could take place near Centreville. Jackson's 
army had not gone there. It was between Groveton and Sudley Springs. 
A small detachment only, if any, was on that side of Bull Kun. The 

* Captain Monteith to Manassas Station at 1 p. m., and Lieutenant McQuade to Bull 
Run at 5 p. m. 



19 

aid who brongiit tlie order could not explain it. He knew only that 
''the enemy bad been at Centreville, and pickets were there last nig^ht." 
Still, as late as eight o'clock this morning General Pope seemed to ex- 
pect an engagement in. that vicinity, for when marcliing from Manassas 
toward Centre ville, in fulfilment of this order, I received messages "■ to 
hasten to Centreville," " to post a force at Bull Eun to protect trains," 
&c. It is proper here to state that, if General Pope correctly stated the 
circumstances, the rapidly changing events so altered the conditions 
before the receipt of his order as even to make their execution unnec- 
essary, and often improper, as in this case, or impossible. 

Xear Manassas Junction, at the Weir house, 1 met General McDow- 
ell. He also was surprised at my orders. What I did not then know 
of the position of the contending forces, I learned from him, and the 
condition was as follows : 

That under General Pope's rapidly changing orders of the day before, 
the 28th, to General McDowell on the Warrenton Pike, between Buck- 
land Mills and Gainesville : Ist. '' To march with his whole force upon 
Manassas ; " 2d. " To march upon Centreville ; " 3d. " To march upon 
Gum Spring," General Sigel, taking the road from Gainesville to near 
Manassas Junction, and thence the road to Sudley Springs, found him- 
self, 3 p. M., same day, hear Grove ton confronting Jackson extending- 
from that place to Sudley Springs. Eeynolds joined Sigel about dark. 
King following the Warrenton Pike from Gainesville, had successfully 
engaged near Groveton Jackson's right, and at dark was a formidable 
obstacle to his retreat. Knowing that Longstreet VA^as passing through 
Thoroughfare Gap early on the 28th, General I^IcDowell had sent Eick- 
etts and cavalry, in all about ten thousand men, to hold him in check at 
that point. At night the prospects were promising for crushing Jack- 
son, but Eicketts, after a slight resistance to Longstreet, had retired 
and was then marching on Bristoe, while King, with about nine thousand 
(9,000) men, in violation of repeated orders to hold his position on the 
Warrenton Pike, and in disregard of assurances of ample supjjort in the 
morning, had withdrawn and was at Manassas Junction, each haying 
feared being crushed between Longstreet and Jackson. Thus the Yfar- 
renton Pike had been left unobstructed. Jackson was not intercepted, 
but was awaiting Longstreet who, unopposed in his march through Thor- 
oughfare Ga}), was hastening to his relief. 

This was the substance of the information communicated to me by 
General McDowell, and it will be found set forth in his official report 
and his defense before his court of inquiry as to the then condition of 
affairs. 

General McDowell was nuuih disturbed by this state of things in his 
command. Moreover, he had left Sigel at Groveton that morning, the 
29th, with orders to move ux)on Jackson, and for Eeynolds to support 
him. He said, however, he expected no contest there, and no good re- 
sult should there be one, and had come to Manassas Junction in search 
of General King and in the hope of seeing General Pope there. (Dis- 
patch Xo. 25a.) My troops had marched from Bristoe Staiion be- 
yond Manassas Junction, and the head of the column had passed the 
Weir house in execution of the order I liad received. Hastening in 
advance of my command to join General Pope, I met Captain Piatt, of 
General Pope's staft, with verbal orders " to march to Gainesvile and take 
King with 3^ou." * The critical condition of affairs and the serioas conse- 

* I always so understood the message, but Captain Piatt, wlio delivered it to uie, has 
testified that be was taking the message to MeDoweH to turn the division over to me, 
and that he merely gave me its purport. However, I at ouee acted ou it, and, facing 
the corps about, put it in motion towards Gainesville. 



20 

qiiences likely to arise from any mistake in the understanding of orders, 
led me to ask, when acknowledging the receipt of the above message, 
that the orders to me then and in future should be in writing. In the 
same dispatch I gave General Pope substantially the above information 
as received from General McDowell. Dr. Abbott delivered this note 
about 10:30 A. m. This verbal order required me to reverse my march 
and move back through Manassas Junction and along the Gainesville 
Eoad past Bethlehem Church to Gainesville. On my return to Manas- 
sas Junction, about 9:30, in execution of the verbal order, General Gib- 
bon of King's Division, just from General Pope, gave me the following 
order. General McDowell had seen it, and had immediately asked 
General Pope to return King to him. 

[No. 25.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Centreville, August 29, 1862. 
^'Pusli forward witli your corx^s aud King's Divisiou, which you will take with you 
upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton Turnpike. Be ex- 
peditious, or we will lose much." 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-General Commanding. 

The object of this order was to enable me with a large force to inter- 
vene near Gainesville on the Warrenton Pike, between Jackson and 
Longstreet, and thus regain the advantages lost by the retreat of King 
and Eicketts early that morning. Exi)edition was enjoined as Long- 
street, near by, was hastening to join Jackson. The distance from Ma- 
nassas Junction to Gainesville is eight miles ] from Gainesville to Thor- 
oughfare Gap, where Longstreet debouched on the 28th, is six miles. Long - 
street and Jackson were each estimated about 25,000 strong. My com- 
mand — Morell, Sykes and King — was now abovit 17,000. 

The position of the contending forces as then supposed by us, about 
9:30 A. M., was as follows : 

Longstreet, in part at least, east of Thoroughfare Gap on the 28th, 
was hastening to and along the Warrenton Pike to join Jackson, whose 
right was near Groveton and left was off towards Sudley Springs. 

Heintzleman and Eeno were between Centreville and Groveton, mov- 
ing on Jackson. 

Of McDowell's command, Sigel north and Reynolds south of the War- 
renton Pike, near Groveton, were fronting Jackson. 

King and Porter were at Manassas Junction, the latter moving towards 
Gainesville. 

Eicketts, of McDowell's command, was on the road from Gainesville 
to Manassas Junction by way of Bristoe. 

Buford with his cavalry had been to Thoroughfare Gap with Eicketts, 
and was on the same road near Gainesville watching Longstreet. 

Banks was moving from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe. 

General Pojje was at Centreville and about six miles from Manassas 
Junction. 

General McDowell, personally, was at the Weir house, his command 
being disposed as stated. 

I had not been through this country, and had no knowledge of its 
character, number of roads, &c., in which I was to move, and there was 
no one with me who had the information. 

I sought General McDowell as of all persons most capable of giving 
information. He said he knew no more about it than I did. He loaned 
me his ma}), however, but said that it was very inaccurate. He pro- 



21 

longed tlie interview till after 10 A. m., evidently expecting orders for 
King's Division to be returned to him. I avail'i^d myself of the inter- 
view to obtain a knowledge of the past, of the probable future opera- 
tions, and of the ruling policy. He said he knew the plans of the cam- 
paign and of the changes likely to occur from the concentration of the 
enemy, of Avhose movements he seemed well i^osted. 

During this period the sound of artillery, in the direction of Groveton, 
had been heard by us. It was spoken of between us, and he character- 
ized it as the " usual artillery duel at long range, as of no imi^ortance, 
and leading to no result." He assured me, his absence from his com- 
mand at that liour seeming to sustain his belief as expressed, that ^' there 
would be no fighting at Groveton ; " that " there was no design of battle 
that day," and that the intention was " to form a new line of this army, 
and of the reinforcements (Sumner and Franklin) coming from the Army 
of the Potomac." He was evidently annoyed at King having been as- 
signed to me, and, expressing the belief that I would not reach Gaines- 
ville, asked me, as a favor, ''to place King on my right, in the new line 
about to be formed, so that connecting with Reynolds, at Groveton, he 
could reclaim iiim at the proper time, and have his command together." 

General jMcDowell spoke encouragingly of the future, and from his 
explanation of the operations of the Army of Virginia, and the plan of 
the campaign. I felt then that his was the ruling spirit in these oi)era- 
tions. In this I was confirmed, when an hour or more later, I received 
the joint order hereafter set out (the tenor, indeed fhe language almost, 
of which he had just expressed), placing him in command of our united 
forces. The impressions having thus been made upon my mind, I gave 
to his opinions and suggestions the respect due to sux)reme authority. 

Daring this conversation my troops were proceeding on the Gaines- 
ville road, in execution of the order delivered to me about 9:30 A. M., 
through General Gibbon.* 

*AVlien General McDowell testified before iny court martial (Record, pp. 90.91,92) 
he was questioned as to his recollection of what passed between us during our inter- 
views at the Weir House, near Manassas Station, Aug. 29, 1862= I exi^ected him to 
state substantially what I have above related, that he told me of the movements of 
King and Eicketts and the reasons therefor. I felt that on his testimony my honor if 
not my life depended. His memory was so defective on some points and so much at 
variance with mine on other points that I was greatly disappointed with his testi- 
mony. Having then no knowledge of witnesses to what was said during onr inter- 
views (and I deemed the matter vital to me) I felt as helpless as I conceive a drowning 
man would feel without even a straw to clutch at. 

General McDowell at that time denied that when at Manassas that '^le had got up 
with either King's or Ricketts's division and of having said to me, or having known, 
anything about the motives for these divisions falling back to Manassas, otlier, than 
perhaps as a question of supplies. He said "he found those divisions after our inter- 
view." I will here state that at the time of our first interview King's division had 
been at Manassas Junction over two hours, and that General McDowell passed it early 
in the morning, between the Sudley Spring road and Manassas Junction on his way 
from the Warrenton Pike to Manassas. General King was present at the Weir House, 
and also quite a number of his officers and some of the wounded of the i^revious night's 
engagement. 

Gene a' M;Do vill, th^i aNo t3s'"i'i3d that as Kind's division of his corps hal been 
assigned to me, I suggested that he commanded our united forces, and that before the 
joint order reached us, he and I started from Manassas, with the understanding iliat, 
under the article of war applicable in such. cases, he had the command of the whole 
force — his division and my corps; and that Avhen the joint order was received by each 
of us, "We"' (he thereby claiming that he was with me at the time or had directed 
my movements, which was not the case) ''had ourselves done the very things the 
joint order had directed." 

Now, this whole statement I claim is utterly absurd; but to j)ermit a fair judgment 
of whose memory is at fault — General McDowell's or mine — I noAv give his despatch 
and its postscript discovered since the adjournment of the board in January. 

On February 14th, one month after the close of the hearing before the IJoard, the 



22 

General Morell, being at the head of his division there, the advance of 
the column, on the direct road to Gainesville, met the enemy about 11:30 
A. M., and was prompt to take an advantageous position on the south- 
erly side of the Manassas Gap Eailroad, and abont a mile and three- 
quarters westerly from Bethlehem Ohnrch. This position was along the 
course of a small stream, on the east side of an open valley, and com- 
manded within ordinary range of field artillery, the opposite slope. 
This valley, except to our left, was surrounded by thick brush-wood and 
lieavy timber, affording ample facilities for opposing forces to conceal 
from each other their exact position and movements. 

Our skirmishers were in the timber, on the opposite slope, west of the 
stream, and were engaged with the enemy's skirmishers at that point. 

At this time I had not accur ate information, or even as mnch informa- 
tion as I subsequently received, bnt having been informed by General 
McDowell that Longstreet was passing through Thoroughfare Gap, nine 
miles distant, early on the 28th, and therefore could have reached my 
front, at the time and place now under consideration ; having seen dust 
rising from the direction toward Gainesville, having also received in- 
formation, through prisoners that were captured, my belief was that 
Longs treet's force was the one which was immediately in my front. 

Knowing, as I did, that his force could not amount to less than 25,000 
men, as my own force amounted to about 17,000, and as the enemy's 
forces were strongly posted, I felt it necessary to act with i^rudence and 
caution in my movements. 

I set about placing my troops in a position to make a forward move- 
ment, which, at the time, I believed necessarily involved an attack upon 
the enemy in front of me. 

My troops were actually being deployed for this luirpose, and a brigade 
was moving to take possession of the rising ground in front beyond the 
stream, when General McDowell came up about noon, and showed me 
the joint order — a copv of which I had just before received at the hands 
of Dr. Abbott. 

following fragment of a despatcli (No. 25a) with its i^o.stscript, was given to me. I 
knew nothing of its existence prior to that day. 

The despatch was written by Gen. McDowell near Manassas Junction, ahont 10 
A. M. Angnst 29th, to be delivered to Gen. Pope at his headquarters at Centre ville. 
But Gen. Pope left Centreville to join the army before the arrival of the messenger, 
and did not see the despatch till after 2 p. m., when it was shown to him near the battle- 
field at Groveton. This despatch is not therefore the one froin Gen. McDowell, which 
Gen. Poj)e testified was mainly the cause of his writing the ''joint order." (No. 26.) 

[No. 25a.] 

« ^ * * till late. This morning, I was told by Eeynolds that King's div. was 
ordered to Manassas, and Ricketts' to Greenwich, andSigelto Gaiuesville. Supposing 
thes" orders were from you, I left Reynolds ou the left of Sigel, and came here to see 
you ;i.id i^et my two divisions. I find here that King caine here ou his own order, 
finding Limself overmatched aud Ricketts the sauie. King's div. is getting supplies of 
food and ammunition, aud will be ready to move soon. I have not heard from Rick- 
etts tliis iiorning, but understand he is coming here. It was Gibbon's brigade that 
Tvas (Mi'^M.ged yesterday. 

" Vrr : respectfullv, 

'^RViN Mcdowell, 

'• 1 i^ave ;]ni,t seen your last order telling Porter to take King. Of course this is but 
tem])orar,,-, a;i 1 I have asked Porter to place King ou his right, that I may have him 
when ^'o.! sav so." 

"L Mcdowell." 

It is I roper for me to state that I have no knowledge of the first part of the dis- 
patch, and aui informed that it was accidentally destro^^ed. 



23 

This order diroateil General McDowell and myself to "move forward 
with your four] joint commands towards Gainesville," and as General 
McDowell was my ranking officer, under the Sixty-second Article of 
War, he was entitled to the command. I recognized him as having that 
position, and he assumed the command. 

This order was in response to General McDowell's application for the 
return of King, and to my request for written orders, to which I have 
previously referred. 

[No. 26. J 

Headquarteks Army of Virginia, 

Centreville, August 29, 1862. 
Generals McDowell and Porter: 

Yon will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I 
sent General Porter written orders to tliat effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzleman, 
Sigel and Reno are moving on the Warrenton Turnpike, and must now be not far from 
Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force 
and your own, the whole command shall lialt. It may be necessary to fall back behind 
Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so, on account of our sui^plies. 
I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way 
with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his Aid-de-Camp 
last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton Pike, until the troops from 
here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' posi- 
tion, as I have not been able to find out where McDowell was until a late hour this 
morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General 
Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practi- 
cable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order 
it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be held in view, that the troops 
must occui)y a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. 
The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a 
pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters 
will be for the present with Heintzleman's Corps, or at this x)lace.* 

JOHN POPE, 
Major- General Commanding. 

General McDowell and I were then in front of the line of battle which 
my command had largely formed. He could see from the position of my 
forces that they were deploying in line of battle. Assuming the com- 
mand, as he did, he at once said to me: ^'This is no place to fight a 
battle ; we are too far out." He also showed me the following dispatch 
from General Buford : 

[No. 26b.] 

Headquarters Cavalry Brigade, 9:.30 a. m. 
"Seventeen regiments, one battery and five hundred cavalry passed through Gaines- 
ville three-quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville road. I think this division 
should join our forces now engaged at once. Please forward this." 

JOHN BUFORD, 

Brigadier-General. 
General Ricketts. 



* Tlie following order was placed in my hands March 14th, the day after the board 
closed its public sessions. The fact that the order had been written Avas unknown to 
me prior to that day. 

This order was written by Gen. Pope at Centreville, and about 12 m. w\is delivered 
to the officers addressed five miles distant, near the battlefield of GrovetoD. 

[No; 26a.] 

Head Qrs. Army of Va,, 

August 29th, 1862. 
To Gens. Heintzleman, Reno and Sigel: 

If you find yourselves heavily pressed by superior numbers of the enemy you will 
not ])ush in afters further. 

Fitz .John Porter and King's division of McDowell's corps are moving on Gainesville 
from Manassas Junction, and will come in on your left. They have about twenty 
thousand men. The command must return to this place to-night or by morning on 

JNO. POPE, 

Maj.-Gen. Corned' g. 



M 

This was shown me by him as confirmation of what he had said to me 
at our previous interview about the appearance of Longstreet's forces, 
and as proof that it was Longstreet's troops which were then in our 
front. We conversed on the subject of its being Longstreet's troops. 
At th at time I had been i^ositively convinced by the facts to which I 
have referred, that Longstreet had arrived with a heavy force. 

We discussed the objects of the order and how best to accomplish it. 
It was not, according to the decision of General McDowell, a question 
of further advance, but of extending the line I had then in part formed, 
and thus making connection with Eeynolds or the troops northward 
towards Groveton. General McDowell had asked me earlier in the day 
to place King's division on my right, so that, uniting with Reynolds, he 
should have his command together. With this object I rode with him, 
at his request, to our right beyond the railroad, as far as a small stream, 
but the wooded and broken character of the country made it evident to 
both of us that King could not be moved to my immediate right with- 
out great labor, delay and danger; and it was suggested, perhaps by 
myself, that the only way he could have King on the left of Reynolds or 
of the troops near Groveton, was by takiDg King, then in my rear, on 
the road near Bethlehem Church, uji the Sudlej' Springs road, to come 
in between Reynolds and me. 

With the understanding — equivalent to an order so long as he was 
present — that I should hold to my present position on the Manassas- 
Gainesville road and stand on the defensive. General McDowell decided 
to take his divisions, then on the road immediately in my rear, and to 
turn back and go by the Sudley Springs road to Groveton to i)lace them 
on the left of the troops at that i^lace. He thus undertook to relieve 
me of the unfulfilled and impracticable obligation of establishing com- 
munication with Sigel. He accomplished his great desire to reclaim 
King, and went to a point from \N'hich he could " easily reach Bull Run 
by night or next morning ; " he also left the road free to me to withdraw 
when ordered. These were the "considerable advantages" which in- 
duced him '^ not to carry out the order strictly." 

The three objects to be accomplished under the joint order were: 1. 
To move towards Gainesville. 2. To establish communication with 
Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno. 3. When this communication was es- 
tablished, to halt. 

But the troox3s s hoiild occupy a i^ositiou from which they could reach 
Bull Run by ni ght or the next morning. There was nothing in this 
order that contemplated a battle. 

On the contrary, the command, being to halt when co mmunications 
were established, implied the contrary. 

The joint order had been fulfilled as far as it could be com plied with, 
when General McDowell rendered it impossible to move any further 
towards Gainesville with our joint forces, by taking King's division with 
him. 

After he left me, I was not oaly authorized but bound to exercise the 
discretion authorized iu the joint order holding in view " that the troops 
must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or 
by morning." The corps had already marched ten miles, and was then 
about eight miles from Bull Run. 

At the time General McDowell separated from me, my position was 
an embarrassing one. He took King's division, 8,000 men from me, 
leaving my force x)roportionally reduced. 

I was satisfied the enemy was before me, in strong force. I had that 



25 

morning received an order from General Pope to push forward witli my 
cori)s and King's division upon Gainesville. 

I had afterwards received, with General McDowell, the joint order to 
move forward towards Gainesville, informing me that Heintzelman, Sigel^ 
and Reno were moving on the Warrenton Pike, and must be not far 
from Gainesville. 

I kncAv that in this General Pope was mistaken ; that they could not 
be farther advanced towards Gainesville than I was, and that Heintzel- 
man and Reno had not joined Sigel; that General Pope did not realize 
the fact that Longstreet had already reached my front ; that instead of 
the " main forces of the enemy " moving at a pace that would bring tliem 
to Centreville by to-morrow night or next morning, they were already 
practically in oiu* front ; that if my troops should attempt to move far- 
ther, it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for them to be 
in a position to reach Bull Run by night or next morning. In other 
words, that General Pope was under the imi^ression that it would be 
twenty-four hours before the whole force of the enemy would be in posi- 
tion to make an attack upon us. Whereas, in fact, they were then in 
actual position, preparing for the conflict, and seemed to be, as far as I 
could judge, inciting an attack upon our i^art. 

In addition to this. General McDowell had informed me that the plan 
of the cami)aign was preparation to form behind Bull Run a line of this 
army and of the reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac, and not 
to bring on a general engagement until this was done. This plan was 
clearly borne out by the terms of the joint order, which shows that Gen- 
eral Pope intended to get his army in position behind Bull Rnn some 
twelve hours at least before the whole force of the enemj^ should be 
upon him. On the other hand, my orders had been to move towards 
Gainesville. These were given upon the theory that Longstreet had not 
then formed a junction with Jackson. 

, 1 felt bound to adopt and act upon the theory of the orders as far as 
it was possible for me to do so, and to make the effort to prevent the 
junction of Longstreet with Jackson, if it had not already actually 
taken place. 

While returning to my command, I saw the enemy's infantry coming 
to the railroad, and artillery moving to a slight elevation north of it. 

Impressed as I was with the strength of the force in my front, I yet 
determined to make the effort to move towards Gainesville if it was at 
all feasible to do so. 

Believing that then, if ever, before the enemy formed in too great 
strength so close to us, was the time to strike with our united forces, I 
determined. General McDowell Laving left me, to take the responsibil- 
ity, and directing Morell to continue the deployment for an advance, 
sent my chief of staff. Colonel Locke, to instruct King not to go away. 
Sykes was coming up as rapidly as Morell's deployment permitted. 

Colonel Locke soon returned and gave me the following message from 
General McDowell, whom he had found with King's division. '' Give my 
compliments to General Porter, and say I am going to the right and 
shall take King with me. He had better remain where he is, but if nec- 
essary to fall back, lie can do so on my left." (Record, ]). 135.) 

This message decided my course. Xot that I regarded it as an order 
obligatory upon me — for I was now independent of General McDowell — 
but, in face of what we had the best reason to believe was a largely 
superior force to mine, and General McDowell's moving away with 
Icing's force beyond all possible assistance to me, left me no alternative 
but to conform to the course he had adopted, because I was too weak 



26 

to make an effective attack. His going away and his consequent in- 
ability, for hours, to be of service at either point, coincided with the 
general policy of no battle that day nor till the Army of the Potomac 
should join in force. It did not deviate from the one of forming a line 
of observation, and of the necessity of "retiring behind Bull Eun to- 
night or by morning," foreshadowed in General Pope's order, ^o useful 
body of my corps could, in face of an enemy, cross the country to Grove- 
ton, and there was no known or apparent necessity of risking the at- 
temi^t. A further advance towards Gainesville would the more widely 
separate me from the right wing, and either course would bring on a 
most unequal contest with the strong and well posted body of the enemy 
betAveen Jackson and myself. My observation and experience during 
our war had proven that the attacking forces had always sustained 
signal repulses when the attacked were well posted and in sufficient 
numbers to be self-protective. With this view I felt persuaded of my 
ability to resist any assault which the enemy might make upon me. 
But, on the other hand, I was satisfied that an attack by myself w^ould 
inevitably be disastrous. 

My conclusions under all the circumstances w^ere, that in the exercise 
of the discretion vested in me by the joint order, and also, by reason of 
my command being a separate one, from the further fact that the con- 
dition of affairs was so different from anything supi)Osed by General 
Pox)e in his orders to me, I should best fulfil my duty by holding the 
enemy in my front in check. 

My most effective service, therefore, was to act on the defensive. My 
action thereafter and my orders aimed by in v^* ting attack or by threat- 
ening it, to keep in my front the forces which otherwise would have 
been available to go against General Pope's scattered army. 

General Morell was again deploying and the other troops were coming 
up, when I received General McDowell's last message. Morell was then 
recalled, and advantageously posted, concealed largely by the brush and 
timber with wdiich our ground abounded. Sykes was thrown back on 
the road and held immediately in the rear of Morell. 

While Morell was taking position artillery opened upon him. This fire 
was soon silenced by one of his batteries, though it was subsequently 
opened farther to our right and was again silenced. From that time the 
enemy rapidly increased in force and formed to resist attack, occasion- 
ally threatened by my command. 

Having recalled Morell to the ridge which he occupied when General 
McDowell left me, and having seen his command posted partly con- 
cealed, so as to invite attack, and liaving directed him to occasionally 
thrf aten an attack, and having Sykes immediately in rear supporting 
him, I took my position at the rear of Sykes' troops, at Bethlehem 
Church near the junction of the Gainesville and Sudley Springs road — 
this ])oint being the most suitable from which to control my command 
and to quickly communicate with General McDowell, he having taken 
the Sudley Springs road to Bull Run and Groveton. 

There was nothing in the attitude of the oi:)posing force to indnce 
attack, but mnch to forbid it after King's di\dsion left me. The enemy 
was in great strength, both in numbers and position, and reported to be 
oc(^asionally tlireatening an attack. I entertained, however, no fear of 
the result had he made one, and aimed, as my orders will show, to keep 
the enemy from going against General Pope. This course was success- 
ful. 

Morell was aware that the general policy and the tenor of General 



27 

Pope's order were not to battle ; but to ^-occupy a position from wliicli 
we could reach Bull Eun that night or next morning." 

Verbal and written communications from Morell were frequent, keep- 
ing me informed of all matters in his front. This information showed 
the enemy was threatening, and at one time being reinforced from the 
troops (Kecord, p. 146) opposing General Pope. All this information 
was at once forwarded to General McDowell, he having furnished 
mounted men for the purpose. He was thus kept informed of matters 
with me. 

The following despatches passed between General Morell and me ; 
they show the tone of all communications during the day.* 

Early in the afternoon, an effort to give aid to or join General Sigel 
was directed in the following despatch, but the difticulty of penetrating 
the intervening country between us even with infantry, and the impossi- 
bility of carrying artillery, and the necessity of holding the enemy in 
our immediate front, caused it to be abandoned : 

[No. 2S.] 
General Morell: 

Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in Ms rear. If you reach a road up which 
King is moving, and he has got ahead of yon, let him pass, but see if you cannot give 
help to Sigel. If you find him re tiling move back towards Manassas, and should neces- 
sity require it, and you do not hear from mc, push to Centreville. If you find the 
direct road filled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to the right as vou return. 

F. .T. PORTEE, 

Major-General. 
Look to the points of the compass for Manassas. 

F. J. PORTER. 

At another time an erroneous report from my front stated that our 
troops near Groveton were retiring, and under this supposition, it being 
folly to attack, and being unable to join General Pope, exce^Dt by call- 
ing my troops down the road towards Manassas, I sent the following note 
stating efforts to communicate with troojjs at Groveton had failed and 
indicating au intention to act, in case I found the reports true/ 

[Xo. 29.] 
Generals McDowell and King: 

I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The 
enemy are in great force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces 
back, the five of the enemy having advanced, and ours retired, I have determined to 
withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicale with McDowell and Sigel, 
but my messages have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery, and cav- 
alry, and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. 
I am now going to the head of the column to see what is x^assing, and how afiairs are 
going, and I will communicate with vou. Had vou not better send vour train back ? 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-(j€nerah 

On '' going to the liead of the column " I found I had been misinformed. 
The opening of an artillery lire beyond Groveton towards Sudley Springs 
on (Tcueral Pope's extreme right, and the cessation temporarily of that 
near Groveton, had created the erroneous impression that " the firing of 
the enemy had advanc^ed and ours retired." ]S'o action was taken to 
carry out the determination expressed, and there was no withdrawing 
to Manassas, or falling back of any kind. 

Tlie above despatch, inquiring for aswell as giving information, shows 
intention to seek it in the right place. It was but a timely warning of 

" F(>r the proper arrangement of these despatches, in connection with the newly- 
<lisco\ ered despatches, see them under the head of Telegrams and orders. 



28 

what was likely to occur under specified circumstances, and gave to 
General McDowell the opportunity to correct or affirm the reported con- 
dition of affairs in the direction he was marching, and in response to it 
I received the message that " all was doing well on the right," and '' the 
enemy is retiring up the pike."* (Eecord, j). 150.) 

[No. 30.] 
General : 

Colonel Marshall reports that two hatteries have come doTrn in the woods on our 
right, towards the railroad, and two regiments of infantry on the road. If this he so, 
it will be hot here in the morning. 

GEO. W. MORELL, 

Major-General. 

This was returned to Morell, endorsed as follows : 

Move the infantry, and everything hehind the crest and conceal the guns. We must 
hold that jdace and make it too hot for them. Come the same game over them they 
do over us, and get vour men out of sight. 

F. J. POETEE. 
[No. 31.] 
General Porter: 

I can moA^e everything out of sight, except Hazlett's battery. Griffin is support- 
ing it, and is on its right, principally in the pine bushes. The other batteries and 
brigades are retired out of sight. Is this what vou mean bv evervthing? 

GEO. W. MORELL, 

Major-General. 

Endorsed as follows : 
General Morell : 

I think you can move Hazlett's battery, or the most of it, and post him in the bushes 
with the others, so as to deceive. I would get everything, if x)ossible, in ambuscade. 
All goes well with the other troops. 

F. J. P. 

To a verbal report, that the enemy in front of us was beln^ increased 
from their forces in front of General Pope, I wrote : 

[Xo. 32.] 
General Morell: 

Tell me what is passing cj^uickly. If the enemy is coming, hold to him, and I will 
come up. Post vour men to renulse him. 

F. J. POETEE, 

Major-General. 

Followed immediately by: 

[No. 33.] 
General Morell : 

Hold on, if vou can, to vour Toresent place. What is passing? 

F. J. POETEE. 

To which I received the following reply, sent in by Colonel Marshall, 
then on the skirmish line, relating to the force extending to his left: 

[Xo. 34.] 
General Morell : 

The enemy must be in a much larger force than I can see. From the commands of 
the officers, I should judge a brigade. They are endeavoring to come in on our left, 
and have been advancing. Have also heard the noise on left as the movement of 
artillery. Their advance is quite close. 

E. G. MARSHALL, 

Col. 13th y. Y. 

The above was endorsed as follows : 

" This is probably the message Lieut. Weld sent to me from Gen. Hatch and subse- 
q uently delivered in person. I received no other message that day from Gen. McDowell. 



29 

[Xo. 35.] 
General Porter : 

Colonel Marshall reports a movement in front of his left. I think we had better 
retir(\ Xo infantry in sight, and I am continning the movement. Stay where yon are 
to aid me, if necessary. 

MORELL. 

The threatened attack not being carried out, I gave the following 
order : 

[No. 36.] 
General Morell : 

I have all within reach of yon, I wish yon to give the enemy a good shelling with- 
out wasting ammunition, and push at the same time, a party over to see what is going 
on. We cannot retire while McDowell Indds his own. 

F. J. P. 

This movement, however, was abandoned, because our threatening 
attitude proved sufficient to hold the enemy to our front, which was the 
object to be accomplished. 

THE ORDER OF 4.30 P. 31., AUGUST 29TH. 

Up to 4 p. M. my despatches to Greneral McDowell had furnished full 
information of my doings and of the enemy's presence. Eeceiving no 
instructions or intimations to the contrary, I concluded my course was 
satisfactory and its policy should be maintained till night when I sup- 
posed orders would probably direct me " to fall back behind Bull Eun 
at Centreville." My troops were without food at this time, and so con- 
tinued throughout the next day, except a small supi)ly of hard tack 
which they received that night. But, to be sure I was doing right, I 
sent my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Stephen M. Weld, to General PoiDe, 
with a note informing him that Morell Avould soon be eng-aged, and asking 
for information and orders. 

About 6 o'clock favorable reports from, the right Aving, " stating that 
the enemy was retiring up the pike," induced me to direct General 
Morell to attack, which I did by the following order (C. M. Eec, pp. 129 
and 150) : 

[Xo. 37.] 
General Morell : 

I wish yon to push up two regiments, supported by two others, preceded by skir- 
mishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the parly with the 
section of artillery op^iosed to yon. The battle looks well on our right, and the enemy 
are said to be retiring up the j)ike. Give the enemy a good shelling when our troopa 
advance. 

F. J. PORTER, 

2Iajor-Geue7'al. 

Judge Advocate General Holt has mistaken, in his review (Eec. p. 
310), this order, directing a reconnoissance in force for the later and 
verbal order borne by Colonel Locke (Eecord, j). 136), commanding an 
attack by General Morell with his whole division, in pursuance of the 
4.30 order of General Pope. 

General Morell believing this attack by two regiments would bring 
on a disastrous repulse followed by a strong pursuit, commenced putting 
all his command in his front line, and urged me, in consequence of the 
great strength of the enemy, not to make it. During the time occupied 
by this preparation, I became satisfied that Morell was right, and that 
by holding the enemy before us, we were producing all the good effects 
of a battle, and would get none of its evils. 



30 

Hence, as the day was nearly ended — then sunset — I suspended the 
attack by an order, which put the troops in position for any service that 
might be required after the return of Lieutenant Weld: 

[No. 38.] 
General Morell: 

Pat your men in position to remain during the niglit, and have out your pickets. 
Put tliem so that they will be in position to resist anything. I am about a mile from, 
you. McDowell says all goes atcII, and we are getting the best of the tight. I wish 
yon would send me a dozen men from the cavalry. Keep me informed. Troops are 
passing up to Gainesville, pushing the enemy; Ricketts has gone, also King. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

Between sundown and dark Lieutenant Weld returned, but without 
orders, and with but little information. He had delivered my note to 
General Pope in rear of Groveton,* near the crossing of the Warrenton 
Pike, by the Sudley Springs road. After his return I received the fol- 
lowing order, which, if properly dated and promptly dispatched, was 
much delayed in delivery: 

[No. 39.] 

Headquarters ix the Field, 

August 29, 1862—4:30 p. m. 
Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's flank. I desire you to push for- 
ward into action at once on the enemy's right flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keej)- 
ing your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in 
the woods in front of us, but he can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. 
Keep heavy reserves and use your l)atteries, keeping well closed to your right all the 
time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep 
von in close communication with the right wing. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General Porter. 

Up to the hour of the receipt of the above order, my command had 

mained substantially in the positions it held when General McDowell 
leftj that is, Morell in line of battle, with suj^ports from his own com- 
mand, and General Sykes immediately in rear, extending along the road 
to my position near Bethlehem church. Morell had, at times, shown 
part of his forces to indicate an intention to attack, and at other times, 
with the view of inducing an attack, thrown them slightly to the rear, 
under concealment of the brush, which abounded on his ground. 

These movements have been erroneously connected with the dispatch 
sent by me to Generals McDowell and King {'No. 29), and have thus been 
made the ground of charging me with having retreated. No action was 
taken in accordance with that dispatch, as I soon found my information 
was incorrect. 

At no time was there any retreat, or order by me or any of my officers 
for a retreat, or any movement leading to a retreat, to my knowledge. 
The denunciations which my enemies have resorted to, had no better 
foundation than the movements above mentioned, whicli necessarily arose 
from placing my command in proper position for defence and to induce 
attack, and in i^roper suj^port.* 

* If additional evidence is needed that I had no intention to retreat, I call attention 
to the dispatch w hich I number 38 c, and which will be found on page 304 of the Board 
record. The original is with the court martial manuscript. It was inti'oduced for the 
record. Its context points its date, and other kindred dispatches fix the hour it was 
written — after 6 p. m., or after sunset. 



31 

I held, all the afternoou of the 29th aud till 4 A. m. of the 30th, the 
same line in front as I occupied wlien General McDowell left me. 

The enem}' in the mean time had been increasing in strength, occasion- 
ally driving in our skirmishers, as if intending to attack, or desiring to 
l^reveut our learning their movements. Our officers on the skirmish line 
were, however, vigilant, and early ascertained the existence of a large 
force in our front. They were prompt to report its presence to Colonel 
Marshall, commanding the skirmishers, who, for verification, reconnoi- 
tered in person and ascertained the facts, and reported them to General 
Morell. The details of the information concerning this force General 
Morell reported to me at various times throughout the afternoon. 

This order w^as delivered to me, according to my best recollection, after 
6:30 p. 31. The sun set about 0:31, Warrenton time. The order was 
delivered to me by Captain Pope, one of General Pope's aides. I was 
then quite near Bethlehem Church, at the junction of the Sudley Springs 
road with the Manassas-Gainesville roads. 

It may be that when the order was delivered to me I was lying down, 
as described by Orderly Duft'ee. I do not recollect whether this was so 
or not, but I had been ill at Falmouth, was still suffering from the dis- 
ease, and was compelled to lie down the greater part of the time, excei^t 
when I was on horseback, as 1 had been that day, from i^robably 7 A. m. 
to 3 p. M. in the afternoon. 

This order asserted that " your line of march brings you in on the 
enemy's flank," and directed me to attack Jackson's right flank, the flank 
of the forces " massed in front of us," " and to keep close communication 
with General Eeynolds." It showed the entire ignorance, on the part 
of General Pope of Longstreet's sex)arate force then confronting and 
outflanking me, and also of the impracticability of any speedy move- 
ment across the country between me and "tlie right wing," which I was 
"to keep close communication with." Its execution involved an attack 
upon Longstreet — an attack, which, in a smaller degree, I had been at- 
tempting, and which, in so large a degree, I had regarded as leading to 
no good result. 

However, I immediately on receiving the 4:30 order despatched Col- 
onel Locke with orders to Morell to attack with his Avhole division, say- 
ing that I would join him immediately. Having thus dispatched Col- 
onel Locke, I then acknowledged the receipt of the order by General 
Pope's returning aide. This reply was in writing. I said that, though 
I believed the order had arrived too late to be executed, I would do aU 
that was possible to carry it into eflect, and I added that I could i)rom- 
ise no good eflect and believed that disaster would attend any attack 
without the aid of the divisions taken away by General McDowell.* 

General Poi3e, in his testimony on my trial, acknowledges having re- 
ceived from me a message somewhat of this character, but he said the 
message made no impression upon him, and he does not give the precise 
language as it was sent him by me. 

This note or the envelope which contained his order to me, and which 
was returned to him, contained a statement of the hour I received his 
order of 4:30 p. ivi., and from my best recollection I would state that it 

* Soon after Gen. MclJ)()Avel] left ine. taking- King and Rickett's Tvitli him, I began 
tsendiug de,si)atclies to liini according to agreement, to be delivered to Gen. Poj^e if 
iirst reached, aud when 1 received this 4.30 P. m. order I supposed Gen. Pope, though 
misstating the conditions, had the iufornuition 1 had been giving, and had ordered an 
attack despite the circumstances. For this reason I did not hesitate, as I would other- 
wise have done, to give the necessary instrnctions to execute it. I now know he was 
totally ignorant of ihe conditions in my front. Gen. McDowell did not forward or 
deliver any of my despatches. 



32 

was not earlier than 6:30 p. M. I am sure, if tlie note and envelope are 
produced, one of them will sustain me in my assertion. It was my 
misfortune that neither this nor any other one of the important dis- 
patches sent by me to General Pope during this period was produced 
by him, although he was requested during his examination as a witness 
before the court martial to produce them. My alleged disobedience to 
this 4:30 order was the chief ground of attack upon me, and I was found 
guilty of it, and had put ui^on me the severest penalties that could be 
imposed short of death. 

My reply to that order becomes of vital importance in determiniug 
the trae test to be applied to my conduct. It can hardly be supposed 
that a rejjly in writing made to a commander by a subordinate officer 
to an order requiring him to execute so important and dangerous a 
movement, especially in view of the fact that he then contemplated or- 
dering the arrest of that officer, would have been carelessly thro^^Ti 
aside or mislaid. 

I submit that every inference to be drawn from the note must be 
favorable to myself, or rather, that the failure to produce the note and 
envelope is in itself strong evidence that, if produced, they would neg- 
ative the charge that I had wantonly or wilfuUj' disobeyed the order. 

But to return to my narrative : 

My order to attack with his whole force, found Morell executing the 
X)re\'ious order to put his troops in line of battle for the night.* It has- 
tened his movements to get his troops in position. A few minutes 
thereafter I joined him. But it was then so dark that it was imiiossible 
to make aggressive movements.! 

*It seems tliat the order to post Ms troops for the night did not reach Morell till 
after I^ocke gave the order to attack with the whole division, though sent prior to the 
one by Locke. When he received the order to pass the night, he construed it as coun- 
termanding the order to attack, and as a reply to his protest against an attack with 
two regiments. He knew nothing of the 4.30 order, and considered the message by 
Locke as merely urging him on. 

tThe following dispatches (numbered 29a, 38«, 38a, and 38&, to correspond with 
kindred dispatches) appeared for the first time in testimony before the Board. 

Their connection with the other dispatches and their bearings upon the evidence of 
facts during the afternoon of the 29th Aug., when the dispatches were written, are 
made clear in the arguments of Mr. Bullitt and of Mr. Maltby. 

General Warren's disi^atch is explained in his testimony, and that explanation makes 
it clear that there was no retreat. 

The other dispatches were brought before the Board by General McDowell. He 
desired to give his reasons for wishing he had x)reseuted them before the Court-Martial 
(Nevr Eep., p. 806), but the Eecorder supplied the deficiency (pp. 439 to 499), which 
was that after General McDowell left me, and after he had sent word that he was 
going to take King away from me, I moved my troops to the right and front, or 
attem])ted to do so, notwithstanding I have said such a movement was a "gross mili- 
tary blunder," and that I recognized thereby and otherwise. Gen. McDowell's con- 
trolling authority over me. 

Now, if these dispatches prove anything, they prove — 

1st. That the 4.30 order was not in my possession at 6 p. m. 

2nd. That I made every effort to keep General McDowell, and through him General 
Fo]}e, fully informed of the state of affairs in my front that day, and was anxiously 
seeking information and instructious to guide my actions. 

3rd. That they show co-operation on my i)art in the carrying out of some plan or 
understanding with General McDowell by which both Avere to act or were acting- 
together, and that understanding was not — after he had taken King and Ricketts 
away — that I should attack or move over the ox)en ground to my right front, a\ ithoiit 
some farther Information from Gen. McDowell or Gen. Pope. 

The first of this family of dispatches is yet missing — I mean the one I testify before 
General McDowell's Court of Inquiry that I had sent to .General Pope, informing him 
that General McDowell had separated from me. 

If that dispatch ever comes to light, I have no doubt it will give my imderstanding 
of the reasons why General McDowell left me, the objects he was to accomplish, and 
what I was to do till I heard from him or from General Pope. 

But to silence forever, I hox^e, the accusation that I designed any movement to the 



33 

It is proper to add that tliroughont the day the firing of artillery had 
been plainly andible in the position of our troops, and the bursting 
shells of the combatants could be seen. 

These had served to indicate to us the relative positions of the con- 
rear except ill connection witli giying- help to my companions on my right, who at one 
time, and for a moment only, I erroneonsly .sni)pose{l were being driven or were falling- 
back, I present dispatch No. 38c, which mnst have been written after Xo. 38 directing 
General Morell to post his troops for the night. It was written after Ricketts' division 
had gone np, and we know that was after snndowu, aud it makes i)reparation to be 
able to remain in that vicinity a few dnys. 

This dispatch (38c) was taken from the nnprinted files of the Court-Martial, where 
it has laid secreted for sixteen years. 

(Xo. 29(1.) 

'•General McDowell: The tiring on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot 
" adA'ance, and have failed to get over to yon, except by the route taken by King. I shall 
' ' withdraw to Manassas. If yon have anytb ing to connnunicate, please do so. I ha ve 
"sent manv messengers to von aud General Sigel, and get norlung. 

(Signed) " ' F. J. PORTER, 

'■'Major-General. 
•' An artillerv duel is going on now — been skirmishing for a hnig time. 

F. J. P." 
(Xo. ma.) 

5 h. 45 m, p. m., Ah;i. 2\), '()2. 
General Sykes : 

I received an order from Mr. Cutting to advance and support Morell. I faced about 
and did so. I soon met Griffin's brigade, withdrawing, by order of General Morell, 
who Avas not pushed out, but returning. I faced about and marched back 200 yards 
or so. I met then an orderly, from General Porter to General Morell, saying he must 
push on md press the enemy ; that all was going well tor us, aud he was returning, 
(iriffin then faced about ; and I am following him to support Geiieral Morell. as ordered. 
Xone of the batteries are closed up to me. 
Respectfnllv, 

G. K. WAR REX. 
(Xo. 38a.) 

"General McDowell or King, — I have been wandering over the woods, and failed to 
" get a communication to you. Tell how nuitters go with you. The enemy is in stro:, 
"force in front of me, and I wish to know your d^esigns for to-night. If left to me 1 
' ' shall have to retire lor food and water, which I cannot get here. Ho w goes the battle ? 
" It seems to go to our rear. The enemv are getting to our left. 

(Signed) ^ F. J. PORTER, 

Major-Geneval Volunteer^:. 
(Xo. 386.) 

General McDowell, — Failed in getting Morell over to yon. After wandering about 
the woods for a time I withdrew him, and, while doing so, artillery opened on us. My 
scouts could not get through. Each one found the enemy between us, and I believe 
some have been cax)tured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, 
but have not succeeded, as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, aiul from reports 
of scouts think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please connnunicate the 
way this messenger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know 
your designs whether you retire or not. I cannot get water, and am out of provisions. 
Have lost a few men from infantry tiring. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major-General Volnuteers. 
Auq. 29, 6 p. m. 

(Xo. 38c.) 

Gen. MOKELL : Send down some good energetic men to Gen. Pope at Centreville. 
Get hold of Colonel Beckwith and get some rations. Bring beef up to kill ; we have 
nothing else ; and get enough to last two or three days, 

F. .1. PORTER, 

Major-iTeneval. 
Ricketts has gone np, also King. 

So it seems from this that even at the late hour at which this note was written 
(after Ricketts had passed up), I not only had not received the 4.30 order, but that I 
did not even know that Gen. Pope had left Centreville. 

3 



34 

teiidiug- forces in the vicinity of Groveton, but they did not convey to 
the mind of any one experienced in the war, the idea of anything more 
than an artillery duel at long range. The noise of any infantry contest 
must have been deadened by the intervening forests. 

That we were ignorant of infantry contests going on will be seen by 
the evidence of General Griffin, on p. 165 of Court Martial Record, who 
says " he heard no firing whatever, excei)t artillery at a long distance," 
until "a little after dark there was some heavy volleys of musketry." 

General Morell says (Rec, p. 147): ^' Just at the close of the day 
there Aveie one or two volleys of musketry. * # * There were a few 
shots exchanged between our pickets and those of the enemy when we 
first came upon that ground and a few scattering shots during the day. 
With that exception, I did not hear any until the volley I have just 
spoken of." 

These generals were at my front in the main line of battle. General 
Reynolds, who was at Groveton, just south of the Warren ton Turnpike, 
and two miles nearer General Pope than 1, says (Rec, p. 170) : " As 
near as I can recollect, it (the infantry fire in force and volume) must 
have been between four and five o'clock, probably five o'clock. That is, 
I refer to the part near me. There may have been infantry firing on 
the right which I could not hear." 

And i^rior to this answer, when asked : 

" Q. Ou the 29tli, before four o'clock, p. M., what was tlie character of the battle; 
artillery or iufautry ? 

^'A. Principally artillery." 

General Pope himself, in his report (Conduct of the War Supi^lement, 
Part 1^, p. 154), does not allege that a battle was raging, but simx)ly that 
'^from twelv^e to four very severe skirmishes occurred constantly at va- 
^'rious points on our line, and were brought on at every indication the 
^^ enemy made of a disposition to retreat." 

At about half-past five he ordered an attack. 

But General Reynolds was nearer these severe skirmishes than I, 
and he testifies that he did not hear infantry firing in force and ^'olume, 
until probably five o'clock. 

Captain Pope, who, as the bearer of an important dispatch, would 
naturally have been observant of all signs of battle, did not remember 
to have heard infantry firing at the time of the delivery of the 4.30 order 
variously affirmed to be 5, 5 J and 6 J p. M. 

I have been held culpable for the course pursued this day on the left 
wing of General Pope's army. 

The judge advocate, in his argument to the President, asserted (Rec- 
ord, p. 313) : 

'' That a vigorous attack upon the enemy by the accused at any time 
between twelve o'clock, when the battle began , and dark, when it closed, 
would have secured a triumi^h for our arms, and not only the overthrow 
of the rebel forces, but, irrohahly^ the destruction or capture of Jackson's 
ariny, the record fully justifies. . This opinion, in effect, is emphatically 
expressed by Generals Pope, McDowell and Roberts, and Lieutenant- 
Colonel Smith, all of whom participated in the engagement and were 
well (pialified to judge." 

Whatever, at that time, may have been deemed the qualifications of 
these witnesses, I will show before closing this narrative and the evi- 
dence to be laid before this Board, that their testimony, in the light 
since thrown upon the then clouded events of that day, is not entitled 
to the weight which was given to it, because they testified in ignor- 
ance of the facts which then actually existed and which I am ready to 



35 

prove ; and tliat the court, in forming conclusions on tlieir inferential 
testimony, and the President in confirming them on the '^ probabilities" 
of the Judge-Advocate, were led into serious errors, which now it would 
be impossible to (commit, and Avhich, as far as it is possible, should be 
rectified. 
For the operations of this day I was charged with. 

Under the 9th Article of War, 

1st. Disobeying the joint order to General McDowell and me. 
2d. Disobeying the order of 4:30 p. M., and. 

Under the 52d Article of War. 

1st. ^'That in disobeying the order of 4:30 P. M., I 'did retreat from the 
advancing forces of the enemy without any attemx)t to engage them, or 
to aid the troops who were alread,y fighting greatly superior numbers, 
and were relying on the flank attack I was there ordered to make to 
secure a decisive victory, and to capture the enemy's army, a result which 
must have followed from said flank attack had it been made by me, in 
compliance with said order." 

2d. " That being with my command between Manassas Station and 
the field of battle then pending between the forces of the United States 
and those of the rebels, and within sound of the guns, and in the presence 
of the enemy, and knowing that a severe action of great consequence 
was being fought, and that the aid of my corps was greatly needed, did 
fail all day to bring it on to the field, and did shamefully fall back and 
retreat from the advance of the enemy, without any attempt to give 
them battle, and without knowing the forces from which I had retreated." 

3d. That being near the field of battle of Manassas, while a severe 
action was being fought by the troops of General Pope's command, and 
being in the belief that the troops of General Pope were sustaining a 
defeat and retiring from the field, did fail to go to the aid of said troops 
and general, and did shamefully retreat away and fall back with his 
army to the Manassas Junction, and leave to the disasters of a presumed 
defeat the said army, and did fail, by any attempt to attack the enemy, 
to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endan- 
gered the safety of the Capital of the country. 

Of these charges I was i^ronounced guilty, except so much as implies 
I ''did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy" after the receii)t of 
the 4.30 order. 

It will be observed : 

First. — That the joint order to General McDowell and myself enjoins — 

1st. Tliat General McDowell and I shall move towards Gainesville 
Avith our joint commands. 

tld. That our joint commands shall halt as soon as communication is 
established between our forces and Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno, 
thereby requiring us to look to the future for orders or events to govern 
our course. 

3d. That one thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy 
a position from which they can reach Bull Eun to-night or by morning. 

Second. — That the 4.30 p. M. order shows on its face that which Gen- 
eral Pope has since declared was the fact : 

1st. That I was to attack the "flank" and, if possible, the ''rear" of 
Jackson's forces then massed in the woods in front of him at Groveton, 
and mainly north of the Warrenton turnpike. 



36 

2d. That there was no knowledge on the part of General Pope of 
Longstreet's force, or of any other considerable force in my front and 
between me and Jackson. 

Even to this date, Jnly, 1878, General Pope asserts that my court 
martial statements of affairs and representation of force in my front — 
the same as herein given — were not correct, and that, with nothing to 
justify, I disobeyed of purpose the "joint order" to McDowell and me, 
and also the order of 4:30 p. m. ; and that under the circumstances, as 
known to him, I should without orders, early in the day, have attacked 
Jackson then contending with Sigel, Eeyuolds, and Heintzelman. He 
insists there was no enemy lying between me and Gro^'eton, as I then 
claimed and proved there was. He errs in his assertion of facts. But 
I let facts speak for themselves. 

I. 

General Pope's understanding of the situation is shown as follows: 

He testified, Eecord, p. 16: ''Had General Porter falleu upon the Hank of the 
enemy, as it was hoped at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, it is my firm conviction 
that we should have destroyed the army of Jackson." 

Again (pp. 34, 35) : 

''General Porter was expected to attack, if possil)le — and as I understood it to be 
practicable — the right flank of Jackson's forces, and if possible the rear of his forces, 
to T)revent, if it were practicable, the junction of Longstreet's forces with Jackson's, 
and to crush Jackson's flank before Longstreet could effect a junction with him. I 
did not then believe, nor do I now believe, that at the time (4:30 p. m.) any consider- 
able portio]! of Longstreet's corps had reached the vicinity of the field. I do not 
know that General Porter, between 5:30 p. m. and 7 o'clock, had the enemy imme- 
diately in his front, though I would think it altogether likely that JacA'.so?? would have 
pushed out some force to observe the road l)etween Gainesville and Manassas Junction. 
It is altogether likely, therefore, that some of Jachson's troojis were in presence of 
General Porter's advance, though of my own knowledge I do not know that." 

Again he says, in his report (p. 22) to General Halleck, January 27, 
1863, and to ^'Committee on Conduct of the War," May, 1865: 

"I do not hesitate to say that if Porter had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, 
at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the 
larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been, by any possibility, suffi- 
ciently reinforced to have made an effective resistance. * * * x believe, in fact I 
am positive, that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th General Porter had in his 
front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that 
it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson and to 
have fallen upon his rear ; that if he had done so we should have gained a decisive 
victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the 
forces of Longstreet, and that the army of General Lee would have been so crippled 
and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condi- 
tion to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character." 

In support of his opinion he adds, extracting from the record of the 
court (pp. 86, 93) : 

"I submit the testimony of General McDowell," "an intelligent and reliable wit- 
ness." 

Question by Judge-Advocate : What would probably have been the eifect upon the 
fortune of the battle if, between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon. General Porter, with 
his whole force, had thrown himself upon the right wing of the enemy (Jackson) as 
directed in the order of 4:30 p. m. of the 29tli of August?^— A. ft is a mere opinion that 
you ash f 

Q. Yes, sir. — A. I think it would have been decisive in our favor. 

Q. Please state the ground on which you formed the opinion that if the accused had 
attacked the right wing of the rebels, as he was ordered, the battle would have been 
decisive in our favor?— A. Because oa the evening of that day I thought the result 
was decidedly in our favor, as it was; but, admitting that it was nearly equally bal- 
anced, I think, and thought, that if the corps of General Porter, reputed one of the 



37 

best, if not the best, in the service, consisting of between twenty and thirty regi- 
ments, and some eight batteries, had been added to the efforts made by others, the 
result would have been in our favor very decidedly; * * and besides the mere ad- 
vantage in numbers from which that result would have followed, the position in 
which this force would have been applied, while the main body was so hotly engaged 
in front, would have been an additional powerful reason for so supposing. 

That the testimony of this "intelligent and reliable" witness was in- 
ferential entirely is made apparent when cross- questioned by the court 

(p. 221): 

Q. From your knowledge of the condition of things on the 29th of August, was 
there any considerable force of the enemy in front of General Porter's corps, near the 
Manassas Eailroad, on the south side of it? — A. I have no xjositive knowledge on that 
point ; I have not supposed that there was, but I cannot support that supposition by 
any positive facts. 

Q. If there had been any such force in front of General Porter's corps, and south of 
the railroad, do you think, from your knowledge of the ground, that would have pre- 
vented General Porter from obeying the order to attack the right wing of the main 
body of the enemy ? 

(The accused objected to the question as not being in the nature of rebutting evi- 
dence. No member of the court sustaining the objection, it was ordered that the 
question be answered.) 

A. I do not knou' ivJiere ilie right wing of the main body of the enemy ivas at that time; 
such a force of the enemy, in such a position, would itself most hkely have been the 
right wing of the enemy, so far as I can imagine the case ; the distance from General 
Porter's head of column to the road at that time was not so great as to have enaMed a 
large force of the enemy to he letween them and to be detached from the main body of the 
enemy. 

Again, under the supposition that Longstreet did not intervene, Gen. 
McDowell testified, p. 97 : 

To have defeated Gen. Porter in an attack upon the enemy's (Jackson's) right 
flank and rear, would have requii-ed a large force of the enemy, which would have 
relieved the attack in front, and, I think, would have still resulted in a success to our 
side. 

That that " large force of the enemy" was there immediately confront- 
ing me, and also that an attack by me would not '^have relieved the 
attack in front" made by Gen. Pope, will be made apparent ere I close. 

I desire, just here, to call attention to the position on that field, which 
Gen. Pope supposed I held that da}' — shown on his maj) presented with 
his reports, and republished b}' the War Department, and now laid be- 
fore you, with this narrative. It is also i^laced in red ink on the annexed 
l^rinted sketch, and upon the larger maps, giving the positions of all 
troops on that field that day. It will be seen that he located me at 
least a mile in advance of my actual position, and with no enemy in the 
position occupied by Longstreet. 

Gen. Eoberts, my accuser on the record, was also as inferential in his 
testimony. He testified (pp. 49, 50, 51, 52, 214, 216, 217): 

Answer. As I understood the relation of General Reynolds with the Pennsylvania 
reserves to the enemy's right (Jackson's) General Porter's reserves having attacked 
the right of the enemy, would have brought him in close connection with Reynolds' 
left. 

Q. Will the witness inform the court whether, at any time in the course of the day 
of the 29th of August, he saw the command of the accused and the enemy in such a 
position as to make an attack l)y General Porter upon the Hank or rear of the enemy 
possible? — A. I did not see General Porter's command on the field on Friday, the SOth 
of August. But I suppose that I know nearly the position where General Porter's com- 
mand was between four and five o'clock, and I supposed that I had seen smoke from 
guns of his command. I know the direction of the road from Manassas Juncition to 
the field of battle, and, in my opinion. General Porter was in a position where he could 
have moved forward and have attacked the right of the enemy : and I also believed 
he could have turned the enemy's right flank and attacked their rear, from what I 
know of their relative positions and from what I know of the country. 

Q. Between four and five o'clock p. m. of the 29th of August, did the witness know 



38 

whether or not Longstreet's forces, in whole or in part, had made junction with Jack- 
son on Jackson's right ? — A. I did not know ; hut I had reason to beheve that they 
had not made junction, as I had been requested by Geueral Pope, before going on to the 
fiekl, while at Centreville ia the morning to take a position, and with a glass to ob- 
serve whether troops were jnoving from the direction of Thoroughfare Gaji to Gaines- 
ville ; and having closely observed that country for a long time I became convinced, 
from the clouds of dnst that arose above the Bull Eun range beyond Thoroughfare 
Gap, towards a gap north of Thoroughfare Gap, the name of which I now forget, that 
Lougstreet was moving very rapidly to get through that northern gap, and to reinforce 
Jackson. But, from the distance from the head of the column of dust to Gainesville, 
I did not believe that he would be able to elfect a junction before late in the evening, 
and so reported to General Pope. 

Q. Such having been the opinion of the witness during the day of the 29th of 
August, will he please state whether, up to the present time, he has become satisfied 
that Longstreet's forces, in whole or in part, did elfect such junction with Jackson's 
right in the afternoon — say between five and six o'clock, or before that time — on the 
29th of August f — A. I am convinced, by information that I have received since that 
day, that a part of Longstseet's forces effected a junction with Jackson in the evening 
of the 29th— I think about dark. 

Q. In view of what the army had accomplished during the battle of the day in the 
absence of General Porter's command, what do you suppose would have been the re- 
sult upon the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked, as ordered by the 
order of 4:30 p. m., either on the right flank or the rear of the enemy? 

The accused objected to the question. 

The court was thereupon cleared. 

Some time after the court was reopened, and the Judge-Advocate announced that 
the court determined that the question shall be answered. 

The question was again propounded to the witness as follows : 

Q. In Alew of what the army had accomphshed during the battle of the day in the 
absence of General Porter's command, what do you suppose would have been the re- 
sults upon the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked as ordered by the 
order of 4:30 p. m., either on the right flank or the rear of the enemy? — A. I do not 
doubt at all that it would have resulted in the defeat, if not in the capture, of the main 
army of 'the Confedera.tes that were on the field at that time. 

The witness had been requested by Geu. Pope to learn what enemy 
was on his right, and he sent cayahy to find out. 
He testified (p. 214.): 

I found only a force of mounted men Avith some light artillery, who were watching 
all our movements on our right flank, Siiidl inferred that it was a similar force to that, 
which was on our left watching our movements there, which were in front of General 
Porter. 

Again (p. 216.) : 

Q. From your knowledge of the position of the enemy on the 29th of August last, 
will you state how many of them were south of the Manassas Eaikoad, or in front of 
General Porter's command ? — A. I do not believe, from vv hat I know of the enemy's 
forces, that there was any force in front of General Porter's command on that day, 
except a cavalry force in observation there, with some light artillery. 

Lieut-Col. Thomas 0. H. Smith, another prosecuting witness, testified 
(pp. 71, 72, 75), on direct- examination : 

Q. Are you sufficiently acquainted with the disposition of the forces under General 
Pope, and of those of the enemy at that hour, to express an opinion as to what would 
have been the effect of an attack by General Porter's corps upon the right flank of the 
enemy at between five and six o'clock p. m. of that day ? 

This C[uestiou was objected to by the accused. 

The court v^as thereupon cleared. 

After some time the court was reopened, and the Judge-Advocate announced the 
decision of the court to be, that the witness shall answer the question. 

The question was then rex)eated as above. 

A. I do not know as I am sufficiently acquainted with the numbers and disposition 
of the enemy to give a conclusive answer in regard to that. I can give my A^iew of 
it, and give the reason why I think a flank attack would have been successful. The 
eneioy were fighting a defensive battle. 

At this point the accused suggested to the court whether in view of what the wit- 
ness had said in regard to his knowledge of the numbers and disposition of the enemy, 
it was proper for him to proceed with his answer. 



39 

At the request of a member of the court, the court "svas cleared. 

After some time the court was reopened. Whereupon the Jurlge Advocate auuouuced 
the decision of the court to be that the Avitness proceed with his ausvrer. 

The witness continued as follows: 

A. The enemy were fighting a defensive battle. The right lay near the turnpike 
roa<l between Warienton and Centreville. The main force, from VN-hich they v.ere de- 
tached for the time being were oft" towards Thoroughfare Gap, or be yond it. Their 
jjosition was a strong one for defence in front, and in the direction in which the three 
corps of Sigel, Heiirtzelman, and Reno were lighting them. Far, and back from the 
front, they had a line of retreat towards Thoroughfare Gaj), towards their main force. 
The tlirection of a fank attack moA'ing on the road from Manassas to Gainesville, and 
then moving in upon their tlank, was such as to cut of their line of retreat. We drove 
them off the ground as it was. I believe that if the attack had been made on their 
flank at that time, between live and six o'clock, exhausted as they were by the lighting 
through the day, it would have made the defeat a rout, by striking them on their line 
of retreat towards their main force, and rolliug them up on Bull Run and the cast 
of the Gum Spring road, and so on in that direction. 

In saying that I did not know their disposition sufficiently to give a conclusive 
answer, I meant, of course, that I did not know the amount of force on their right. 
But frcmi the fact that all onr attack had Ijeen directed with our left resting on that 
road, and their right apparently resting there, I supposed that if they had a heavy 
force beyond that road they would have attempted a flank attack upon us. The ap- 
pearance of the field was such as to lead one to suppose that the entire force of the 
enemy, except, perhaps, something thrown out to guard that flank, was right in front 
of us on those ridges. That was where all their artillery fire was, and there was where 
the fight continued during the day. They were fighting in that position, with their 
backs towards their main force. Of course, though we might drive them off' the field, 
we could accomplish not any great success, with their great force in the rear and off 
before Thoroughfare Gap. This flank attack was the main attack to decide the bat- 
tle, by striking them quartering on the flank and cutting of their line of retreat, so 
that they could not unite with their main force in that direction. 

Q. You have no knowledge of General Porter's position with his command during 
the 29th of August '^ — A. I have not. 

Cross-questioned by the defence : 

Q. You have said, if understood correctly, that the whole of the enemy's forces, 
while the battle of the 29th of August was going on, was not on the field in front of 
the Union troops ? — A. Yes, sir. 

Q. What portion of the enemy's forces was in the rear on that occasion, as you sup- 
I^osed ? — A. I believe, as far as we had information from spies, etc., that we had Jack- 
son and Ewell in front of us then, and a part of Longstreet's force that came on to 
the field. 

Q. AVas not General Longstreet there ? — A. I do not know ; I understood that Gen- 
eral Buford counted a portion of the enemy that passed through Gainesville, which 
were all the reinforcements that got up for the enemy that day, I thiul:. I cannot re- 
member distinctly when he rex)orted that, or how it came to us. 

Q. Do you now know whether General Longstreet, Avitli the forces under his imme- 
diate command, joined the enemy at that time, and on what portion of the enemy's 
lines '! — A. 'No, sir ; as I said before, all I can give is the impression derived from the 
appearance of the field in front of us as to where the enemy Avere and what their force 
was ; that combined with such information as we had received of their movements 
the two or three days previous. 

Such is the testimony of the four "reliable and intelligent" witnesses 
for the prosecution. ^STot One of them knew my i)osition, or supi^osed 
that any " but a small force of cavalry and artillery " was in my front 
during the day, or that Longstreet was present till a late hour in the day. 

My actual position and Longstreet's will be ])roved to have been as 
now represented on the map, respectively east and w^est of the small 
stream separating us. 

II. 

Xow, in rei)ly, as to Longstreet's forces being in my front : 
IH. l^eto evidence — Statements of Confederate officers. 

General officers commanding the troops opposing us certainly knew 
where they were that day, and were capable of judging of their ability 



40 

to ineet our attacks. They are entitled to credence, and I traverse 
the above suppositions by extracts from their statements. (Pamphlet. 
After-discovered evidence and original letters.) 

I wish here to state that witnesses are within easy call to orally sus- 
tain all that is here presented. 

General Lee, commanding and present on the held, writes, 9tli Sep- 
tember, 1870 : 

"As far as I cau judge, the position assigned to tlie troops of the army of N. E. Vir- 
ginia, on the map or a little in advance is that held by them on the 29th August, 1862." 

Again, 31st October, 1867, he writes : 

''Long-street's command arrived within supporting distance of Jackson on 29th Au- 
gust, '62, between 9 and 10 a. m., and his line was formed by noon." 

" It was after 12 m. that General Stuart reported the approach of a column of troops 
which threatened our right, and General Wilcox, with Ms three brigades, was sent to re- 
inforce it. * * * 1 was with that portion of the troops south of the turnpike." 

"General Longstreet's command was formed by 12 m. on the 29th August, in two 
lines on Jackson's right. General Hood's division crossing the Gainesville Turnpike, 
and General D. K. Jones' division the Manassas Gap Kailroad ; artillery was between 
Jackson's right and Longstreet's left, and cavalry, under General Stuart, guarded the 
extreme right flank." 

" The result of an attach before 12 M., with 25,000 men, cannot be certainly pro- 
nounced ; but \t ought to have been repulsed if made after Longstreet's troops were 
formed. His whole force, except Anderson's division, was up, and that arrived before 
next morning." 

" Thr probahle result of an altack on Longstreet after 12 M., with less than 12,000 men, 
would have been a repulse." 

18th Feb., '70: 

"The result of an attack upon Longstreet after 12 m., August 29th, 1862, with about 
12,000 men, would have been a repulse, and, 'if a repulse, especiallij at an early hour, 
or before 5 p, v/i.,' the ejfcct would have been an attack upon General Pope^s left and rear by 
Longstreet and Stuart, which, if successful, would have resulted in the relief of Jackson, and 
have probably rendered unnecessary the battle of the next day. If the attack had been 
made after 5 p. m. on Longstreet, he Avould have been able to have resisted it with 
his whole force, Avhich, if successful, would have equally secured Jackson's safety." 

And July, '70: 

"I had no anxiety for Jackson at 2d Manassas. I knew he could hold on till we 
came, and that we should be in position in time." 

"Porter could not take Jackson in flank while he was attacked in front. He could 
do nothing of tliat K<nt. I was there then. I saw Porter approach. I w^ent out and 
reccmnoitered his corps; and made the proper dispositions to meet it. ^'e flanked 
him. He could not flank Jackson.'" 

"I suppose we should have cut Porter to pieces if he had attacked to get at Jackson's flank.^^ 

The map referred to above, and hereafter is the lithographic sketch 
herewith attached. 
General Longstreet says, Sept. 7th, '08, and July 1st, '75: 

"My command (25,000 in round numl)ers) was within supporting distance of General 
Jackson at 9 a. m., August 29tli, having passed Thoroughfare Gap at early dawn." 

"My command was deployed in double line for attack, between 10 a. m. and 12 m. 
on the 29th, extending from Jackson's right across turnpike and Manassas Gap Rail- 
road." 

"My command was ready to receive an attack after 11 a. m., and all were particu- 
larly anxious to bring on the battle after 12 m.. General Lee more so than the rest." 

"If you had attacked any time after 12 M., it seems to me that we would surely have 
destroyed your army. That is, if you had attacked with less than (25,000) twenty-five 
thousand men." 

Generals Wilcox, Hood, Ewell, Early, and others confirm these opin- 
ions. 

(Jolouel Charles Marshall, aid-de-cam j) to General Lee, says : 

I think it safe to say, that our total effective force present that day was about as 

follows: 

Longstreet's infantrv 30, 000 

Jackiion's " ' 20,000 

ArtiPery 4,000 

Cavalry 2,500 



41 

I cannot speak x)ositively as to the hour of Longstreet's arrival on the morning of 
tlip 29tli, as I (lid not accompany the column from Thoroughfare Gap, T)ut I know that 
his troops hail readied the turnpike on the right of Jackson, and within supporting 
distance, as early as 10 a. m. As they came up they Avere formed on the right of Jack- 
sou, extemliug our line nearlj^ at a right angle with, and east of the turnpike; Hood 
and Evans on Lougstreet's left, supported l»y Wilcox and Kemper; D. R. Jones on 
the riglir extending towards the Manassas Gap Railroad. 

Most of ^liese troops Av ere in position or ahout moving into position when Stuart, 
Avhosc cavalry was on our extreme right, reported the approach of a Federal force 
from The direction of Manassas Junction, or rather by a road passing hy our right, one 
branch lea<ling to Manassas and one to Bristoe Station. 

Tliereupon General Lee directed Jones' division to be disx)osed so as to meet this ad- 
vance, and Wilcox, with his three brigades, was transferred from Lougstreet's left to 
su])porr Jones. 

The (roops, Avhose approach caused this change in the arrangement of our line of 
battle, I h-arned afterwards, were yours, and I can state positively, from personal ob- 
servation as well as on the authority of the official reports of the officers commanding 
on that part of our line, that those troops made their appearance after Lougstreet's 
counnand had arrived, as I have above descril>ed. 

General Jones remained in the position assigned to him during the Avhole of the 
29th, and took no part in the engagement of that day. 

General Wilcox ^\ns not withdrawn until late in the afternoon, when he Avas ordered 
back to su])port Hood. T\^ien he reached Hood's position the tiring had ceased. 

The next day (August 30) Jones w^as throAvn forAvard on our right, and participated 
iu our engagement, which occurred in the afternoon. 

Had not Wilcox and Jones, Avith their six brigades, been occupied in Avatching your 
adA'ance, they Avould, of course, have been aA^ailable iu the action of the 29th August — 
the former near our center, Avhere Hood was hotly engaged, and the latter to operate 
against the Hank of the force which assailed our left and center. 

I repeat that I AA^as an e^e-Avitness of the circumstances that were afterwards made 
the ground against you, and can assure you that in the opinion of CA^ery Confederate 
officer who was present, including General Lee and General Longstreet, so far as our 
moA^ements were concerned, the facts Avere not correctly stated to the court. 

General B. H. Eobertson says : 

" Longstreet was on Jackson's right, extending in an almost perpendicular direction 
across Warrenton Turnpike and the Manassas Gap Railroad. My brigade Avas on his 
right flank. Lougstreet's right extended beyond Porter's left ilank, and my orders 
were to protect his right. Upon making a reconnoissauce, a large body of Federal 
troops Avas disc()A^ered — afterAvards known to be Porter's. I was instructed to watch 
their movements. This Avas about 12 o'clock (Friday, 29th), and I am quite sure that 
most of Lougstreet's forces were in line of battle at 11 a. m., or A^ery shortly after- 
wards. Although Stewart Avas present, I had the immediate command of all the Con- 
federate cavalry at 2d Manassas. And there aa as no caA^alry in that direction but 
mine, Avhich was held there the remainder of the day to guard the right and watch 
Porter. " 

The result of that day's battle ii])on the success of their arms is seen 
in their official reports ijublished in Yol. 9 Eebellion Eecord, pp. 278, 
571, 633, and are in marked contrast with the above inferential opinions 
of the prosecuting witnesses. I extract, however, from a letter of Gen- 
eral Longstreet, written since General Pope's claims became known. It 
throws much light on events of that day. He says : 

''Just afrer ])assing GainesA^ille, while iu the act of deploying, General Lee ordered 
me to attack as soon as I could find a tViA orable or assailable point. As my right Avas 
foriuing into line, I rode forAvard to examine the Federal i)osition. As my OAvn recon- 
noissauce and that of others did not justify i)re(ij»itated battle, I reported against at- 
tack till a more faAorable moment. This did not satisfy (Tcueral Lee, Avho still urged 
immediate attack." 

''Al>out this time, say 2 p. m., a rc^port froui our cavalry advising of the approach of 
a considerable force (infantry and artillery) against my right, three brigades* were 
scut to reinforce the threatened j^oint. After examining the force and position myself, 
I re])oited it too Aveak, in my judgment, to mean real battle." 

"General Lee then again urged me to attack, biit upon my suggestion that it was late 
to begin a battle, that it would be better to make a forced reconnaissance at nightfall, 



*Wili()x"s Division, sent to meet a movement ordered of and commenced by Morell. The approach 
of this division was reported to me at the time. 



42 

and attack at dayliglit, if jiistitied in so doing by onr reconnaissance, lie consented to 
put off battle for another day. 

'^At niglitfall, or a little before the reconnaissance was made, and before midnight, 
we had reports from all points of my line representing the Federal liositiou strong, 
success probable, but at a great sacrifice. Believing myself warranted by previous 
conversation and nnd(^rstanding with General Lee, I ordered the withdrawal of my 
troops to their original position, sending forward axes to cut up some artiUerij that had 
fallen into otir hands during the reconnaissance. The troo^^s returned to position long- 
before daylight on the 30tli, It seems now that the Federal commander mistook my 
reconnaissance of the 29th for my battle, my withdrawal for retreat, and thus misled, 
moved forward on the 30th, to renew his attack upon General Jackson." 

It is clear onr opponents did not consider the resnlt of that day's 
action in onr favor. 

2d. Neic Evidence from Federal Sources. 

Oai)tain J. A. Jndson^ an Assistant Adjntant- General in King's Divis- 
ion, a prisoner in the hands of the enemy on the night of the 29th August, 
says, writing of the attack by the division that evening : 

Here, near Warrentou Pike, on the Sudley Springs road, we remained until nearly 
dark, when an aid-de-camp dashed up with a message to General Hatch from Gen- 
eral McDowell, to the following effect: "The enemy is in full retreat clown the War- 
renton Turnpike. General Hatch will pursue with his division, overtake and attack 
him." Instantly the division filed out into the road, and- well closed up, began arapid 
march along the Sudley Springs road toward its junction with the turnpike. At the 
intersection of the two roads, and on our right sat General McDowell on horseback, 
surrounded by his staff and cavalry escort. I was riding by General Hatch's side, and 
as we approached. General McDowell said, in loud tones, "General Hatch, the enemy 
is in full retreat," and he added, pointing down the pike towards Groveton, "pursue 
him rapidly." We moved out at double-quick, Hatch at the head of the column, fol- 
lowed by his own brigade, then Doubleday, and then Patrick and then Gibbon, an 
order of march I feel sure I recollect, though I cannot remember the place in column 
of the artillery. It was now quite dark when we reached and crossed the arm of the 
Bull Run close to Groveton. As we pressed on rax)idly no signs were seen of a retreat- 
ing enemy, when suddenly our skirmishers encountered those of the enemy. A well- 
sustained and rapidly-increasing musketry fire from an unyielding line, together with 
a vigorous cannonade on his part, soon convinced General Hatch that the enemy, far 
from being in retreat, was strongly posted and determinedly resisting our advance. 
After considerable time had elapsed, to make this certain, he ordered me to ride back 
and tell General McDowell so. I did so, finding General McDowell at the same spot 
where we left him. When I had delivered my message, General McDowell said, 
"What ! does General Hatch hesitate? Tell him the enemy is in full retreat, and to 
pursue him." I delivered this reply to General Hatch, but it was no longer a ques- 
tion. So far from being "in retreat," the enemy had not yielded to Hatch's furious 
attack at all, but bringing up reinforcements, first i)oured in volleys from their right, 
which they had so advanced as to almost enfilade our left, — second did the same 
thing on our right, having advanced their left also, — and finally, Avith a charge, com- 
pelled our division to retire. The large number of killed, wounded and prisoners, 
and the loss of several guns, attest the stubborn fighting of our division, and the mis- 
take in believing " the enemy in full retreat." Myself and twenty or thirty officers 
and a large nuniber of enlisted men were captured, andAvhat I saw that night and the 
next morning may be of use to you as going to prove the accuracy of the enemy's 
position, as shown by you on your map sent me. 

1st. The individual to whom I surrendered was an officer —a lieutenant of infantry— 
who, in reply to a question, said we " had been engaging a part of Longstreet's (;orps." 

2d. The prisoners were immediately marched a short distance down the pike towards 
Gainesville, the Ijattle having been fought on the same ground where our division fought 
the night before — the 28th. A very short distance from the battle field, on each side 
of the pike, I saw in the darkness indications of large bodies of troops quietly in 
cam]». We were that night ke})t here, not being taken to Gainesville until later in 
the day of the iJOth. In'the gray daAvn of the 30th I saw these troops, Longstreet's 
corps, in ca.mp, and was told they had been there since early on the 29th, nor did the 
Confederate officers fail to jokeiis on General Pope's failure to intercept Longstreet's 
march through Thoroughfare Gap. 

The statements of Generals Hatch, Patrick and others, now in my 
possession, of the strong resistance met by Hatch's attack, confirm Cap- 



43 

tain Judson's naiTative. I do uot present their opinions formed at that 
time, though they are against General Pope's opinion of the result of 
that day's battle being in our favor, as, like those of Generals Pope, 
McDowell and Eoberts, and Lt. Col. Smith, they were all guesses. 
They had, however, better opportunities of judging of the result, hav- 
ing been in the battle. 

3^. The old evidence on the record. 

In the lig^ht of the new evidence now open to view, it is manifest that 
the testimony of Generals Morell, Griffin aud Marshall, and Major 
Hyland, Lieutenant Stevenson and others, is fully sustained. That I 
knew of Longstreet's force being in my front — is made clear from the fre- 
quent reports of these officers; and from my orders and despatches of 
that day. I had also been informed at an early hour, by General Mc- 
Dowell and others, of the rapid advance of Longstreet, and the march- 
ing of Eicketts and King from the Warrenton Pike, because of his anti- 
cipated early arrival that day, and, besides my own observation, and the 
reports of my officers and the statements of prisouers, I had the report 
of General Buford stating his arrival, shown to me by General McDow- 
ell. I expected these facts to be substantiated by General McDowell 
before my court, and although he failed to remember it on my trial, it is 
e\adent that he had the information, because in his official report of 
^S'ovember 9th, 1862, he says : , 

^'The niglit of the 27tli I saw General Sigel at Bucklaud Mills and informed Mm 
Longstreet would he coming through the Gap next morning.'" * * 

^^ Knowing that Longstreet would he coming through Thoroughfare, I sent, early in the 
morning (28tli), Colonel Wyndham's New Jersey cavalry to the Gap, and sent up 
other cavalry as fast as I could get hold of it ; and on recei\dng word the enemy was 
coming through (at 10:45 a. m.) I detailed Eicketts' division to hold him in check." 

"This departure from your orders to move with 'my whole force' on Manassas I 
felt called upon to make, to carry out the spirit of your plan of crushing the enemy 
(Longstreet) at that ]Dlace before his reinforcements, of whose position I had just re- 
ceived positive intelligence, could join, as those reinforcements, 1 thought, would be 
better lield in check at the Gap than this side of it." 

And I find in his prmted defense (p. 43) before his court of inqniry 
sitting in the same building, and at the same time as my Court Mar- 
tial, that he was i^roving that he knew all about these corps of the 
enemy, and had taken steps to prevent Longstreet joining Jackson — steps 
which a corps commander had condemned him for not taking, and 
General Pope regretted he had taken. 

4tth. The disobedience of the ^^ joint order P 

The "joint order" contains, as I have shown, only three injunctions, 
and these are addressed jointly to General McDowell and me. Wherein 
the order was disobeyed no witness testified, and the Judge- Advocate 
alone could reveal. 

General Pope testified, Eec, p. 16 : 

I do not know whether he obeyed it; he did not obey fully ; how far he obeyed it I 
am not able to say ; he certaiuly did not obey it fully. " 

If he had obeyed it, it would have hrought him up with tlte cnenu/ht^foie half past four 
in the evening. 

I was " up with the enemy." 

General McDowell, who was my commander present with me on the 
ground, testified, Rec, pp. 83, 85, 87, 90, 92 : 

I conmuinded General Porter's corps and my own divisi(m; we there (on the ground) 
received the joint order, which directed the very thing we had ourselves done." 

When that joint order reached us we were doing- what that joint order directed us 
to do. TJiat joint order found the troops in the positiou it directed them to he. 



44 

That joint order contemplated General Porter's corps and my own to be employed 
differently from the Tvay I had arranged when I left General Porter, which arrange- 
ment was to separate them, leaving him alone on the Gainesville road, whilst I went 
np the Sudley Spring road. 

I decided, under the latitude allowed in that order, that General Porter should put 
his tioops in to the right of where the head of the column then lay, and that I would 
take mine away from the road on which our two commands then lay up the Sudley 
Springs road into the hattle, in this dissolving the joint operations of our two corps. 

His object in leaving me, he says (p. 85), was to i^lace his troops on 
the left of those at Groveton. * * To join General Eeyn old's divis- 
ion. 

The object of this joint order was, that with our united forces, we 
should have force strong enough to intervene between Longstreet and 
Jackson on the Warrenton Pike. General McDowell's direction and 
action, for which he had full authority, annulled the order. Of course, 
as soon as he left and took away his troops I was free (having no re- 
straining orders) to exercise my own discretion — holding in view the 
injunction " that the troops must occupy a position from which they 
can reach Bull Eun to-night or by morning." Still, notwithstanding his 
declared intention to take King's division away, I made an effort to re- 
tain it, with the view of using it for a continued advance, feeling sure 
that our united forces were needed to accomplish any good result. How- 
ever, General McDowell took King away beyond all support of me, and 
his going away comi)elled me, in presence of the force then known to be 
between me and the Warrenton Pike', not to undertake an advance 
which, with our united forces, my superior had avoided. It forced upon 
me the posting my command on that ground and trying to hold the 
enemy there, and to induce him to attack us, in place of attacking him. 
My arrangements for that i^urpose threw some of my command to the 
rear, where they were held, in support of my main body confronting the 
enemy, all that day and night. 

The Judge- Advocate called this arrangement a "falling back," and a 
disobedience of the order. 

He tells the President, Eec, p. 308 : 

•'The court concluded, and justly, that his falling hack, under the circumstances, 
and for the purposes mentioned in his note (p. 22) to Generals McDowell and King, 
was a violation of the joint order." 

As the note to Generals McDowell and King was written an hour or 
more after this movement, the reason assigned by the Judge -Advocate 
shows that the court wa^ in error. 

This joint order commanded General McDowell and me to halt. It 
avoids the idea of a battle in whole or in part. It prohibits it, evidently 
with the view of enforcing some general policy or united action by the 
whole army, which circumstances might torce or General Pope might 
enjoin — whether to attack, to wait an attack, or to fall back behind Bull 
Eun. 

General Pope's course that day accords with this view, which at first 
sight of the order, as well as careful study of it and of facts, shows must 
have been intended. His location of his headquarters with Heintzle- 
man's corps or Centreville, some twelve miles from me; his not getting 
to the field near Groveton, till near 2 p. m.; his feeling for the enemy 
till late in the afternoon, with skirmishers and single brigades, and pos- 
sibly a division, all show intention of combined action and of waiting 
till a late hour, when he expected the united effort of General McDowell 
and myself on his left wing. It was only at a late hour, and when he 
learned that General McDowell was coming to him by a totally different 



45 

route from wliat he expected, aud was close at hand to join in this com- 
bined movement, that he issued the order of 4.30 p. M.* 

That I so construed the joint order, and so ado^ited it as the best 
course of action, is evident from my action that day. My orders all 
show that I strived to keep the enemj'from g'oing- against General Pope, 
that I strived to induce an attack npon me, and kept my command at 
times threatening an attack, and at times concealed from the view of 
the enemy. And I now repeat (and it i.^ shown on the record) that at 
no time before dark, had I or my ofticers, knowledge of any other than 
an artillery contest going on, or of any battle pending, or that General 
Pope needed any aid,f and, in fact, if he had needed aid, the best way 
of rendering it was by the very course I adopted. Had I attacked I 
should have been repulsed, and have done no good, as I then believed, 
and as facts now show would have been the case. Had I attacked at an 
early hour my repulse wonld have been followed by the enemy's attack 
with combined forces upon General Pope's centre at Groveton. The result 
may perhaps be conjectured with General McDowell's corps out of the 
field of action. Had I left my post on the left wing, I should have been 
coiH])elled to take the same route as was taken by General McDowell, 
and during that time have been of no use to any one, and in the mean- 
thne tin- main fore;' under General Longstreet would have been free to 
go against General Pope, as we now know was designed. 

As for a retreat to Manassas Junction, or any retreat, the record of 
the court does not ])rove it; my officers all say there was none, and that 
no orders were gi^'en by them or b,v me for such purpose, and I now re- 
iterate that there Avas no retreat, and am fully prepared to refute all 
sucli accusations. 

^)tJi. Ylolaiion of the 9th and 52^7 articJes of ivar. 

Under this charge it was claimed that within sound of the enemy's 
guns, and knowing that a severe battle of great consequence was being 
tbught, I was inactive all of the 29th August, from the time General 
McDovrell left me to dark, wlien the contest closed; and that I did fall 
back and retreat, not knowing the forces of the enemy; also, that I dis- 
obeyed of ])urpose the order of 4:30 p. m. of that day. 

At the risk of >ome repetition, I have to say: 

1st. It was sliown on tlie trial by the exidence of General Morell, 
General Marshall, General Griffin and others, that General Pope and 
the other witnesses for the prosecution misunderstood entirely the C(m- 
dition of affairs in my front. That showing is now fully sustained by 
new evidence not attainable during the trial. 

It is evident from their own showing that General Pope and his wit- 
nesses did not know, as I did, that a force larger than mine, and advan- 
tageonsly i:)osted, was, that day, in my front, and between me and Jack 
son's force "massed in the woods in front of us" (i. e.. General Pope 
personally), which I Avas expected to attack; and also that I was over 

* It is somewliat surprising that General McDowell, from about 12.30 p. m., when lie 
left nie, till 5.45, when he reported in person to General Pope, made no rei)ort to Gen- 
eral Pope of his action under the joint order — that he had separated from me. Gen. 
Pope says, in his Se])temher :3d, '62, report, expected Geu. McDowell and me to attack 
together under the 4.80 order: He seems to forget wliat he has said from time to time. 

tit is evident from my note to McDowell (Xo. 29) and King, and my instrnctions 
(No. 28) that I suspected the troops at Groveton needed help. But that impression was 
of short duration, as despatch Xo. 8:3 suspended the movement ordered in Xo. 2"^. It 
was not even commenced. Xo aid was needed. The order was given under a wrong 
imi)ression, aud moreover tlie movement would have been too dangerous to risk; the 
position then held was too important to vacate. 



4G 

two miles from Jackson's flank instead of less than one, as they sup- 
posed, and as General Pope has located me on bis map. They stated 
in their evidence that they supposed I had no opponents other than "a 
cavalry force in observation there and some light artillery;" and that I 
was expected "to attack the right flank of Jackson," and "get in his 
rear, which they believed practicable." The evidence of my officers 
states that we had no knowledge till about dark of any contest going 
on other than one of artillery at long range, and I assert that prior to 
the receipt of the 4:30 order I had no knowledge of any intention of bat- 
tle or of one likely to take place except from what might arise from 
our forces standing on the defensive.* 

With the knowledge of this large force between me and the Warren- 
ton Pike (additional evidence that its presence was known I now have) j 
with no knowledge of a contest pending or going on, but with a belief 
that if this force in my front could be kept from going against General 
Pope, he had abundant force to take care of his assailants; and with the 
belief that an attack by me upon my opponents would lead to no good 
result, and might derange plans and do great harm, I held to my place. 
My orders and the despatches from my officers — returned to me since my 
trial and heretofore given — on that atternoon prove that I was not an 
inactive occupant of that ground,t and that I was not a useless one is 
shown in the facts that of all of Longstreet's forces confronting me, no part 
of them engaged in the contest with General Pope, having been held 
there to meet any movement I should make against them. It is true, as 
records now show, that General Wilcox's division, which was sent from 
in front of General Pope to meet a supposed attack by me, was, at a 
late hour (after 5 o'clock), recalled to take x)art in an attack by General 
Hood ui)on General Pope's forces at Groveton, yet movements of my 
forces indicating an attack detained him till too late to be of service. 

It may not be out of place to here state that General W^ilcox occupied 
the ground which General Pope erroneously says, on his official map 
in Eeport to the Committee on the Conduct of the W^ar, I " had fallen 
back from," and to reach Hood he had to go a much less distance than I 
would have had to march to attack Jackson, and yet, unopposed and 
moving on an unencumbered road, he did not reach Hood till after dark. 

2d. General Pope claims that the order of 4:30 p. m., to attack Jack- 
son's flank, reached me in ample time to be carried into elfect, supposing 
there was no enemy between Jackson and me — this against the evi- 
dence of General Sykes, Colonel Locke^ Lieutenants Weld, Monteith 
and Ingham — and on the evidence of Captain Pope and his orderly. 
The proof was strong and clear that it was delivered to me about sun- 
down (6:30) instead of 5 to 5:30, as they claimed. General Pope had my 
desijatch acknowledging the receipt. It gave the hour — but he said he 
could not find it. There is reason to believe that no special haste was 
made to deliver the order to me, even if the bearer did not lose his way, 
and was not greatly delayed thereby. 

General Pope also claims that had I attacked " at any time up to 
eight o'clock that night it was his firm conviction that we should have 
destroyed the army of Jackson" ; and the Judge- Advocate, to convince 

*From about 10 a. m., when Gen., Pope sent me the joint order from Centreville, till 
after 6.30 p. m., when I received tlie 4.30 order, I received no instructions or indica- 
tions of Gen. Pope's purposes fiom him or Gen. McDowell, though I had sent many 
messages to both of these officers. Apparently I was left out in the cold — forgotten, 
as was Gen. Banks on the 30th. 

tTlie despatches newly presented by Gen. McDowell (Nos. 29a, 38a, 38b), which 
have been sleeping or concealed these sixteen years, accord with other despatches 
showing consistent vigilant action all that day, and sustain my statement above. 



47 

the President of the justice of my conviction, tells him ^' that even had 
the attack failed General McDowell states that the number of troops 
which would have been withdrawn from the Diain battle by the enemy 
(that is, Jackson's forces) to effect tliis result would have so far relieved 
our centre as to render our victory complete." 

Wherein any \ictory was attained by our side that night it was diffi- 
cult to see, as it was then known, that the enemy were in possession of 
the field on which General McDowell threw his trooi)s, and also of artil- 
lery captured from his command. And it is now as well established a 
fact that I could have given no assistance better than I did give and 
that not a man would have been withdrawn from the enemy in front of 
General McDowell to have met an attack by me. 

3d. On the ground that the order was received in time to be executed, 
General Pope asserts that I disobeyed the order, and that I should have 
attacked no matter what tlie force opposed to me, or the result. He says 
that I had no discretion under the maxim "A military order exacts pas- 
sive obedience only ivhen it is given by a superior who is present on the spot 
at the moment ichen he gives it. Having then knowledge of the state of 
things, he can listen to the objections and give the necessary explana- 
tions to him who should execute the order." He has claimed that he 
was in my immediate presence, and that so far as I was concerned, the 
risk of my sacrifice may have been taken and resolved upon. The order 
carries the contrary on its face. The blame of any utterly useless and 
disastrous sacrifice would have fallen on lue, and verj^ justly for having 
executed an order issued by Gen. Pope in utter ignorance of the cir- 
cumstances existing at the time of issue and of receipt. He forgets that 
I was arraigned for not attacking Jackson, and was condemned for not 
attacking Longstreet, of whom he Ivnew nothing. He also forgets that 
I had been preparing for a deinonstration at the time his order reached 
me, and was prevented by the lateness of the hour from carrying it into 
effect. 

4th, Another assertion is that I could and should liave passed my 
corps from my position on the Manassas-Gainesville road directly north 
to Groveton (as the enemy passed over the same ground the following 
day in their attack on General Pope), or have taken the SiuUey Springs 
road to the same point as did General McDowell. Had I done this last, 
as questions by the court indicated they thought it was advisable, I 
should have been justly condemned for abandoning the field, and letting 
loose upon General Pope, at Groveton, the main force of the Confederate 
Army, comprising their right wing, and thus have hastened the disaster 
which came on him the following day — a movement which the Confeder- 
ate leader had ordered, had arranged, and the execntion of which the 
presence of my command on his front ine vented that day. 

^o doubt a corps could take j)osition on that ground between me and 
Groveton, if unopposed in such a flank movement*, but the question of 
its advisability and practicability was settled by General McDowell not 
adopting it himself when present with nie. It is trne. General McDow- 
ell says he deemed the countiy practicable, for the following reasons. 
He testified, p. 93 : 

"My knowledge of tlie country is derived ])riiicipal]y, first, from liaviiif^ fjone over 
the railroad from Manassas to Gainesville 'ni a car, or on a locomolivc. winch f/are inc hut 
lUtle icha of it, a.s' / icas oujaf/cd icliit^t (joUkj over it iritJi maiters ichivh prcrcnicd my 
paijing attention to the eomUry ; next, in njarchiiiii,- fioin Biickland Mills to Gainesville, 
and ironi Gainesville <'ast along- the Waricnton turnpike for a mile or two — I do not 
remember tlie exact distance — then lurning off to the right and south, and going 
across the country to Bcthleheni Church, and thence to Mfinassas ; then from the fact 
that General Reynolds' division, which had the lead on the occasion that I refer to, 



48 

going from Gainesville to^vards Groveton, liad gone fnrtlier on that road tliau I went 
myself, had turned to the right and gone towards Bethlehem Church; and from the 
fact that General King's division, wliich had gone on that same road towards Grove- 
ton from Gainesville, and liad turned down south of that road, liad again gone north 
on to that road, had engaged the enemy at a certain place, had fallen hack to Manassas 
from that place, which i)lace I lefirncd were nearly reached, if not quite, on Friday, 
the day of the battle, by the troops moving from Groveton west ; and fr-om the fact 
that the enemy's force had moved to the south on Saturday, and turned our left on 
that day. These movements by these two divisions of my corps, my own movements, 
and the movements of the enemy, give me the belief that troops could move through 
the country com]irised between the Warrenion turnpike and the Sudley Spring road, 
and the road frem Belirieliein Clmi'cli to Gainesville. I will mention, further, that 
that country is a niixTiire of woods, eleared groiiud. cind hills, and that it is easy for 
troops to uiarcli without being seen, or seeing the enemy." 

Facts, liowever, do not confirm tliese statements or conclusions, and 
they slionld not he relied upon for tlie tbllowing reasons, 1st : His own. 
knowledge is sliglit, and there is a great difference between the free 
movement of a few persons on horseback, and a corps of artillery and 
infantry opposed by a vigilant foe; 2d: General Eeynolds testifies that 
he was forced by the difiiciilt character of the country fi^oni marching 
over it, except by following the roads; 3d: That King marched entirely 
on the roads: 4th: That the enemy marched over but a small part of 
that country in its attack on General Pope the next day, and that march 
was entirely unopposed by me being called to Groveton, or by any one ; 
5th : That there were no roads available from my i)osition, and the roads 
moved over by Generals McDowell, Eeynolds and King, Avere held hj 
Lono'street. 

Of all this I liave full proof. 

With a few conmients I will close my narrative of the events of this 
day. 

From the time (August 27) I joined General Pope to August 30th, the 
general movements of the enemy fi^oiii day to day, were largely known 
to me. From General Pope at Warrenton Junction I learned sufficient, 
with what I then knew, to con\ince me of the enemy's plans and of their 
aim to reach Maryland as early as possible. I so reported to General 
Burnside at the time and suggested, in the way to reach the govern- 
ment, the means of thA\arting them. (Despatch Xo. 20.) I also learned 
the i)olicy, as Avell as the necessity forced ui)on General Pope, of i^utting 
Bull Eun between him and Lee's army unless he should be joined in 
time by the Army of the Potomac in large force. (Xo. 20.) From day 
to day and almost from hour to hour, I kept myself well informed of the 
movements of oui^ army. I thus had, at that time, a tolerably correct 
knowledge of the management of the campaign, special as well as gen- 
eral. Therefore in tlie absence of restraining orders, my chief. General 
Pope being distant, I knew kow best to act, if necessary to act promptly ; 
and on receipt of a discretionar3' order from him when distant, I could 
and must judge of its ax)i3licability when the circumstances under which 
it was issued, and the accompanying statement, were so contrary to the 
facts known to me to be existing at the time and place of receipt of the 
order as to make its execution exceedingly culpable, even if possible. 
The only positive order received by me on the 29th, I tried to execute, 
but it was received too late for any result to be obtained. 

Till a late hour on the 29th, General Pope's army was scattered, and 
from the hour when General McDowell left me till 5 p. m., when King's 
division under General Hatch alone joined General Pope, McDowell's 
corps was available for no purpose. It was not good management for 
me under such circumstances, to voluntarily bring on a general action 
^Yith mv small and isolated commaiid. AVl'ien (4{Micral McDowell was 



49 

with me we knew tliat Longstreet's force, tlien largely iii my front, com- 
posed full one-lialf of the opposing armj^ — at least it was so strong that 
on the 28th, King's 8,000 and Ricketts' 7,000 had vacated the Warren- 
ton Pike, each fearing to be crushed between Longstreet and Jackson. 
(See ^o. 25a.) 

The time, if any, for attack on the 29th was before General McDowell 
left me, while he was with me controlling our united forces. Then, 
within an hour, if it had been possible that day, an attack, with any 
hope of success, might have been made upon Longstreet's forces. Gen- 
eral McDowell, however, decided otherwise. Leaving me on that ground 
with power only to engage the attention of the enemy, and thus to retain 
forces otherwise available to reinforce Jackson and attack General Pope, 
he turned aside some 15,000 troops and marched thi'm away five miles 
beyond support of me, to join General Pope at Groveton, whom he 
reached hours after — too late in the day to be of effective service. 

I believe my course throughout this day was go\^erned by correct 
principles and intentions'. Heretofore, as now, I have maintained 
I disobeyed no order of General Pope, and that under conditions 
of which he was totally ignorant, I sought in all my acts the best 
interests of the service, and I have rested under the belief that I did 
my fall duty. Up to the time General McDowell withdrew his com- 
mand from united action Avith me I was not responsible for our move- 
ments. After that hour my movements were controlled by the circum- 
stances under which he left me. l^o charge of disobedience can be laid 
against me, unless constructively by showing that I erred in judgment, 
which, in the light of the knowledge I then possessed, 1 have failed to 
see after all the criticisms of my personal enemies, whose persecutions I 
have endured. Kor do I believe any error of judgment can be charged 
to me in the knowledge of facts since disclosed. On the contrary, I be- 
lieved then, as I have reason to know now, that the presence that day 
of the Fifth Army Corps on the left flank of our army, delayed the com- 
bined attack of the Confederate army upon General Pope till the next 
day, when, besides other causes, his being driven from the field Avas 
hastened by the transfer of the corps from the position it held on the 
29th to the centre near Groveton. 

SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 

Soon after sunrise (by orders Xo. 40 of 8.30 p. m., 29th, received at 3 
o'clock a. m., 30th), 1 reported to General Pope near the crossing of the 
Warrenton Pike by the Sudley Springs road, and relieved King's divis- 
ion — that part of McDowell's corps not in reserve. 

General Morell, fearing an attack, withdrew Griflin's brigade so cau- 
tiously and slowly from the immediate front of the enemy as to lose 
sight of tlie rest of his division. He kept the direct road to CentreAille, 
believing he Avas "following Sykes" as he Avas instructed (despatch Xo. 
41), instead of turning at Bethlehem Cliurch toAA'ards Groveton. Piatt^ 
who had rejoined from detatclied duty at Warrentou Junction without 
my knoAvledge, folloAved Griffin. From a dispatcli (No. 41a) to Gen. 
Sturgis, AAdiich saw tlie liglit for the first time before tliis board, it is 
evident 1 did knoAv of Piatt's presence near by, but I had forgotten the 
fact, even in 1803, Avhen I testified before General McDowell's court of 
inquiry, and Avhen I Avrote this narratiA^e. Orders to Morell on the 
Gainesville road to hasten up, did not reach him ; he, hoAvever, came up 
from Centreville, but not in time to alloAv of his taking part in the action 
ot the day. 
4 



50 

Our army, facing westward, was posted in a form of an inverted Y 
with unequal arms, thus, /\, the opening towards us. The short arm 
just south of the Warrenton Pike was occupied by Eeynolds' division. 
The long arm, north of the pike, stretching oft' toward Sudley Springs, 
was held in the order named — by me, Sigel, Reno and Heintzelman — 
Ricketts and King being in the reserve. Elevated ground immediately 
in front, and to the left of Eeynolds, was covered with dense timber, 
interspersed with patches of pine and scrub oak. A narrow but dense 
forest was on my right front. Between the forests — one-half mile apart — 
and skirting the Warrenton Pike, on the north and in my front, was 
cleared ground, a natural glacis rising rapidly to an elevated ridge held 
by the enemy and crowned by numerous artillery. This artillery com- 
manded the pike and the cleared ground, and concentrated a flank and 
direct lire ui^on any attacking column. 

The enemy's skirmishers held the oi^en ground and the forests. His 
forces and movements were concealed from us, whilst the least of ours 
as far oack as Centreville were o])en to his view. Unsuccessful eflbrts 
on the 29th to gain possession of these forests had caused heavy losses 
to General Pope, levealed the presence of large forces south of the pike 
and the fact that Jackson had acquired great strength north of it, by 
standing behind a railroad embankment. 

I learned at General Pope's headquarters that those efforts of the 29th 
had been mainly a series of skirmishes, artillery contests at long range, 
and a few attacks (after strong protests and delay) by brigades, and 
separate divisions resulting in repulses and heavy losses, and that about 
dark. King's division, the only part of McDowell's command which at 
that hour had reached General Pope at Groveton, was sent into action, 
lost heavily, and did no good. 

Early in the day General Pope suggested plans of attack, the favorite 
one being with corps on our right along the Haymarket road. All were 
based on the erroneous impression that the enemy had been some hours 
retreating. General Eeynolds — since early 29th engaged with the newly 
arrived body of the enemy — coincided with me in the opinion that the 
enemy had been strengthened, not weakened, and was in great force 
along our whole front and especially on our left, ^o such impression, 
however, could be made on the mind of General Pope. 

Seeing great danger in the enemy holding in our immediate front, the 
forests which masked his strength and movements, and as no plan was 
decided upon, and each commander was left to act on his own judgment. 
General Eeynolds and I arranged to clear our respective fronts and ascer- 
tain if possible, the strength and position of the enemy. We succeeded — 
our skirmishers not meeting strong resistance. I soon found the enemy 
well i^osted behind the railroad embankment — and his front and flanks 
well protected by numerous artillery. General Eeynolds from his newly 
acquired elevated position, at once informed me of a numerous enemy in 
my front, and of his intention to at once report that his left was being 
turned by a heavy force. He did in person so rex)ort. He told Gen. 
Pope in order to get to him he had to pass through the enemy's skir- 
mishers getting to his rear, but General Pope put no confidence in what 
he Siiid and sent General Buford to ascertain the truth of his statement. 

General McDowell, returning from a reconnoissance on our extreme 
right, reported to General Pope, the enemy as having withdrawn. The 
contraction of their line was mistaken for a '' retreat." About the same 
time a union soldier — recaptured by my skirmishers and sent by me to 
General Pope — reported that he had "heard the rebel officers say their 
army Avas retiring to unite with Longstreet." So positively did our 



51 

knowledge of Longstreet and the iudications before us, contradict tlie 
statement of this soldier, that on sending him to General Pope, I said, 
^^ In duty bound I sent him, but I regarded him either as a fool or de- 
signedly released to give a wrong impression, and no faith should be put 
in what he said." Unfortunately General McDowell's report was consid- 
ered as confirmed by his story, and I received this message, ''General 
Pope believes that soldier, and du-ects you to attack; King will support." 
I received the following orders about 2.30 p. m., about an hour after 
the verbal order, and after I had i^repared to attack : 

[No. 42.] 

Headquarters, near Grovetox, 

August 30tli, 1862, 12 M. 
Special OrdeRj No. — . 

The folio wiug forces will be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy, and 
press him rigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to 
the command of the pursuit, Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the War- 
renton turnpike, followed by the division of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds. 

The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket road, fol- 
lowed by the corps of Major-General Heintzelman.* The necessary cavalry will be 
assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent 
reports wijl ])e made. 

The general headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnpike. 
By command of Major-General Pope. 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

Col. and Chief of Staff. 
[No. 43.] 

Headquarters 3d Corps Army of Virginia, 

August 30th, 1862. 
Major-General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue 
the enemy, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by 
King's division, supported by Reynolds. Heintzelman, with his corps, preceded by 
Ricketts' division, will move on your right, on the road from Sudley Springs to Hay- 
market. He is instructed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which it is desirable 
you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the 
head of Reynolds' division, on the Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to 
precede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come 
in contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade will be ordered to report 
to you. Push it well to the left as you advance. 
Verv resx)ectfully, your obedient servant, 

ED. SCHRIVER, 

Col. and Chief of Staff. 
Major-General Porter, 

Commanding, <^x., 4-C' 

Xo orders of this campaign, to my knowledge, more erroneously" stated 
the attitude of the opposing forces or led to more serious disaster. An- 
ticipating strong resistance from the enemy, well posted and waiting 
attack, I had asked that Sigel should be held ready to assist me. 

Confident I was to attack a well posted and wxll x)repared enemy, I 
arranged to make a strong attack, and deferred "pushing forward" "in 
pursuit of the enemy," till I got my forces iu position for this strong 
attack. 

On the receipt of General Pope's verbal order I sent Butterfield (com- 
manding Morell's two small brigades) to develop the strength of the 
enemy beyond the forest on my right; lield Sykes to support, called uj) 
Hatch (King's division) who had reported, and directed him to deploy 
in four lines to Sykes' riglit. I had thus become so involved in a move- 
meut against Jackson that I could not, on the receipt of the above order, 
ma'.ie the change, " to push forward on the Warrenton turnpike." I had 
largely completed my dispositions to attack witli my wliole, force. A 

" No such movement was even attempted 



52 

heavy artillery fire was directed upon iis. Butterfield h ad twice reported 
he could make no headway against the infantry fire which opposed hiio. 
I therefore informed General McDowell on recei^i.ng his order " to push 
forward," &c., that, availing myself of the cover of the timber, I should 
attack Jackson, and if successful, would wheel to the left, and move 
towards the turnpike. Anticipating strong resistance, indeed fearing 
repulse, I again urged that Sigel should he brought up to assist, if- nec- 
essary. 

By this time General McDowell had uncovered our left wing by with- 
drawing Eeynolds (though Eeynolds had reported his left being turned 
by large forces) frojn his commanding i30sition, and putting him north 
of the turnpike in my rear. 

Colonel AYarren, prompt to remedy errors, and to take advantage of 
positions, seeing the key to our whole line thus vacated by the removal 
of Reynolds, without waiting for orders but with Sykes' ready api3roval, 
threw his small brigade into the gap.* 

Jackson was too strongly posted against Butterfield's repeated efforts. 
Hatch having deployed, I ordered a renewed attack with my whole com- 
mand, hoping by the time we would be engaged, Sigel would be close hj. 
Bayard being useless in fi-ont, and it being impossible ''to push him well 
to the left" or to use him in any other manner, I had directed to keep in 
rear beyond the artillery shot pouring upon us, and to arrest the wounded 
and stragglers now flocking to our rear from our forces fiercely engaged. 

General McDowell, still not appreciating the real state of affairs, re- 
plied to my request to have "Sigel pushed up," 

[No. 44.] 

Headquarters 3d Army Corps Army of Virginia, 

August liOth, 18u'2. 
General: 

Major General McDowell directs that yon pnsh on tlie movement, snggested in 
your note to liim, to tlie left, and General Heintzelxtian, now liere, will attend to the 
front and right. Yon have at your disposal to reinforce you, King's division and 
Eeynolds'. 

Very respectfuUv, vour ohedient servant, 

ED. SCHRIVEE, 
Colonel and Chief of /Staff. 

He added in a postscript, the presence of an aggressive enemy only 
then becoming evident to him : 

':The enemy having shown indication of advancing hy the right, Reynolds has been 
withdrawn from your column and put over on your left. It is still thought you will 
he strong enough to effect vour purpose vrith King ; if not General Poj)e will send von 
Sigel. " 

And again, as if he had expected my G,000 men (Griffin being absent) 
to overcome Jackson, that which General Pope's right wing had failed 
to do on the previous day, he directed thus : 

[No. 45.] 

Headquarters 3d Army Corps, Army of Virginia, 

August 30 th, 1^62. 
Major-General McDowell is now husy attending to our left; he directs me to inform 
y6u that yon must use your discretion in reference to the employment of King's divis- 
ion in connection with the service you are to perform. 
Very respectfnllv, vour ohedient servant, 

ED. SCHRIVEE, 
Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-General Porter, Commanding, ^-c., ^^c. 

*The rempval of Reynolds took all of our troops fron the south of the turnpike, 
thus uncovering entirely my left. 



63 

[Xo. 46.] 

Gexekal McDowell: 
•I fear for tlie result unless you push up Sigel. Our right is a''so attacked. 

F. J. POETER, 

Major- General 

Eeplies came too late to get Sigel up to join in our attack. 

From his elevated, crescent shaped position, the enemy swei^t with 
numerous artilley, every foot of ground over which we liad to pass. He 
opposed us also by a terrible musketry fire from behind the railroad em- 
baukment, where he was driven and stood almost unharmed by us. 
Butterfield, aided by Sykes, with Hatch on his right einerging from the 
sheltering ti7nber, rapidly advanced, gallantly attacked and desperately 
contended for victory. The resistance could not be overcome. The en- 
filadiug artillery, combined with the direct infantry fire, almost annihi- 
lated line after line, as each was about to crown the embankment. Many 
of the enemy, hard pressed, had not time to reload, and received us with 
stones, severely wounding many and killing some of our men. Four 
successive, unceasing vigorously desperate attacks were repulsed. Gen- 
eral Hatch apparently badly wounded, on asking to leave the field, re- 
ported the condition desperate, and my presence necessary with his divis- 
ion to induce renewed attack. Colonel Sullivan, commanding one of his 
brigades, reported affairs deplorable, and added that one brigade could not 
be forced agaiust the fire. I had started with him to use n\y i)ersonal in- 
fineuce when 1 met the e videu ce of disa strous repulse in numerous wounded 
and stragglers, and in remnants of regiments declaring themselves out of 
ammuuition. As if to add to our discomfiture, cam e to our ears the shouts 
of Longstreet's forces, pushing down upon oiir almost defenceless artillery 
to gain our rear and cut us off from the turni)ike. Eenewed attack by 
us on Jackson was madness. The enemy dared not attack us, he had 
enough to occui^y him in '' Heintzehnan, Kicketts and Eeno attending 
to tlie front and right," and sufficient to oppose him in reliable parts 
of King's command, and in my artillery at hand and being well served. 
I therefore assigned to the serviceable part of King's division the pro- 
tection of that p>art of the field, and sent such of my own divisions as 
had ammunition to form south of the turnpike, near the Henry house 
in the rear of our left, to which point I had authorized Sykes (ever 
prouipt to see aud meet imminent danger) to hasten with the remnants of 
his division and give aid to Eejmolds, now striving to hold against vastly 
superior forces the vital point of our line. 

After securing the numerous artillery in my vicinity, and using it suc- 
cessfully to arrest attempts to follow up our repulses, I joined Sykes, 
now with Eeynolds contendiug against Longstreet. 

The force that had almost annihilated Warren threw itself upon artil- 
lery belonging to and defended by the Pennsylvania Eeserves. Though 
twice driven from the defence of the guns, this gallant division regained 
them tenii)orarily, re-enacting scenes of stubborn resistance and gal- 
lantry frecjuent in the Corps on the PeniiLsula. 

Other troops* were brought to the left, where now took place the all 
important contest. These forces were thrown into action at the same 

* McLean's hrigade of Schenck's division and Milroy's brigade, botli of Sigel's corps; 
Tower with two brigades of Ricketts' division; Reno's division of the 9tli Corps; 
Bufoi'd's Cavalry ; Graham's, Randol's, Siiiead's, Weed's, and some other artillery were 
all severely engaged in this contest on the left, and were all tlie troops of General 
Poi>e's army vrhich, with .Sykes' and Reynolds' divisions and Piatt's brigade of Stnrgis' 
division, stubbornly resisted till dark tlie attack of Longstreet in turning the left of our 
army, south of the turnpike. 



54 

point, often so qnickly npon the heels of their predecessors, as mid the 
excitement, to mistake friends for foes and fire npon them. Reynolds 
and Sykes (Bnchanan's and Chapman's brigadesof regular troops) moved 
to the left and thwarted the enemy, continually working around to oiir 
left and rear. The remainder of Sykes' division was held close by in 
reserve, and on emergencies, occasionally arising, sent support to their 
companions. These, their ammunition being expended, fell back to the 
division as they were replaced by fresh troops. 

General McDowell took charge of this part of the field — General Pope 
appearing about sundown. Soon after dark the battle ceased. I was 
directed by General Pope to repair to Centre ville, whither such of the 
army as had not gone was ordered to assemble. 

As evidence of the efforts of my command in this day's struggle, I 
have to say of 6,000 men present, the loss in killed, wounded and pris- 
oners was 2,171 of which 112 were officers. - 

Of the losses in King's division I have no report. 

The following extract* from the report of General Jackson, shows the 
estimate the enemy held of our efforts on that day : 

Eeport op General Jacksox of Operations from Aua. 15 to 

Sept. 5, 1862. 

Headquarters Second Corps, A. N. Y., 

April 27, 1863. 
Brigadier-General R. H. Chilton, A. A., General Headquarters Department A. 
N. v.: 

During the day the commanding general arrived, and also General Longstreet with 
his command. On the following day (tliirtieth) my command occupied the ground 
and the division the same relative positions to each other and to the field which they 
held the day before, forming the left wing of the army. General Longstreet's com- 
mand formed the right wing. A large quantity of artillery was posted upon a command- 
ing eminence in the centre. 

After some desultory .skirmishing and heavy cannonading during the day, the Fed- 
eral infantry, about 4 o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the wood and 
advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its attack to 
the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and san- 
guinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place^nd 
pressed forward, as if determined, by force of nnmljers and fury of assault, to drive us 
from our position. So impttuous and icelJ susi((i)U'(l were fhoie onsets as to btduce me to send 
to the commanding general for nhiforcements, hut the timely and gallant advance of General 
Longstreet, on tlie right, relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelming numbers and 
gave to those brave men the chances of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet pressed 
npon the right, the Federal advance was checked, and soon a general advance of my 
whole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhib- 
iting in parts of the field scenes of close encounter and murclerous strife not witnessed 
often in the turmoil of battle. 

I am, General, very resx3ectJFnlly, 

Your obedient servant, 

T. J. JACKSON, 

Lieutcn a n t- Gen era 1. 

In presence of an enemy vastly our superior, defeat would probably 
have resulted from remaining west of Bull Eun with an army dispirited 
by fatigue, and by scarcity of food ; but, be that as it may, it was hastened 
by uncovering the left wing and by abandoning a strong position to at- 
tack a concealed foe, whose elevated position masking his own, revealed 
to him all our movements, and made him master of the situation — to 
attack, moreover, a supposed or declared to be retreating enemy, actually 
prepared, as I had reason to know, with full force to give battle under 
the most favorable circumstances. 

^ This extract is the one Generals Pope and McDowell used as describing the battle 
of the 29th August. 



TELEaRAMS TO GENERAL BURNSIDE. 

General Pope lias made such improper use of my telegrams that I 
deem it proper to exi>lain their origin and real purpose. 

General Burnside, who was opposite Fredericksburg, felt that early 
and reliable information of General Pope's army, and as far as possible 
of the enemy, was vit Q to the usefulness as well as the safety of his 
command. Information furnished by General Halleck for his guidance 
proved so inaccurate on receipt as to mislead and delay, and thus 
destroy confidence in that source. I so reported at the time to General 
Burnside. (Xo. 8 and 1>.) 

At General Burnside's solicitation, and to expedite my own move- 
ments and supplies, I established telegraphic communication with him. 

General Burnside asked me to dispense with the formality of official 
correspondence, and to send him everything of interest, and my own 
impressions of tlie state of affairs. 

This correspondence I maintained till I left Bristoe at 7 A. 3i., Angust 
the 29th. At that hour (the distance to the wires becoming too great for 
safety), I gave it up, trusting to one which must soon be opened and be 
more exi:)editious and s^ife through Centreville, towards whicih General 
Pope's order of 3.30 A. 3i., received about 6 A. m., urgently called me. 

On the 27th August, when I reported in person to General Pope at 
Warrenton Junction, Jackson and Stuart held General Pope's line of 
communication with Washington. I then informed General Pope of 
this channel of telegrai)hic communication and nrged him to nse it, but 
he declined. General Burnside .informed me, as an incentive to frequent 
communication, that President Lincoln, to whom he was sending many 
of my disi)atches, was without information, and deprived of all other 
means of hearing from the army and was often calling for information 
from me. Under these circumstances, I felt it my duty to General Burn- 
side, to the forces with which I was serving and to the government, 
that I should not only give information, but that I should withhold 
nothing which would give the military anthorities the means of forming 
a correct estimate of our condition. 

My dispatches were frequent. Each transmitted an order of march 
from General Pope, and gave information of the rapidly changing phase 
of affairs, which made his orders often imx)roper if not impossible to 
execute. In some cases they suggested how to take advantage of the 
enemy's errors and to proA'ide against the effects of past and other 
inevitable losses on onr side. They exhibit a state of affairs either mis- 
understood by General Pope, or much changed, after his orders were 
issued. Their accuracy, now fully established, shows that I was better 
acquainted than General Pope was, with the i)Ositions and movements 
of the contending forces, and with the dangers to ours. Their value 
was acknowledged by the President, in person to me, on the battle-field 
of Antietam. 

Uj) to this time I had taken for granted that the original plan of the 
cami)aign, (page 5) as I understood it, was to he carried out in full faith. 
I knew nothing to the contrary. I tliought that tlie main body of the 
Army of the Potomac was landing at Aquia Creek, and would join the 
Army of Virginia by the line of the Eappahanno(.'k 5 that the Army of 
the Potomac and the Army of Yirginia, under their respective com- 
manders, McClellan and Pope, would co-operate and be man(jenvered by 
one head — General McClellan. I did not then know or suspect that "it 
had been decided that General McClellan was to have nothing to do Avith 
the camx^aign." 



xVfter August 20tli, AThen I left Fort Monroe, T received no instruc- 
tions from General McOlellan. His instructions liacl been to hasten to 
and give to General Pope, all possible help. From August 23d to Sep- 
tember 2d, I heard nothing whatever from him or of him. 1 knew 
nothing whatever of his status in regard to the army. I believed that he 
still commanded the Army of the Potomac, and that my service under 
General Pope was temijorary. Hence an occasional reference to Gene- 
ral McOlellan in my dispatches to General Burnside. Under this belief, 
and knowing that the main body of the enemy had passed to the right, 
leaving his rear comparatively very insecure, I suggested, August 27th, 
1862, see dispatch No. 20, that I miglit be recalled to the Eappahannock, 
there to unite with the Army of the Potomac or with Burnside, in 
order either to push to Richmond, now defenceless, or to strike upon 
the enemy's rear near Orange Court House. Either of these mo\'ements 
I felt sure would arrest the enemy's almost unimpeded march towards 
Maryland, and would give time at Washington for amx:)le preparations 
(also suggested) to prevent the crossing of the Potomac. All this will 
be seen in my dispatches. 

Before I united with General Pope, reverses had come upon him, and 
liroju a campaign conducted as this was, others at least as serious 
seemed inevitable. The army had no confidence in his management, 
and my suggestions were only a part of the prevailing wishes of the 
army, or indicative of the apparent means to remedy the eifects of past 
failures, or to alleviate those which seemed inevitable. I asked General 
Burnside '' to make use of my dispatches to effect any good purpose," 
and though addressed to him I expected the Government would act upon 
them, in all i>robability through General McClellan, the only officer in 
whom, as I then knew, both armies had confidence. 

Such was the origin, the object and the tenor of those dispatches. I 
had nothing to conceal. When I found the prosecution before my court 
was seeking in them something evil on my part, I immediately brought 
forward all I could get. Conscious of my own innocence, I gave every 
assistance to aid their presentation to the court. 

All the prosecution claimed that these dispatches proved was, that I 
had no favorable opinion of General Pope or of his ability to conduct 
the campaign. The same charge could have been made against many 
officers of high rank whose patriotism has never been suspected. 

Because I was supposed to entertain an unfavorable o])inion of Gen- 
eral Poi^e, it was undertaken to infer that I could not or would not do 
my duty to him, to the army and to the country. 

With the exception of those presented by the prosecution, my dis- 
patches when offered were excluded, and at the close of the trial, when 
all the injury to my case that could arise from their exclusion, had been 
done, some of them were admitted to the record, but so disconnectedly 
as to destroj^ the effect of tlie honest object of all the dispatches. I 
have, however, in closing tliis subject, to state that on the battle-field of 
Antietam, President Lincoln in person, gave me his congratulations for 
the past, his warmest wishes for the future, and his "thanks for having 
furnislied these messages and letters — the only correct information re- 
ceived at the time from the army — and which had led to the hai)piest 
results.'^* 

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL POPE AT FAIRFAX COURT-HOISE. 

About 9 o'clock A. m., September 2d, soon after arriving at Fairfax 
Court- House, before I knew of the receipt by General Pope of any order 

*Tlie timely recall of the Armj^ of Virgiuia; under General Poi^e, and the success a 
Antietam, of which we were sx^eaking. 



57 

for the Army of Virginia to falJ back within the intrenchmeuts of Wash- 
ington, and hefor.e I knew anything whatever of the relations General 
McClellan held with the army and with the Administration, I received 
this despatch : 

[No. 50.] 

War Department, 

Sept. 1, 1862—5:30 P. M. 
I ask of you for my sake, that of the country and of the okl Army of the Potomac, 
that you aud all friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to Gen- 
eral Pope in all operations no^y going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of 
our arms are at stake, and all depends up<m the cheerful co-operation of all in the 
field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to all my friends in the 
Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make to them is that, for 
their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same snpi)ort they ever have 
to me. 

I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, and doing all I can to render your re- 
treat safe should that become necessarj", 

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

Major- General. 
Major-General Porter, 

Commanding bth Corps. ^ 

General McClellan testified of this dispatch: 

Q. As you have stated that you never doubted that General Porter wouhl be true 
to his duty to General Pope, how came you to send General Porter such a despatch as 
that ? — A. I sent it in accordance with the request of the President of the United States, 
who sent for me on that day, and told me that he had understood that there was an un- 
kind feeling on the part of the Army of the Potomac towards General Pope, and re- 
quested me to use my personal influence to correct it, by telegraphing either to Gen- 
eral Porter or to any other of my friends there. I told hini that I did not consider it 
necessary, but was perfectly willing to do it. I had no doubt that, in my own mind, 
but that the Army of tlie Potomac,' and all connected with it, would do their duty 
v\'ithout tlierc being any necessity tor an}' action on my part. 

Q. I uudei'staud you to say, then, that you sent the telegram to quiet the apprehen- 
sions of the President, and not to remove any api^reheusions of your own '? — A. En- 
tirely so. 

At a loss to conceive why I should have been thus addressed, I sought 
Gen. Pope for an explanation, desirous of learning what, if any, com- 
plaint he had made against me or my command, determined to meet at 
once in the presence of trustworthy witnesses^ active participants in the 
campaign, any comi)laint or false representation which might have been 
made by him to shift the responsibility of the failure of his Virginia 
campaign. 

After showing the corps commanders present at General Pope's head- 
qnarters General McClellan's dispatch, I asked of General Pope the 
transmission of the following reply: 

[No. .51.] 

Fairfax C. H., Sept. 2d, 186-2—10 a.m. 
You may jest assured that all your friends, as well as e^^ery otlier lover of his coun- 
try, will ever give, as they have given to General Pope, their cordial co-operation and 
coiislant support in the execution of orders and plans. Our killed and Avounded and 
enfeebled troops attest our devotion to dutv. 

F. J. PORTER, 
M((Jor-GcneraI Commanding 5//( Jrmg Corps. 
Gen. Geo. I?. McCleli.ax, 

M.rj.-frcneral Co>ninunding, Washington. 

In tlie conversation which ensued, General Pope declared that he had 
made no complaint of me or of my command, and that none existed ex- 
cept in the single case of Griffin's brigade, which had not engaged in. 
the battle of the 30th August, yet expressed himself satisfied with my 



5S 

explauation, promptly given, liow that brigade happened to go to Oen- 
treville that day. 

General Pope said that '^ he had had cause to complain of me prior to 
my joining^ inasmuch as in a, letter which had fallen into the President's 
hands, I had commented upon his military conduct and ability, had pre- 
dicted disasters, and had unjustly criticised as his, the 2)1 an of the campaign 
just closed^ The letter referred to was a private one (written from Har- 
rison's Lauding, in Jnl;\', before I had any idea of joining him), on receipt 
from Washington of a plan of cami)aign abont to be commenced under 
the control of General Pope. The just criticisms of the proposed cam- 
paign, and predictions of inevitable failures contained therein, induced 
the receiver to lay it before the President, in the hope of doing some 
good. 

Unable, at the instant, to recall the criticisms, I replied that " if I had 
been unjust, I would make all amends possible, and that if 1 had i)re- 
dicted misfortune, he must admit the justice of the prediction." Frus- 
trations of his plans had commenced prior to my arrival, and were legiti- 
mate results of his operations, and readily to be foreseen in a campaign 
executed with a comparatively small force in the face of an active foe, 
and OD a plan such as that proclaimed in his orders. 

A correct statement of this conversation was of importance to me on 
my trial, as showing that at that date General Pope had denied all cause 
of complaint against me. Any testimony as to what took place at that 
interview was objected to by General Pope as irrelevant, and the objec- 
tion was sustained by the court All efforts to elicit a statement were 
defeated till General Pope, after twenty -four hours' reflection, said he 
desired to make one. The court then accepted it. 

There are points of difference between General Pope and myself, as 
to actual occurrences, so great that I feel compelled to call attention to 
them and to point out the differences between his sworn statement and 
other of his statements and between his sworn statements and estab- 
lished facts. 

In all essential particulars, my version as above is corroborated by 
the testimony of General George D. Euggies, chief of General Pope's 
staff, the only witness of the interview . 

General Pope (Eecord, p. 20), says of this interview: '^General Porter 
asked me why I had supposed such a desi)atch (General McClellan's) had 
been sent to him, seeming to apprehend, or to believe, or to suspect, 
that 1 had reported his conduct to Washington, and made comxjlaint of 
him which had made it necessary for this despatch to be sent. I told 
General Porter that I had not reported him to the Department in Washing- 
ton, and that as matters stood, I thought I should not talce any action in his 
case, though I felt bound to do so in the case of Griffin. This is about 
the substance of what I said." 

Taking this, his sworn version of the interview, I was surprised at 
subsequently seeing a despatch (Xo. 55) to General Halleck, dated Sep- 
tember 1st, speaking of me and my command as follows: 

"The commander of a corps, who was ordered to march from Manas- 
sas Junction, to join me near Groveton, although he was only five miles 
distant, failed to get up at all, worse still, fell back upon Manassas. 
Their (the officers') constant talk, indulged in i)nblicly, and in i^romis- 
cuous company, is, that the Army of the Potomac will not fight, that 
they are demorahzed by withdrawal from the Peninsula," &c. I have 
yet to learn the name of any officer of the Army of the Potomac who 
ever entertained such an opinion. 

It was the sight of this despatch that caused the President to ask 
General McClellan to telegraph me or some other of his friends. 



59 
General Pope further testified in regard to our interview : 

I said to General Porter that I had received information from friends of mine in 
Washington, that he (General Porter) had written letters, or sent despatches to General 
Burnside, dated before he had joined me, which criticised my conduct, my military 
capacity and the campaign, which I was conducting very severely, and which exhib- 
ited a very unkind spirit. *f * * * He seemed surprised that his letter had become 
known, and stated that it was a priA^ate letter, which he had never intended should 
go further than General Burnside;* that General Kearney had expressed opinions opposite 
to his own on the subject of the campaign^ and that therefore both sides of the question ivould 
now be heard. (Pecord, p. 22.) 

This reference to Geneiial Kearney's oi^inions is quoted by me merely 
to point out the imx^ossibility of such version of our conversation. I 
did not know, nor could he have known of these opinions, as beyond the 
person to whom General Kearney's letters were addressed, they were 
made known only by their publication in Willies^ Spirit of the Times y 
October 18th and 25th, 1862, some weeks after our interview at Fairfax 
C. H. 

By the next quotation from his testimony, it would seem that Gen- 
eral Pope did not know, at the time of our interview, of the telegrams 
to General Burnside, above referred to, and he could not have known 
of them, as no communication had been held with Washington. Indeed, 
General Pope so testified : 

"It was not until the campaign was closed, and I came to Washington City, on the 4th 
or .5th of September, that I was informed by the President of the United States that 
he had seen several despatches or letters from General Porter to Genernl Burnside, 
dated a day or two previous to these battles, which had occasioned him very grave 
apprehensions that General Porter would fail to do his duty. This communication of 
the President opened my eyes to many matters, which I had before been loth to be- 
lieve." (Eecord, p. 23.) 

Thus it ai)pears that he had to be shown my letter, doubting his abil- 
ity to conduct the campaign, written long before the events inquired 
into, and to learn of my telegrams pointing out the errors into which 
he was falling, in order to instigate him to this prosecution and to in- 
duce the belief, on his part, that I had committed offences which called 
for it, 

A few words more and I close on this point. 

General Pope denied under oath that he knew Longstreet was on the 
field of battle at Groveton during the 29th of August, and said that a 
small portion only of his forces reached there at sundown. Yet, he des- 
patched to General Halleck on the 30th August as follows, and subse- 
quently admitted before the Court Martial that the expression " com- 
bined forces," referred to " Longstreet and Jackson :" 

"We fought a terrifiobattlehevejesterdsiy with the combined forces of the enemy, which 
lasted with continuous fury from daylight till dark, by ^A'hich time the enemy was 
driven from the field, which we now occupy." (No. 53.) 

To that part of his despatch, September 1st, relating to the conversa- 
tion of officers, etc., I give, so far as I am concerned or knoAv, an un- 
qualified denial. At that time I discussed General Pope and his officers 
with no one. 

The cordis which I had the honor to command joined General Pope 
after many days of excessive fatigue, arising from long and hard marches, 
and almost sleepless nights. United heart and hand Avith all wlio per- 
iled their lives for their country, they were the first to seek the side of 
their conq)anions in arms under General Pope, known to be in danger, 
and then, as ever before and since, unhesitatingly to take their places 
in the front line of dutj', animated bj^ an ardent and i)ure patriotism. 

*Xo such letter was CA'er written to General Burnside by me. 



60 

Though ahiiost broken down by fatigue and hunger, they were yet char- 
itable even to forgetfulness of palpable errors and incapacity, and they 
left unperformed no practicable duty, nor avoided any effort, however 
desperate. Eelying on the justice of our cause to crown our efforts with 
success, they boldly contended on the plains of Manassas for the honor 
of our arms and for the safety of our Capital. 

With the hope that such efforts would at least be recognized by their 
country, they sought victory in bloody sacrifice. It is lamentable that 
such noble endeavors have been met by misrepresentation and neglect, 
and availed of to elevate and sustain the unworthy. 

TELEORAMS AND ORDERS. 

Sensible of the insufficiency of the evidence on my trial to warrant 
conviction, the prosecution sought to create the belief of an evil animus 
on my part. The Judge Advocate said : 

" As the animus of the accused towards'his Commanding General in 
pursuing the line of conduct alleged against him must largely affect the 
question of his criminality, and may furnish a safe and valuable light 
for your guidance " (he addressing the President of the United States, 
not the Court) '' in deteroiining points otherwise left doubtful by the ev- 
idence, it is proper that it should be ascertained before entering at 
large uj^on the review of the case, which you have instructed me to 
make." 

For the purpose of convicting me of bad intention before the court, he 
selected four dispatches out of some fifty, Rud resisted the presentation 
by me of any of the others, until this effect had been produced. He then 
accepted a small number, and these in such a way as to prevent the 
effect of the evidently honest purpose, shown hy these dispatches as a 
whole. 

General Pope seeks the same object in the following manner in his 
^' Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter:" 

" It will also be noticed tliat in this statement no reference is made to tlie motive of 
Porter's conduct. It will be admitted, I tliink, that this conduct can only be explained 
on one or two theories. Ist. Incompetency and cowardice ; or, 2d. Deliberate treach- 
ery with a view to bring about the defeat of the rest of the army. If there l)e any 
other alternative, I confess I am unable to see it. As a practical question it has no 
bearing upon the sentence of the Courts Martial, which must have been the same in 
either case; but as the mass of the witnesses called by Porter for the defence testified 
to his l>rave and skilful conduct during the battles on the Peninsula, he has himself 
narrowed down the question of motive to the se€ond alternative. Unfortunately for 
him, he has put upon record as complete proof of his motive as he did of the conduct 
for which he was cashiered. On the files of the Coiirt Martial proceedings will be 
found dispatches from him to Burnside intended for the use of McClellan, who was 
then at Alexandria. These dis]Datche8 were written aiid sent, in violation of all mil- 
itary propriety, Avhilst he was under my command. They contain the falsest a.nd 
most malicious reflections upon me, his then commanding officer, hoping that ' "Mack " 
is at work to get him out of this,' etc. All these dispatches were written in the face 
of the eneuiy, in the midst of severe fighting in which he alone was not engaged, 
witliDUt knowledge of the enemy's forces and position, or our own, and show from 
fir.st to last an animus and intentions fully carried out in his subsequent shameful de- 
sertion from the field of battle. I will venture to say, that for personal malevolence, 
false statement, insulting insinuation and bad manners, these dispatch^'s are without 
a parallel in military history, and they exhibit a state of mind capable of any act 
whatever. It is almost impossible to Ijelieve that such <lispatches could have been 
written by any sane man under such circumstances, but he himself admitted their 
authenticity before the Court Martial, and they furnish the most complete explana- 
tion of his conduct that can be given." 

In examining these dispatches it should be borne in mind that to 
August 31st, not one of them Avas addressed to or intended for General 
McGlellan, of whom I knew nothing. 



They were addressed to General Burnside, who was oiy Commander 
a large part of tlie time, and who, after I passed under General Pope's 
orders, was continnally calling tor information, and urging, as an in- 
duceoient for sending it, that the President was without any news from 
the army and anxiously calling for it from me. It should also be borne 
in mind^ that before I left Harrison's Landing I was informed that Gen- 
eral McClellan would command the two armies — his own and General 
Pope's; that when I learned at AYilliamsburg of the enemy's intention 
to crush General Pope I hastened, without orders, to his aid; and that 
when at Falmouth 1 was ordered to defend the line of the Eappahan- 
nock, but finding no enemy there, I voluntarily put myself under the 
command of General Poi)e. 

To the 2oth of August, I was ill at Falmouth. The information sent 
to General ^Morell and General Sykes was a repetition of erroneous in- 
formation received from General Pope through General Halleck. 

Dispatches ]S'os. 1 and 2, with others, were excluded by the ruling of 
the Court as not coming within the period embraced by the charges. 
The fact of their having been sent was testified to by General McClellan 
and General Burnside, who also testified that my motive for deviating 
from General McClellan's instructions to remain at Williamsburg till 
the army should pass me, was my desire, in the quickest way, to give 
aid to Geueral Pope. 

The Judge Advocate General thus perverts my motive in presenting 
the case to the President : 

^' It should likewise be borne in mind that the transfer of the Army 
of the Potomac, once begun, was a movement of extreme peril, and that 
extraordinaiy eftbrts on the part of all engaged in it were prompted, 
not only by those high considerations of patriotism which must be sup- 
posed to have been i^resented, hut also by the equally urgent instincts of 
self preservation.''^ 

Dispatches numbered 1 and 2 show that no part of the movement 
could have been hastened by any apprehension of an attack from the 
enemy. The enemy were fifty miles away, hastening to attain a partic- 
ular i^oint before this. Army of the Potomac could intervene. 

General Halleck and the Secretary of War put no confidence in my 
report of the enemy marching on General Pope and construed my mo- 
tive, as General Halleck said, to be "the desire to retain the Arimy of 
the Potomac on the Peninsula and General McClellan in command." 
The effect of my dispatches on General Halleck should have been to 
cause him to order our steps towards, instead of continuing the march 
from Eichmond. 

Such retention and advance of the Army on the Peninsula would, it 
is fair to assume, i^robably, have recalled General Lee to Richmond, and 
have x^i'evented, at that time, the lamentable termination of General 
Pope's campaign. 

I willingly acknowledge that I was not among those who favored the 
removal of our army from befor(^. Iliclimond — thus to relieve our oppo- 
nent's capital IVom the burdens and daiigcis of a siege, and take them' 
upon ourselves at Washington. But my opinion Avas never asked, and 
when the orders of my superiors reached me, I sought, without discus- 
sion or hesitation, how best to execute them. 

The following dispatches are all that I could secure from the govern- 
ment. They form but a small part of the wliole. The most of tliem 
were published in the World, of Xew York, January 5, 1803, and a part 
only in the Record ot the court : 



62 

[No. 1.] 

Williamsburg, Va., Aug. 16tli, 6 p. m. 
General McClellan : 

I sent you letters from people in EichiDond taken from negroes. They say troops 
are moving north against General Pope. The negroes confirm them, and another 
who left thereon Thursday says it is true. Colonel Campbell reports there is no 
enemy between us and Richmond. Unless you forbid, I shall, at day-break, send 
everything to Fort Monroe, and embark for Acquia Creek. I have asked that trans- 
ports be in readiness. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-Gen eral. 

[No. 2.] 

United States Military Telegraph, 

War Department. 
Time received, 4.45 p. m., Aug. 17th. 

Williamsburg, Va., Aug. 16th, 186*2. 
Major-Gexeral H. W. Halleck: 

Two negroes who left Richmond, on Wednesday, say Jackson's wounded arrived there 
on Tuesday. All admitted he had been badly whipped. He had asked for large re- 
inforceinents, and they had gone, and they comprised all cavalry and artillery which 
could be dispensed with about Richmond. All guns in Manchester, and one"^ or two 
from those about Richmond, and eighteen thousand men, twelve thousand of which 
were from about Fort Randolph, had gone up. The cavalry in cars. He says this move- 
ment was known on Tuesday. I send this direct, not having immediate communica- 
tion with General McClellan.* 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 
True copy. 

THO. T. ECKERT, 

Assist. Supt. Military Telegraph. 

With the exception of the artillery, which was i)nshing to Falmouth 
as rapidly as it disembarked, my command had marched (Aug. 22d and 
23d) to hold the line of the Eappahannock 5 orders for that purpose hav- 
ing been received from General Halleck through Gen. Burnside. 

[No. 3.] 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 

Falmouth, August 23d, 1862. 
General Morell: 

Despatch received. Move on at once to Kelly's Ford, and occupy and hold it. Re- 
lieve Griffin when Sykes gets up to him. If you are called ux)ou to go to Rappahan- 
nock Station, move up to the support of the army there. 

Your artillery is on the road to vou. Sykes will move up this morning and relieve 
Griffin. 



[No. 4.] 



F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General Comi)ianding. 

Falmouth, August 24th, 1862. 



Generals Morell and Sykes: 

Keep your commands well in hand for any emergency, and before advancing another 
step do your utmost to ascertain the position of Pope's forces, and where the enemy is — 
what force is at Kelly's Ford, and has the enemy been seen on the opposite bank ? 
Give me all the information you have, and the location of your forces and amount of 
cavalry at the fords. There is no more cavalry here to send you. If you can x)nsh 
scouts over the ford do so as far as possible. What is the latest information ? 

Send your despatches so that General Sykes can see them. Direct Griffin to fix the 

* Just after the date of this despatch, Mr. William Henry Hurlbut, now of Xew York 
City, then in Washington, strove in vain to make General Halleck believe that Gen- 
eral Lee was pushing his forces against General Pope. He had just escaped from Rich- 
mond, and had seen the confederate army in motion. 

The correctness of our reports are contirmed by General Lee's and Jones' report, vol. 



63 

ground or woods at Baruett's Ford sotliat a small force witli artillery can hold it. I 
am just informed that Pope is on the Rappahannock, at Warrenton Springs, having 
attacked and whipped the enemy. I wish to hold Kelly's Ford to-morrow, and I hope 
by the time I join you that you will be able to inform me what is at and opi)osite Raj)- 
pahannock Station. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 
[Xo. 4a.] 

Falmouth, Aufjust '24. 
General Morell : 

If there is no large force at Kelly's Ford push on to Rappahannock Station ; Sykes 
will follow, and the whole corps will move on to join Pope, near Suli^hur Springs, at 
-which point he attacked and drove the enemy over the river. Give aid to the tele- 
graph operators; cut poles for them and push it along. The artillery is in motion ; 
Graham and Smead join Sykes for the present. 

F. J. PORTER. 

[No. 5.] 

August *24th, 2 P. M. 
Generals Morell and Sykes: 

Push a scout to Rappahannock Station and find out if Pope has the pickets near 
there, and gain information of Pope or the enemy. Pope attacked the enemy yester- 
day, near Sulphur Springs, and the latter retreated. He was to renew the attack 
to-day, and it is probable Pope was pushing after him, knowing the river at Rapi)a- 
hannock was not fordable. 

General Halleck's orders are for us to hold the Rappahannock. 

Your artillery is en route; also Sykes'. You will therefore carry out your former 
instructions. 

Reinforcements will push uj) to you. 
All goes right. 

F. J. PORTER, 

2Iajor-Generah 

Early on the morning of the 2oth I left Falmonth and joined my com- 
mand. I began then to send Gen. Burnside the information of onr forces 
and of the enemy, which he required. 

[Xo. 6.] 

X'^EAR MORRISVILLE, 

August l-2th, 1862, 11:43 a. m. 
To General Burnside : 

I fiud that last night Pope's cavalry was withdrawn by order, and Kelly's Ford 
abandoned, without any notice to my command or the cavalry x^icketiug the river. 
X'o enemy seen 0)i opposite side of river, except what was moving up towards Sulphur 
Springs. A good ford about three miles above railroad bridge. Kearney is at War- 
renton Station picketing to Bealeton. Xo x)ickets extending from Pope this way, and 
no ettbrt made to keep up communication. The removal of his cavalry diminishes 
the means. Morell is near Morrisville, with Griffin at Baruett's. Sykes two miles to 
the rear, with Warren at Baruett's, to take Griffin's place Avhen he goes to Kelly's. I 
shall go to Baruett's, then Kelly's, and on return give such intelligence as I can gain. 
Water is very scarce on the road, insufficient for large commands. Regiments have 
forty rounds, two wagons each ; brigade headquarters one ; division headquarters, two. 
Will give full report on return. Four companies of Rhode Island cavalry at Rappa- 
liannock Station last night. Telegraph advances very slowly, too slowly. More pickets 
appear to be wanted, and wire. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- General. 
[Xo. 7.] 

From Deep Creek, 
Received August 2.5th, 1862. 
To General Burnside: 

The rejjort to me that all Pojjc's cavalry at Kelly's ford was withdrawn is an error. 
He left a small company at the fords. I find, or think, the enemy is merely watching 
us at Baruett's, and was within striking distance of Kelly's. Sufficient force to resist 
crossing. The enemy has shown himself in small parties. I have decided to leave 
Griffin at Baruett's for a day longer, send the remainder of Morell to Kelly's, and to- 
morrow, dependinsi; on information I get from a ])arty I have sent to Ra])pahannock 
Station, to push Sykes there or halt him in supporting distance of Morell, ready to 



64 

push on to tlie Eappaliaunock Station. I find tlie river can be crossed almost any- 
where by cavah\Y and infantry, so that with the exception of the prominent fords, 
watching is all I can do. The special fords I can hold easily. At Eappahannock 
Station are fonr companies of Rhode Island Cavalry, and Kearney's pickets are at 
Bealeton. Reno and Reynolds I can hear nothing of. Reno's batteries have been with- 
drawn from Kelly's and Barnett's. The country is miserable, scarcely x^roducing good 
telegraph poles, much less subsistence for man or beast for this arrnv. 

. . F. J. PORTER, 

Major- General,. 
[Xo. 8.] 

From Advance, 
Received Aug. 2.5, 1862. 
To General Burxside: 

Have you received my despatches indicating my movements to-morrow ? You know 
that Rappahannock Station is under fire from opposite hills, and the houses were 
destroyed by Pope. I do not like to direct movement on such uncertain data as that 
famished by General Halleck. I Icnow he is misinformed of the location of some of the 
corps mentioned in his despatches. Reno has not been at Kelly's for three days, and 
there is only a ]iicket at Rapi^ahannock Station, and Kearney, not Banks, is at Beale- 
ton. Reno and Reynolds are beyo?id my reach. I have directed Sykes to go to Rap- 
pahannock Station at 5 to-morrow, and will go there myself via Kelly's Ford. Does- 
General McClellan approve ? About daybreak my aid and scout will be in from Beale- 
ton. Have you any orders? I want cavahy to remain with me for a few days. For 
want of grain and i:)rovisious I have had to send home some who came up. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-GeneraJ. 
[Xo. 9.] 

From Advance, 3:30, 

Received Aug. 25, 1862. 
To General Burnside: 

Despatch of 10:20 received. General Halleck is misinformed in regard to Reno's 
location. He is not at Kelly's Ford, nor can I hear of him. Xo one but four compa- 
nies of Rhode Island cavalry is at Rapiiahannock Station and Bealeton. This was 
the last information I received. I have sent to Bealeton to get information, and shall 
start Sykes at daybreak for Rappahannock Station or its \-icinity. The Sixth Xew 
York occupy Barnett's and are on opposite bank. I think they can hold and watch 
that point. 'with the addition of a Dutch battery; but if there is a battalion of 
infantry availal>le without breaking a brigade, think it well to put it there to mor- 
row. Shall leave Griffin there. Reynolds is gone, and, like Reno, is beyond reach. 
This portion of my corps ivouhl have been one day further forward had I had any informa- 
tion of Pope's forces or the enemy. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General . 
[Xo. 10.] 

Advance, August 25, 1862. 
To General A. E. Burnside: 

My aid has just returned from Bealeton. He says Birney is there with two regi- 
ments, one at Rappahannock Station. Pope's headquarters are at AVarrenton ; Kear- 
ney at Warrenton Junction. King went to AYarrenton to-day. Hooker was to go. Reno 
is at Sulphur Springs. Reynolds is at Warrenton. Banks and Sigel are at Sulphur 
Springs fighting to-day. A*^ deserter came over to-day arriving at Rappahannock Sta- 
tion. Said enemy moving his forces to our right. Those left down this way are their 
regiments which have been cut up in the battles. At Brandreth's station are five 
himdred wagons guarded by a small force of infantry and squadron of cavahy. At 
Rappahannock station the river is fordable for all arms. Are my arrangements satis- 
factory ? 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major General. 
[Xo. 11.] . 

Falmouth, Aug, 25. 

Major-General F. J. Porter: 

Until Sumner's troops arrive it would be well to hold the fords with an ample force. 
You are now in connection with Pope, and, no doubt, can get what cavalry you walit. 
When you can dispense with the three companies of Indiana cavalry, x:)lease send them 
back. ' We will send up the forty wagons with provisions for Morell and Griffin ; have 
sent down to Acquia for wagon load of hospital stores; will send them Avith supply 
train if they arrive. The wagons and abulances will be sent out as they arrive with 
the direction you request. All quiet here. Your despatches all received, and your 



65 

disposition of troops is all right. You state tliat Reno is expected to pass to your left. 
To what point is he to go ? 

A. E. BURNSIDE, 

Major-General 
[No. 12.] 

Advance, Barxett's Ford, 

8 A. M., August 26, 1862. 
All quiet at and on the Rappahannock during the night. At Kelly's Ford the im- 
pression exists that tvro brigades of in fantry with one regiment of cavalry are oppo- 
site Rappahannock Station. A squadron was seen last evening opposite Kelly's. A 
company from Bealeton to-day says Kearney is there with his whole division. I ex- 
pect Sykes to halt about four miles short of Bealeton, at water, and until I can find a 
proper camp. Water is to be had oidy by going within range from opposite shore. I 
shall go through Rappahannock Station and Bealeton to Sykes, where my camp will 
be. Please have the telegraph run n]) that way by troops. Barnett's and Kelly's 
Fords will communicate with you by telegraph to-night. Many men are sick, and, for 
want of medicines and ambulances, will sufier. I have directed trains to be sent for 
grain. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

After sendiRg' the above clespatcli, I went to Eappaliannock Station, 
and thence to Bealeton. The enemy had gone to onr right. There was 
no need of staying on the Rappahannock, and at 11 a. m. I sent by Gen- 
eral Kearney a letter to General Pope, pntting myself niider his com- 
mand. 

[No. 13.] 

From Bealeton Station, 

Received Aug. 26, 1862. 
To General Burnside : 

Have been to Rappahannock Station. I find it in possession of General Kearney, 
whom I will relieve to-morrow. No enemy in front ; river fbrdable anywhere ; Sykes 
is here. Morell, with two divisions, is at Kelly's, and Griffin at Barnett's ; Reno is ex- 
pected to pass mv left. 

F. J. PORTER. 
[No. 14.] 

From Bealeton, via Washington, 

Received Aug. 26, 1862. ' 
To General Burnside: 

Sykes is within three miles of this camp, and I will be up to-morrow to relieve 
Kearney. Reading your despatch of last night, I expected to find Banks and Reno 
here, t consider the fords l)elow perfectly safe with much less forces, but for future 
movements I think they should remain. Sykes will get provisions and grain here. 
His wagons can come up with ammunition and medical supplies. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 
[No. 15.] 

From Advance, six miles from Bealeton, 

Aug. 26, 1862. 
To General Parke : 

I desi)atehed you from Bealeton, under the impression that Sj^kes was three miles 
ofi". I went to Barnett's. All is well at the first two. Griffin is at first ; Morell, with 
two divisions, at the second. I have decided to post Sykes at Bealeton, and picket, 
with strength from infantry and artillery, Rappahannock Station, and patrol with 
cavahy. The Rappahannock is fordable everywhere ; and if the enemy desired to 
cross, he could do so with a larger force than I have. Camp, ibr want of water, can- 
not be found nearer, except within gunshot. I have sent back cavalry as fast as I 
could, and ordered them from the divisions, and directed Morell to use tliose at the 
fords. Tills I had done before receiving your telegram. The one hundred and fifty 
cavalry will be a good thing. Send grain. Provisions can be brought to Bealeton 
from AVaiTenton. Please send up the wagons and ambulances, and have the drivers 
directed to pick up sick In a house about nine miles from Bealetim, on right hand side, 
and bring them here. The supply train must go to Barrett's a:ul Kelly's Fords ; am- 
bulances, also, which belong to Morell's. Please have sent up to-morrow a a operator 
and Instrument, for Bealeton, to work the other lines ; also the corps mail. 

F. J. PORTER. 
5 



m 

At 11 p. m., 26th, I received the following order from G-eueral Pope, 
given in reply to my report for duty. This I despatched at once to 
General Burnside. 

The speed with which General Pope's orders were generally delivered 
begin to be illustrated in this case. It was more than four hours going 
twelve miles. 

[No. 16.] 

From Advance, 11:45 p. m., Aug. 26th, 

Received August 27, 1862. 
Major-General Burnside : 

Have just received orders from General Pope to move Sykes to-morro^v to witMn 
two miles of Warrenton, aud to call up Morell to same poiut, leaving the fords 
guarded by cavalry. He says the troops in rear should he be brought up as rapidly 
as possible, leaving only a small rear guard at Rapxjahannock Station, and that he 
cannot see hovr a general engagement can be put oif more than a day or two. I shall 
move up as ordered, but the want of grain and the necessity of receiving a supply of 
subsistence will cause some delay. Please hasten back the wagon sent down, and 
inform McClellan that I may know I am doing right. Banks is at Fayetteville ; Mc- 
Dowell, Sigel, and Ricketts at and immediately in front of Warrenton ; Reno on his 
right ; Cox joins to-morrow, Sturgis next day, and Franklin is expected. So says Gen- 
eral Pope. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Warrenton Junction, 

August 26, 1862, 7 o'clock p. M. 
General: 

Please move forward with Sykes's division to-morrow morning through Fayetteville, 
to a point two and a half miles of the town of Warrenton, and take position where 
you can easily move to the front, with your right resting on the railroad. Call up 
Morell to join you as speedily as possible, leaving only small cavalry forces to watch 
the fords. If there are any troops below, coming up, they should come up rapidly, 
leaving only a small rear-guard at Rappahannock Station. You will find General 
Banks at Fayetteville. I apppend below the position of our forces, as also those of 
the enemy. I do not see how a general engagement can be postponed more than a 
day or two. * 

McDowell, with his own corps, Sigel's, and three brigades of Reynolds' men, being 
about thirty-four thousand, are at and immediately in front of Warrenton ; Reno joins 
him on his right and rear, with eight thousand men, at an early hour to-morrow ; 
Cox, with seven thousand men, will move forward to join him in the afternoon of to- 
morrow ; Banks, with six thousand men is at Fayetteville ; Sturgis, about eight thou- 
sand strong, will move forward by day after to-morrow ; Franklin, I hope, with his 
corps, Avill, by day after to-morrow night, occupy the point where the Manassas Gap 
railroad intersects the turnpike from Warrenton to Washington city ; Heintzleman's 
corps will be held in reserve here at Warrenton Junction until it is ascertained that 
the enemy has begun to cross Hedgeman's river. You will understand how necessary 
it is for our troops to be in position as soon as possible. The enemy's line extend from 
a point a little east of Warrenton Sulphur Springs around to a point a few miles north 
of the turnpike from Sperryville to Warrenton, with his front presented to the east, 
and his trains thrown around well behind him in the direction of Little Washington 
and Sperryville. Make your men cook three days' rations and keep at least two days' 
cooked rations constantly on hand. Hurry up Morell as rapidly as possible, as also 
the troops coming up in his rear. The enemy has a strong column still further to his 
left towards Manassas Gap railroad, in the direction of Salem. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major- Genera I Co mm anding . 

Major-General Fitz John Porter, 

Commanding bth Army Corps. 

[Xo. 16a.] 

H'dq'rs 5th Ar]my Corps, 
6 miles from Bealeton, Aug 26 — 11 a. m. 
Major-Gen'l John Pope, 

ComUVg Army of Virginia, Warrenton Junction : 
General: Your dispatch of 7 p. m. is at hand, and your instructions will be obeyed 
as rapidly as possible. My forces have been disposed of under instructions from the 



67 

General-in-Cbief, and OTriiig to the fact tliat their Tvagons lla^-e been sent to Falmontli 
for provisions (that on hand being expended), they may not move as rapidly as you 
may wish, but they will be there in time for effective service. 

Xo troops are in my rear, that I know of. Sumner is to land at Aquia, but I know 
nothing- of him. I shall leave at the fords the cavalry force which has been guarding 
them. 

I have no cavalry. 

I am, general, verv respectfullv, vour ob'd't servant, 

F. J. PORTER, 
MaJ. Gen'l ComhTg. 
I will thank you to direct grain for 800 auimals for 3 days to be sent to Bealton 
early in the morning. I am out entirely, and there is none to be had in this country. 
I have very few wagons. F. J. P. 

Xoue to carry subsistence or ammunition, and I have only 40 rounds of the latter. 
The wagons have not come up, and we have been hastened forward to occupy posi- 
tions, and depend on the small transportation which General Burnside could provide. 
I have no ambulances, and no medical supplies. I mention these facts in the hope 
you may provide deficiencies. F. J. P. 

[Xo. 17.] 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 

August 27th, 1862. 
Ma.jor-Gexeral Morell, Commaxdixg Dmsiox: 

General, The commanding general directs that you hurry up with your command, 
pass through Bealeton and Fayetteville, and join the commanding-general in the vi- 
cinity of Warrenton. Smead will be directed to join and report to you with his 
battery. 

When your command passes through Bealeton and Fayette^dlle have your ranks 
well closed up, so that a good impression may be made by the appearance of our troops. 
Permit no straggling. 

Verv respectfully, vour obedient servant, 

FRED. T. LOCKE, A. A. G. 

P. S. — After getting to Bealeton send all your men belonging to the cavalry back to 
their commands. If Griffin cannot get all the way up to-day let him stop at Bealeton. 

Try and keep three days' cooked rations always in possession of your men. 

General, lose no time in getting up. You will find me near Warrenton, and if you 
send forward an officer to me will have you located. Do all you can to get up provis- 
ions, and put as much bread in haversacks as possible — three days. We go right to 
the railroad, and with your cattle will manage to get all that is wanted. Hurry up 
Griffin ; don't wait for him. Hope you are improving. 

F. J. PORTER. 

^Yhile on the marcli in execntiou of the above I received the follow- 
ing order. Jackson and Stewart, at 8 p. 3i., 26th, had struck General 
Pope's rear and occupied all his communications with Washington. 
This order was five hours by daylight reaching me, then only five miles 
from General Pope : 

[Xo. 18.] 

(From advance. — Received August 27th, 1862.) 

Bealeton, 9 a. m., August 27th, 1862. 
To General Burnside : 

I am ordered to move direct to Warrenton Junction, and to push up the command 
at Barnett, &c. The enemy have struck with their cavalry the railroad near Manas- 
sas. I expect to be out of reach of you, and you must keep back trains, &c. If 
you can push up ambulances I want them much.^ Your animals will have to rely on 
grassing ; there is no grain. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major Creneral. 

Headquarters Army of Virglnla., 
Warrenton Junction, August 27th, 1862, 4 o'clock a. m. 
General : 

Your note of 11 P. m. yesterday is received. Major-General Pope directs me to say 
that under the circumstances stated by you in relation to your command he desires 



68 

you to march direct to tins' place as rapidly as possible. The troops behind you at Bar- 
nett's Ford will be directed by you to march at once direct to this place, or Weaver- 
ville, without going to Rappahannock Station. Forage is hard to get, and you must 
graze your animals as far as you can do so. The enemy's cavalry has intercepted our 
railwai/ coinmunXcation near Manassas, and he seems to be advancing with a heavy force 
along the Manassas Gap Railroad. We will x^robably move to attack him to-morrow 
in the neighborhood of Gainesville, which may 'brinrj our line further hack towards 
Washington. Of this I will endeavor to notify you in time. You should get here as 
early in the day to-mon-ow as possible, in order to render assistance should it be 
needed. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major- General F. J. Porter, 

Commanding Fifth Army Corps. 

After a very hot and hard march running into night, my command 
reached Warren ton Junction, via Bealeton, and until a late hour was 
engaged gettiiig food, of which they had had none that day, and which 
was very scarce with General Poise's army. 

[No. 19.] 

Warrenton, 21th, p. M. 
To General Burnside : 

Morell left his medicine, ammunition, and baggage at Kelly's Ford. Can you have 
it hauled to Fredericksburg and stored ? His wagons were all sent to you for grain 
and ammunition. I have sent back to you every man of the First and Sixth New 
York Cavalry, except what has been sent to Gainesville. I will get them to you after 
a while. Everything here is at sixes and sevens, and I find I am to take care of myself 
in every respect. Our line of communication has taken care of itself, in compliance with 
orders. The army has not three days' provisions. The enemy captured all Pope's and 
other clothing ; and from McDowell the same, including liquors. No guards accom- 
panying the trains, and small ones guard bridges. The wagons are rolling on, and I 
shall be here to-morrow. Good niglit ! 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major General. 

The despatch (20), enclosing the annexed order, was written with suf- 
ficiently full information of the movements of the enemy to form an 
idea of their destination. I also became, as will be seeu, in some degree 
acquainted with the general policy of the campaign till the large rein- 
forcements from the army of the Potomac should join us. 

[No. 20.] 
(From Warrentcn Junction, August 27th, 1862 — 4 p. m.) 

To General Burnside' Falmouth, Virginia: 

I send you the last order from General Pope, which indicates the future as well as 
the present. V/agons are rolling along rapidly to the rear as if a mighty power was 
propelling them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. McDowell is 
moving to Gainesville, where Sigel now is. The latter got to Buckland bridge in time 
to put out the lire and kick the enemy, who is pursuing his route unmolested to the 
Shenandoah or Loudon County. The forces are Longstreet's, A. P. Hill's, Jackson's, 
Whiting's, E well's and Anderson's (late Huger's) divisions. 

Longstreet is said by a deserter to be very strong. They have much artillery and 
long wagon trains. The raid on the railroad was near to Cedar Run, and made by a 
regiment of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a section of artillery. The x^lace 
was f;uarded by nearly three regiments of infantry and some cavalry. They routed 
the gaarfl. captured a train and many men, destroyed the bridge, and retired leisurely 
down the rouds toward Manassas. It can easily be repaired. No troops are coming 
up except new tr()0]>s, that 1 can hear of. Sturgis is here with two regiments;* four 
were cut off by I lie raid. The positions of the troops are given in this order. No enem^^ 
in our original front. A letter of General Lee, seized when Stuaxt's aide-de-camp was 
seized, directs Stuart to leave a sqiiadrou only to watch in front of the Hanover Junc- 
oion. &-3. Everything has m.oved up north. I found a vast difference between the-" 

=^ Piatt's. 



69 

troops and ours, but I suppose they were new, as to-day tliey burned their clothes, &c., 
when there was not the least cause". I hear that they are much demoralized, and needed 
some good troops to give them heart, and, I think, head. We are working now to get 
behind Bull Run,* and I presume will be there in a few days, if strategy don't use us 
up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the inverse proportion. I would like 
some of my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksburg, 
to push toward Hanover, or, with a larger force, to push toward Orange Court House. 
I wish Sumner was at Washington, and ivp near the Monocacy, with good batteries. 
I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and I 
believe they have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish mysolf away from it, 
with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions. I was informed to- 
day by the best authority that, in opposition to General Pope's views, this army was 
pushed out to save the Army of the Potomac, an army that could take care of itself. 
Pope says he long since wanted to go behind the Occoquair. I am in great need of 
ambulances, and the officers need medicines, which, for want of transportation, were 
left beliind. I hear many of the sick of my corps are in houses on the road — very sick, 
I think. There is no fear of an enemy crossing the Rappahannock. The cavalry are 
all in the advance of the rel)el army. ' At Kelly's and Barnett's fords much property 
was left, in consequence of the wagons going down for grain, &c. If you can push 
up the grain to-night, please do so, direct to this place. There is no grain here or any- 
where, and this army is wretchedly supplied in that line. Pope says he never could 
get enough. Most of this is*private, but if you can get me away, please do so. Make 
what use of this you choose, so it does good. Don't let the alarm here disturb you. 
If you had a good force yoii could go to Richmond. A force should at once be x^nshed 
on to Manassas to oi)en the road. Our provisions are very short. 

F. J. PORTER. 

After telegraphing, this dispatch will be sent to General Burnside. 

, Headquarters Army of Virgixia, 

Warrenton Juxction, August 27th, 1862. 

General Orders Xo. — . The folioAving movement of troops will be made, viz : 

Major-General McDowell, with his own and Sigel's corps, and the division of Briga- 
dier-General Reynolds, will pursue the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville, if 
possible, to-night. 

The ariny corps of General Heintzelinan, with the detachment of the Ninth corps, 
under Major-General Reno, leading, will take the road from Catlett's Station to Green- 
wich, so as to reach there to-night or early in the morning. Major-General Reno will 
immediately communicate with Major-General McDowell, and his command, as well 
as that of Major-General Heintzelman, will sup^Dort Major-General McDowell in any 
operations against the enemy, 

Major-General Fitz John Porter will remain at Warrenton Junctien till he is relieved 
by Major-General Banks, when he will immediately x)ush forward with his corps in the 
direction of Greenwich and Gainesville, to assist the operations on the right wing. 

Major-General Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the 
charge of the trains, and cover their movement toward Manassas Junction. The train 
of his own corps, under escort of two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, 
will pursue the road, south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of Manassas 
Junction. As soon as the trains have passed Warrenton Junction he will take post be- 
hind Cedar Run, covering the fords and bridges of that stream, and holding the posi- 
tion as long as possible. He will cause all the railroad trains to be loaded with the 
public and private stores now here, and run them back towards Manassas Junction as 
far as the railroad is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burned so as to impede the 
further passage of the railroad trains, he will assemble them all as near together as 
possilile, and protect them with his command until the bridges are rebuilt. If the 
enemy is too strong before him before the bridges can be repaired, he will be careful to 
destroy entirely the train, locomotives and stores before he falls back in the direction 
of Manassas Junction. He is, however, to understand that he is to defend his position 
as long as possible, keeping himself in constant communication with Major-General 
Porter on his right. If any sick, now in hospital at Warrenton Junction, are not pro- 
vided for and able to be transported, he will have them loaded into the wagon train 
of his own corps (even if this should necessitate the destrnction of much baggage and 
regimental property), and carried to Manassas Junction. The very important duty de- 
volved upon Major-General Banks, the major-general commanding the Army of Vir- 
ginia feels assured he will discharge with intelligence, courage and fidelity. 

The General Headquarters will be with the corps of General Heintzelman until fur- 
ther notice. 

By command of Major-General Pope. 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

'■General Pope. 



70 

The above order was superceded by the following, received at 9:50 
p. 31. It turned me again towards Alexandria. 

In anticipation of an early march under the above order, I had sent 
two aids to examine the character, direction, &c., of the roads. They 
found the road to Catlett's Station where that to Grreenwich branched, 
so crowded with wagons as to be almost impassable. The bearer of the 
order had found great difficulty in getting to me, having been three hours 
and twenty minutes going ten miles, part by daylight. 

[No. 21.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia 
Bristoe Station, August 27, 1862, 6:30 p. m. 
General : The Major General commanding directs tliat you start at one o'clock to- 
night, and come forward witli your wliole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so 
a® to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action 
with the enemy, with a loss of a'bout three hundred killed and wounded. The enemy 
has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from 
Manassas, and clear the country between that place and Gaines%'ille, where McDowell 
is. If Morell has not joined you, send word to him to push forward immediately; 
also send word to Banks to hurry forward at all speed to take your place at Warrenton 
Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight. 

I send an officer with tliis dispatch who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to 
send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville probably in the direction of 
Bealeton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad trains to this 
side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him to that etfect. 
By command of Major-General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel aud Chief of Staff. 

P. S. If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two 
pieces of artillery, as a guard, till he comes up, with iustructions to follow you imme- 
diately upon his doing so. If Banks is not at the Junction, instruct Colonel Clary to 
run the trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and a section of 
aitillery with it. 

By commaiMi cvf Major-General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-General Porter, Warrenton Junction. 

The following dispatch (21 a) was never heard of by me till I found it 
in a pamphlet published by General Roberts. It was not sent to me. It 
was acknowledged as genuine by the Recorder before the Board. 

[No. 21a.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Bristoe Station, Aug. 28th 186^2.-6.5 a. m. 
Maj. Gen. F. J. Porter, 

Commanding bth CorjJs: 
General : Major-General Pope directs me to say tiiat General Hooker reports his 
amuHinition exhausted. Gen. Pope desires, therefore, that you come forward with 
your command at once with all j^ossible speed, and that yoii send back to hurry up 
your ammunition- train. 

I am, general, vour obedient servant, very respectfullv, 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Col. tf Chief of Staff. 

1 joined General Pope before 8 A. m., 27th. The head of my column 
was lialted at Broad Run to close up the column, fearfully broken by 
unruly and crowding T^agon trains. About 10 a. m. the corps took its 
place in line. 

[No. 22.] 

Bristoe, 9:30 a. m., August 28, 1862. 
My command will soon be up, and will at once go into position. Hooker drove 
Ewell some three miles, and Pope says McDowell intercepted Longstreet, so tliat with- 



71 

out a long detour lie cannot join E\vell, Jackson and A. P. Hill, who are, or supposed 
to be, at Manassas. E well's train, lie says, took the road to Gainesville, where Mc- 
Dowell is coming- from. We shall be to-day as follows: I on right of railroad, Heint- 
zelman on left, then Eeno, then McDowell. He hopes to get Ewell, and push to Ma- 
nassas to-day. 

I hope all goes well near Washington. I think there need be no cause of fear for ns. 
I feel as if on my own way now, and thus far have kept my command and trains well 
up. More supplies than 1 supposed on hand have been brought, but none to spare, 
and we must make connection soon. I hope for the best, and my lucky star is always 
up about my birthday, the 31st, and hope Mc's is up also. You will hear of us soon 
by way of Alexandria. 
Ever yours, 

F. J. P. 

General Burxside, Falmouth. 

At tliis time, with forty wagons of provisions from General Burnside 
on hand, I felt myself independent of General Pope's supply, but I was 
disappointed, as amid the confusion the wagons could not be found be- 
fore the night of the 29th. The men were then supi)lied with a small 
allowance of hard tack, about all the food they had from breakfast that 
morning till the 31st at Centre ville. 

[No. 23.] 

The following just received from Porter, four miles from Manassas, the S8th, 2 p. m. r 
"All that talk about bagging Jackson, &c., was bosh. That enormous gap — Manas- 
sas — was left open and the enemy jumped through; and the story of McDowell having 
cut off Longstreet had no good foundation. The enemy have destroyed all our bridges, 
burnt trains, &c., and made this army rush back to look at its line of communication, 
and find us bare of subsistence. We are far from Alexandria, considering the means 
of transportation. Your supply train of forty wagons is here, but I can't fijid them. 
There is a report that Jackson is at Centre ville, which you can believe or not. The 
enemy destroyed an immense amount of i)roperty at Manassas — cars and supplies. I 
expect the next thing will be a raid on our rear, t)y way of Warrenton Pike, by Long* 
street, who was cut off. 

''F. J. PORTER, 

" Major- General." 
This is the latest news. 

A. E. BURNSIDE, 

Alajor-Generat. 
[No. 24.] 

Fajlmouth, Vii-ginia, 5^ p. m., 29. 
GiasERAL H. W. Haxleck, 

GeneraJ-hi-CMef : 
The following message has just been received: 

Bristoe, 6 A. M., 29. 
To General Burnside : 

I shall be off in half an hour, the messenger who brought this says the enemy had 
been at Centre ville, and pickets were found there last night. 

Sigel had severe tight last night; took many prisoners; Banks is at Warrenton 
Junction; McDowell near Gainesville ; Heintzelman and Reno at Centreville, where 
they marched yesterday, and Pope went to Centreville with the last two as a body 
guard, at the time not knowing where was the enemy, and when Sigel was fighting 
within eight miles of him and in sight. Comment is unnecessary. 

The enormous trains are still rolling on, many animals not being watered for 50 
hours ; I shall be out of x^rovi si ons to-morrow night ; your train of forty wagons can- 
not be found. 

I hope Mac's at work, and we will soon get ordered out of this. It would seem from 
proper statements of the enemy that he was wandering around loose ; but I expect 
they know what they are doing, which is more than any one here or anywhere knows. 
Just received the following order : 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Near Bull Run, Aug. 29, 1862, 3 a. m. 
Major-General Porter : 

General McDowell has anticipated the retreat of Jackson ; Sigel is immediately on 
the right of McDowell. 



72 

Kearney and Hooker marcli to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn; Major-General 
Pope directs yon to move npon' Centreville at tlie first dawn of day witli your whole 
command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should he here 
at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and 
TOur presence is necessarv. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Ch. 

A large hody of the enemy reported opposite ; I am preparing and will hold the 
place until the last ; the only fear I have is a force coming from Manassas Junction. 

A. E. BURNSIDE, 

Major-Geneml. 

A verbal message by Captain Piatt of Gen. Pope's staff of the same 
tenor as Xo. 25 found me about midway between Manassas Junction 
and Bull Eun, going to Centreville under the preceding order.. 

That verbal order was : 

General Pope orders you to march to Gainesville and take King with you. 

An order (No. 25), by the hands of Gen. Gibbon, found me about 9.30 
a. m. nearer Manassas Station, where I had returned to execute the above 
verbal order. 

After passing Manassas Junction this despatch was sent: 

August 29, 1862—8.30 o'clock. 
General Morell : General Porter desires you to keep closed up and see that the 
ammunition train, which is, I learn, at Manassas, is put in with our train. 
Yours, respectfullv, 

GEO. SYKES. 

It was endorsed as follows about 9 a. m. j 

Manassas Junction. 
General: There is an ammunition train here belonging to King's division; nothing 
for us. 

GEORGE W. MORELL, 

Major-General. 
To Major-General Porter. 

and again endorsed about 9.30 a. m. : 

General: We have sixteen wagons here with 396,000 rounds, caliber .58; 20,000 
rounds .69. We are ordered to support General King. The head of the column is 
halted beyond the junction ; General Porter will be here soon ; he rode ahead to find 
General Pope ; General Gibbon has just come with an order from Pope for us to march 
to Gainesville at once. 
Yours, 

F. T. LOCKE, A. A. G. 

The ammunition was distributed as rapidly as possible, and about 10 
a. m. the corps marched toward Gainesville, under the following order 

(Ko. 25): 

[No. 25.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Centreville, August 29, 1862. 
Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you 
upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton turnpike. Be ex- 
peditious as we lose much. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-General Commanding. . 
Major-Generai. Fitz John Porter. 

Since the close of the hearing the following fragment of a dispatch and 
its postscript of August 29th, from Gen. McDowell, at Manassas, to Gen, 
Pope, at Centreville, has been furnished to me. It was delivered to Gen. 
Pope after 2 p. m., near Groveton. 



73 

[No. 25.] 

* * * ''till late. TMs morning I was told by Reynolds that King's 

div. was ordered to Manassas, and Ricketts' to Greenwicli, and Sigel to Gainesville. 
Supposing these orders were from von, I left Eeynolds on the left of Sigel, and came 
here to see you and get my two divisions, I find here that King came here on his own 
order, finding himself overmatched and E'lcketts the same. King's div. is getting sup- 
plies of food and ammunition and will be ready to move soon. I have not heard from 
Eicketts this morning, but understand he is coming here. It was Gibbon's brigade 
that was engaged yesterday. 
' ' Verv respectfullv, 

"iRYiN Mcdowell, jt. &." 

''I have just seen your last order telling Porter to take King ! Of course this is but 
temporary, and I have asked Porter to place King on his right, that I may have him 
when vou sav so. 

''I. Mcdowell." 

This order (Xo. 26) was written on the receipt by General Pope of a note 
from me requesting written orders and informing him of the position of 
McDowell, Eicketts, &c. : 

[Xo. 26.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Cextreville, August 29, 1862. 

You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I 
sent General Porter written orders to tliat effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzel- 
man, Sigel and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far 
from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this 
force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It maybe necessary" to fall back 
behind Bull's Euu at Centreville to-night. I i)resume it will be so, on account of our 
supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Eicketts, and none to interfere 
in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide- 
de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton Pike until the 
troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Eick- 
etts' position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a 
late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate 
with General Eicketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as 
soon as possible. 

If any considerable advantages are to be gained" by departing from this order it will 
not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops must oc- 
cupy a position from which they can reach Bull Eun to-night or by morning. The 
indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace 
that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters 
will be for the present with Heintzelman's Corps, or at this place'. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major- Genera I Com ma nding. 

The following order (Xo. 26 a) is explanatory of General Pope's pnr- 
poses in issning the above order. 

The order was delivered abont noon Augnst 29th to the generals 
addressed. 

[26 a.-] 

Headq'r's Army of Ya., Aug 29th 1862. 
To Gens. Heintzelman, Eeno & Sigel. 

If you find yourselves heavily pressed by superior numbers of the enemy you will 
not push matters further. 

Fitz John Porter and King's Division of McDowell's Corps are moving on Gaines- 
ville from Manassas Junction & will come in on your left. They have about twenty 
thousand men. The command-must return to this place to-night or by morning on 
account of subsistence and forage. 

JNO. POPE, 

l[aj. Gen. Comd. 

General McDowell joined me and assumed command of my forces, 
then on the road to Gainesville and about five miles from Manassas 



74 

Junction. They were deploying into line of battle — having the enemy 
in force immediately in front. 

[No. 26 &.] 

Headquarters Cavalry Brigade, 9.30 a. m. 
" Seventeen regiments, one battery and five hundred cavahy passed througli Gaines- 
ville three quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville road. I think this division 
should join our forces now engaged at once. Please forward this." 

JOHN BUFORD, 
Brigadier- General. 
General Eicketts. 

General McDowell decided to sei)arate from me and turn his troops 
up the Sudley Springs road towards Groveton. 

Soon after 1 o'clock, I sent Colonel Locke, my Assistant Adjutant: 
General, to King's Division, with instructions for it not to go away — in- 
tending to use it in extending my march to the Warrenton Pike. I re- 
ceived the following verbal reply : 

[No. 27.] 

From General McDotvell to Porter on Manassas road, delivered hy Colonel Locke, hetween 1 

and 2 o^clock. 

Give my compliments to General Porter, and say to him that I am going to the right 
and will take King with me. I think he had better remain where he is ; but if it ig 
necessary to fall back, to do so upon my left. 

The following was given early in the afternoon, and was followed by 
the despatches and endorsements from 28 to 39 inclusive, in the order 
now arranged, at various hours up to 6.35 p. M., 29th August : 

[No. 30.] 
General: 

Colonel Marshall reports that two batteries have come down in the woods on our 
right towards the railroad, and two regiments of infantry on the road. If this, be so, 
it will be hot here in the morning. 

GEO. W. MORELL, 

Major- General. 

Endorsed as follows : 

Move the infantry and everything l)ehind the crest, and conceal the guns. We must 
hold that place and make it too hot for them. Come the same game over them they 
do over us, and get your men out of sight. 

F. J. POETER. 
[No. 31.] 
General Porter : 

I can move everything out of sight except Hazlitt's battery. Griffin is supporting 
it, and is on its right, j)rincipally in the pine bushes. The other batteries and brigades 
are retired out of sight. Is this what you mean by everything ? 

GEO. W. MORELL, 

Major-General. 

Endorsed as follows : 
General Morell: 

I think you can move Hazlitt's, or the most of it, and post him in the bushes with 
the others so as to deceive. I would get everything if possible in ambuscade. AM 
goes well with the other troops. 

F. J. P. 
[No. 29.] 

Generals McDowell and King : 

I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The 
enemy are in force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces back, 



75 

the fire of fhe enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to with- 
draw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but 
my messages have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavalry and 
Infantry, and the advancing masses of dust shoAv the enemy coming in force. I am 
now going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how affairs are going, 
and I will communicate with you. Had you not better send your train back ? 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

General Heintzelman's diary recites the substance of this dispatch, 
and shows it was received by General Pope at forty-five minutes past 
five. 

The following dispatch is but a duplicate of the foregoing, l^he du- 
plicate was sent by another messenger, so that in case the one should 
not reach its destination the other would do so. 

[NEW.] 

Produced by General McDowell — Board Eeeord, j). 810. 

[29 rt.] 

General McDowell : The firing on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot ad- 
vance, and have failed to get over to you, except by the route taken by King, I shall 
withdraw to Manassas. If you have anything to communicate, please do so. I have 
sent many messengers to you and General Sigel, and get nothing. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-Genei'al. 

An artillery duel is going on now — been skirmishing for a long time. 

F. J. P. 

In pursuance of the purpose expressed in these dispatches, I sent to 
Morell the following order : 

FNo. 28.1 

August 29th, 1862. 

€fEN'ERAL MaRELL : 

Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you reach a road up which 
King is moving, and he has got ahead of you, let him pass, but see if you cannot give 
help to Sigel. If you find him retiring, move back toward Manassas, and should 
necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centreville. If you find 
the direct road filled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to the right as you return. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 
Look to the points of the compass for Manassas. 

But soon, finding he was mistaken as to the main army retiring, and 
before anything was done by Morell in execution of it, I sent him the 
following : 

[No. 33. J 
General Morell : 

Hold on, if you can, to your present place. What is passing ? 

F. J. PORTER. 
[No. 32.] 
General Morel : 

Tell me what is passing, quickly. If the enemy is coming, hold to him, and I will 
come up. Post your men to repulse him. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Majoi'-Generah 
[No. 34.] 
General Morel: 

The enemy must be in a much larger force than I can see, from the commands of 
the officers, I should judge a brigade. They are endeavoring to come in on our left, 
and have been advancing. Have also heard the noise on left as the movement of 
artillerv. Their advance is quite close. 

E. G. MARSHALL, 

Colonel rSth K Y. 



76 

[No. 35.] 
General Porter : 

Colonel Marshall reports a movement in front of liis left. I think we had better 
retire. No infantry in sight, and I am continuing the movement. Stay where you 
are to aid me if necessary. 

MORELL. 
[No. 36.] 
General Morel : 

I have all within reach of you. I wish you to give the enemy a good shelling with- 
out wasting ammunition, and push at the same time a party over to see what is going 
on. We cannot retire while McDowell holds his own. 

F. J. P. 

^ext follows in order the despatch from General Warren, who had 
read the above, to General Sykes : 

No. 35 a. 

5 h. 45 m. p. M., Aug. 29, '62. 
General Sykes : 

I received an order from Mr. Cutting to advance and support Morell. I faced 
about and did so. I soon met Griffin's brigade, withdrawing, by order of General 
Morell, who was not pushed out, but returning. I faced about and marched back 200 
yards or so. I met then an orderly from General Porter to General Morell, saying he 
must push on and press the enemy ; that all was going well for us, and he was return- 
ing. Griffin then faced about ; and I am following him to supx^ort General Morell, as 
ordered. None of the batteries are closed up to me. 
Respectfully, 

G. K. WARREN. 

This dispatch undonbtedly refers to one of the dispatches last to Gen- 
eral Morell, the date 5.45 P. M., shows about the hour at which those 
dispatches were received and sent back. 

[No. 37.] 

August 29th. 
General Morell : 

I wish you to j)ush up two regiments supported by two others, preceded by skir- 
mishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the section of 
artillery opposed to you. The battle works well on our right, and the enemy are 
said to be retiring up the pike. Give the enemy a good shelling as our troops advance. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major-General Commanding. 
[No. 38.] 
General Morel : 

Put your men in j)osition to remain during the night, and have out your pickets. 
Put them so that they will be in position to resist anything. I am about a mile from 
you. McDowell says all goes well and we are getting the best of the fight. I wish 
you would send me a dozen men from the cavalry. Keep me informed. Troops are 
passing up to Gainesville, pushing the enemy ; Ri'cketts has gone, also King. 

F. J. PORTER3 Ma}. -Gen. 

After the time of these occurrences, I sent the following : 

[No. 38 a.] 

Newly produced by McDowell : 

General McDowell or King : I have been wandering over the woods, and failed 
to get a communication to you. Tell how matters go with you. The enemy is in 
strong force in front of me, and I wish to know your designs for to-night. If left to 
me I shall have to retire for food and water, which I cannot get here. How goes the 
battle ? It seems to go to our rear. The enemy are getting to our left. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major- Gen eral Volun teers. 
[No. 38&.] 

Newly produced by McDowell : 

General McDowell, — Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about 
the woods for a time I withdrew him, and, while doiiig so, artillery opened upon us. 



My scouts could not get through. Each one found the eremy between us, and I believe 
some tiave been captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, 
but have not succeed, as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports 
of scouts think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the 
way this messenger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know 
your designs whether you retire or not. I cannot get water, and am out of i^rovisions. 
Have lost a few men from infantry tiring. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major-General Volunteers. 
Aug. 29, 6. p. m. 

The two dispatches last set out are evidently duplicates of each other. 
They were sent by different messengers, and probably by different 
routes, so as to secure that one of them should reach the intended desti- 
nation. It is quite evident that they intended to describe, in short, the 
movement of Morell over to the right, the inability to communicate the 
moving of the enemy on his right, and to ask for such information as 
would enable me to determine what I should do for the night, which 
was then approaching. It is a mistake to suppose that these dispatches 
intended to describe events occurring immediately before their date (6 
p. M.). They run hurriedly over the events of the afternoon, so as to 
give an idea of the situation at that time. 

These dispatches contain intrinsic evidence that they were written 
before I had received the 4.30 order. The language found in them could 
not have been used by me if I had already received the order to attack, 
as contained in the 4.30 order. In fact the following despatch shows 
that at that hour (Eicketts not having passed at sunset) I did not know 
General Pope was at Groveton. 

[No. 38 c.] 
Newly discovered (Board Record, p. 304) : 

Gex. Morrell: Send down Some energetic men to Gen. Pope at CentrevilJe. Get 
hold of Colonel Beckwith and get some rations. Bring beef up to kill ; we have 
nothing else; and get enough to last two or three days. 

F. J. PORTER, Major General. 
Ricketts has gone up, also King. 

After this, and certainly after sunset, I received the following order : 

[No. 39.] 

Headquarters ix the Field, 

August 29, 1862— 4.30 j9. m. 
Major-General Porter : 

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push 
forward into action at once on (he enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping 
your right in communication Avith General Reynolds. 

The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you 
engage their flank. Keep heavy res('rves and use your batteries, keeping well closed 
to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right 
and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major- General Com manding. 

Immediately on receipt of the above order I sent Colonel Locke with 
verbal orders to General Morell to attack with his whole force, and 
after acknowledging the receipt of the order went myself to Morell, and 
then the events occurred which are described by General Morell in his 
evidence and in the evidence of Colonel Locke. 

[No. 40.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

In the Field Xear Bull Bun, August '29, 1862, 8:50 j9. m. 
General: 

Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will 
acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and 



78 

report to me in person for orders. You are to understand tliat you are expected to 
comply strictly witli this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after 
its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major General Commanding. 
Major General F. J. Porter. 
Received 3:30 A. M., Aug. 30. 

Though the above order from General Pope was dispatched from and 
delivered at the same points as the 4.30 order, only five miles apart, six 
hours and a half were occupied in the delivery. 

[No. 41.] 
General Morell: 

Lose not a moment in withdi'awing and coming down the road to me. The wagons* 
which went up send down at once, and have the road cleared; and send me word 
when you have all in motion. Your command must follow Svkes's. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major-General Commanding. 

The following despatch (B. E. p. 717), written at the same time as ^o. 
41, came to light for the first time in the evidence of Gen. Sturgis. 
If it had been brought forward before the court-martial in 1862, it 
certainly would have relieved me of all suspicion and of the charge that 
knowingly I permitted Piatt's brigade and Griffin's to wander to Centre- 
ville, and would have tended to destroy the impression of an evil animus 
on my part. 

[No. 41«.] 

Gen. Sturgis : Pleass put your command in motion to follow Sykes as soon as he 
starts. If you know of any other troops who are to join me, I wish you to send them 
notice to follow you. 
We march as soon as we can see. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major General .. 
[No. 42.] 

Headquarters, near Groveton, 

August 30th, 1862, 12 o'clock m. 

Special order No. 

The following forces will be immediately thrown forward and lyi pursuit of the enemy, 
and x)ress him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned 
to the command of the pursuit. Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the 
Warrenton Turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King ahd Rey- 
nolds. 

The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket Road, fol- 
lowed by the corps of Major-General Heiutzelman ; the necessary cavalry will be 
assigned to these columus by Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent 
reports will be made. 

The general headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton Turnpike. 

By command of Major-General Pope. 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff, 

[No. 43.] 

Headquarters Third Corps, Army of Virginia, 

August 30th, 1862. 
Major-General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue 
the enemy, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by 
King's division, supported by Reynolds; Heintzelman, with his corps, preceded by 

*Two wagous of ''hardtack" — all that could be got hold of, of Burnside's 40 
wagons — and the only provisions the men had from early 29th to about noon 31st. 



79 

Reynolds' division, will more on your right on the road from Sndley Springs to Hay- 
market. He is instructed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which it is desirable 
you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the 
head of Reynolds' division on the Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to 
precede your command and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in 
contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade will be ordered to report to 
you ; x>ush it well to the left as you advance. 

Yerv respectfullv, your obedient servant, 

ED. SCHRIVER, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-Gexeeal Porter, 

Commanding, J^c, tf-c. 

[No. 44.] 

Headquarters Third Army CorpSj Army of Virginia, 

August 30th, 1862. 
Gj^xeral : 

Major-General McDowell directs that you push on the movement suggested in your 
note to him to the left, and General Heintzelman, now here, will attend to the front 
and right. You have at your disposal, to reinforce you. King's division and Reynolds's. 
Very resi^ectfully, your obedient servant, 

ED. SCHRIVER, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-Gexeral Fitz Johx Porter, 

Commanding, ^^c., ^-c. 

Note. — The enemy having shown indications of advancing by the right, Reynolds 
has been withdrawn from your column and put over on our left ; it is still thought you 
will be strong enough to effect your purpose with King ; if not, General Pope will send 
you Sigel. 

[No. 45.] 

Headquarters Third Army Corps, Army of Virgixia, 

August 30th, 186-2. 
Major-General McDowell is now busy attending to our left; he directs me to inform 
you that you must use your discretion in reference to the employment of King's divis- 
ion in connection with the service you are to perform. 
Very res^Dectfully, your obedient servant. 



Major-Gexeral Porter, 

Commanding, <|'C., ^c. 



ED. SCHRIVER, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 



[No. 46.] 



Gexeral McDowell: 
I fear for the result unless you push up Sigel. Oiir right is also attacked. 

r. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

[No. 47.]. 

(Received September 1, 8 a. m.) 

Cexteryille, August 31, 1862. 
Dear Gexeral: 

I send you copies of some orders under which I have moved lately. I advanced in 
pursuit of the enemy and struck the centre of his line, especially under the direction 
of General Lee, and was whipped, as was the whole army, badly ; that is, it was over- 
powered. Two of Morell's brigades were in action, under Buttertield, and two of 
Sykes' (Buchanan and Chapman), and they did nobly. The latter lost by volunteers 
firing into them before passing through them. They were not sustained on the right, 
and had to retire. The Pennsylvania Reserves did beautifully ; thej- show the ad- 
vantage of being well led by Reynolds, Meade, Seymour and Jackson. A battery was 
lost and retaken by them, but again lost after gallant resistance. Warren has only 
one hundred and eighty-seven men left — not one missing — and only three commis- 
sioned ofticers. We were driven from the field, and here we are, after marching all 



80 

last niglit, strongly located in a position, whicli, if the enemy sliells, will cause 
slaughter; but I do not helieve he will attack, but get in our rear and compel us to 
attack him in a well-selected place. The men are without heart, but will fight when 
cornered. To-day General Pope asked the question of the Government if arrangements 
had been made to protect Washington in case this army met with a disaster. He said 
to us chiefs of corps present when the reply was received that he was glad the Gov- 
ernment had decided the question for him, but we were to fight wherever the enemy 
was, meaning we were not to return to Alexandria, &c., as all forces were coming to 
us. I believe the decision was a general disappointment except to him. However, 
we obey, and do what Halleck thinks is best. Pope says there are political considera- 
tions which control, not the safety of the army. But our men will not fight with 
heart when they know, if wounded (as we cannot retain the field against present 
odds), they are to be left to the care of the enemy. 

Pope sent in a fl^ag to-day to get our wounded. I have many officers in their hands, 
some of the most valuable from every State. Our wagons are gone, and our artillery 
and cavalry will not soon be movable. The latter is broken down, and, as Pope says, 
he has no cavalry, though he has ref/iments. We have taken very few prisoners — some 
400. In return we have left all our killed, and the most of our wounded, in their hands. 
The enemy got one battery of six pieces yesterday. I believe they belong to Reynolds. 
The enemy took, at Manassas, one battery, and left one piece (iron) spiked and use- 
less. It was left on the ground when we abandoned Manassas. I hear it is claimed 
we captured it. 

We are bivouacking ; and, as I have had no dinner or supper to-day, and no chance 
of any to-morrow, I will bid you good-bye, in the hoi)e of seeing you (without being 
whix^ped), and that you have plenty to eat. If we return, I hope the forces will be 
directed to take different roads to the forts, and they will be well manned and i)ro- 
tected by us. I do not wish to see the army back, if it can be helped ; but I fear it 
may be kept here, at the will of the enemy, to crixjple it so that when it does get l^ack 
it will be so cripj)led that it cannot defend the forts against the powerful force of the 
enemy, who will hold it here while they cross into Maryland. I may be in error as to 
their purpose. Lee is here. Jackson is not nowhere, ^admus Wilcox commands Hill's 
division, directly in front ; and the enemy are massing to turn us. I expect to hear hourly 
of our rear being cut, and our supplies and trains (scarcely guarded) at Fairfax Station 
being destroyed, as we are required to stay here and fight. I am glad Couch is coming 
up on the road. Hope we will have the fight before he gets here, as so much will be 
saved for another day. I understand the Secretary of the Interior sent out some men 
to take care of our wounded, and they were nmch surprised to find that th^y were in 
the hands of the enemy. They returned with a different impression from what they 
came. Good-night. The bearer will tell you much. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major -General. 

General McClellan. 

[No. 48.] 

Centre viLLE, Virginia, August 31. 
General McClellan^ near Alexandria : 

Baj^ard reports the enemy forming in on the Chantilly road, and my pickets that 
they are coming down the Little River turnpike. Twelve brass guns were seen, and 
infantry and cavalry. I can see the dust and flags ; columns evidently moving directly 
north, evidently towards Leesburg. If you can, I hope you will protect the ford into 
Maryland, and guard the railroad to Baltimore. I think we will have a fight before 
night. The enemy are between us and Fairfax Court-House, and shelled our trains 
last night. We will fight, or they will avoid us and strike our rear first. We have 
been held on thirty-six hours too long, and we are bound to work our way to Alex- 
andria. I only regret that we have not been distributed to forts, and to the fords over 
the Potomac into Maryland. God speed your operations, and enable you and others 
in authority to save our country. 
Yours, 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- General. 



After a conference with, general officers at Oentreville, lasting till dark, 
G-eneral Pope gave verbal orders to fall back to Fairfax C. H. After 
arrival there on the 2d I received the following order. The enemy had 
struck our rear, and the fight provided for therein had taken place while 
we were at Gentreville : 



81 

[No. 49.] -- Z-^- 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Fairfax Court House, September 1, 1862. 
General Order No. — . 

The army corps of Heintzelman, Sigel, Sumner, Porter and Reno, as soon after day- 
light as possible, will begin to draw slowly to their right in the direction of. Fairfax 
Court House until they come closely in contact with each other. Major-General 
Eeno will follow as closely as possible the. line of the old railroad now occupied by him ; 
the others along the pike. He will notify those in his rear of his exact x^osition and 
every step of his movements, and will ask support if he needs it. They will not be 
more than half a mile in rear of him. If any severe engagement should occur at any ' 
point of the line the army corps commanders on the right and left will immediately 
send forward a staff officer to report to the general commanding the troops of the at- 
tack, and to notify him that they are ready to support him if he needs it. For the 
present the general headquarters will be established at Fairfax Court House. 

By command of Major-General Pope. ■ ■'. 

GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

I received the following despatch, at Fairfax 0. H. about 9:50 A. M., 
September 2d. 

[No. 50.] 

War Department, 

September 1, 1862—5:30 p. m. 
I ask of you for my sake, that of the country and of the old Army of the Potomac, 
that you and all friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General 
Pope in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of* 
our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in 
the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to all my frienda* 
in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is that, 
for their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever 
have to me. 

I am in charge of the defenses of Washington ; I am doing all I can to render your 
retreat safe, should that become necessary. 

GEO. B. "McCLELLAN, 

Major-General. 
Major-General Porter, ^ 

Centreville, Commanding 5th Corps. 

I asked of General Pope, but was refused the sending of this reply: 

[No. 51.] 

Fairfax Court House^ September 2d, 1862—10 a. m. 

You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, 
will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope, their cordial co-operation and 
constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed and wounded 
and enfeebled troops attest our devotion to duty. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major-General Commanding. 
General Geo. B. McClellan, 

Washington City, 

General McClellan said as the cause of sending his dispatch : 

[No. 52.] 

I sent the despatch in accordance with the request of the President of the United 
States, who sent for me on that day, and told me that he had understood that there 
was an unkind feeling on the part of the army of the Potomac towards General Pope, 
and requested me to use my personal influence to correct it by telegraphing either to 
General Porter or to any other of my friends there. I told him I did not consider it 
necessary, but was perfectly willing to do it. I had no doubt, then, in my own mind 
but that the army of the Potomac, and all connected with it, would do their duty 
without there being any necessity for action on my part. 

G 



82 

He sent, as thus showD, the telegram to quiet the apprehensions of 
the President, and not to remove any apprehensions of his own. 

[No. 53.] 

Headquarters Field of Battle, 
Near Groveton, Virginia, 5 a. m., August 30, 1862. 

Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief, United States Army. 
We fought a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of the enemy, which 
lasted with continuous fury from daylight until after dark, by which time the enemy was 
driven fiom the field, which we now occupy. Our troops are too much exhausted yet 
to push matters, though I shall do so in the course of the morning, as soon as General 
Fitz John Porter comes up from Manassas. The enemy is still in our front, but badly 
used up. We have lost not less than eight thousand (8,000) men, killed and wounded; 
l)ut from appearances of the field, the enemy lost not less than two to one. We stood 
strictly on tlie defensive, and every assault was made by ourselves. The battle was 
fought on the identical battle-field of Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthu- 
siasm of the men. 

The news just reaches me from the front that the enemy is retiring towards the 
mountains. I go forward at once to see. We have made great captures, but I am not 
able yet to form an idea of their extent. Onr troops behaved splendidlv. * * * 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-General. 
[No. 54.] 

Centreville, August 30, 1862 — 9:45 P. M. 

We have had a terrific battle again to-day. The enemy largely reinforced assaulted 
our position early to-day. We held our ground firmly until 6 P. M., when the enemy 
massing very heavy forces on our left, forced back that wing about half a mile. At 
dark we held that position. Under all the circumstances, both horses and men having 
been two days without food, and the enemy greatly outnumbering us, I thought it best 
to draw back to this place at dark. The movement has been made in perfect order 
and without loss. The troops are in good heart, and marched off the field without 
the least hurry or confusion. Their conduct was very fine. The battle was most 
furious for hours without cessation, and the losses on both sides very heavy. The 
enemy is badly crippled and we shall do well enough. Do not be uneasy. We will 
hold our own here. The labors and hardships of this army for two or three weeks 
have been beyond description. We have delayed the enemy as long as possible with- 
out losing the army. We have damaged him heavily, and I think the army entitled 
to the gratitude of the country. Be easy; everything will go well. 

JNO. POPE. 

Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

P. S. — We have lost nothing, neither guns nor wagons. 

The following despatch caused the President to ask General McGlel- 
lan to send me, or some other of his friends, despatch 50 : 

[No. 55.] 

Centreville, September 1, 8:50 p. m. 
All was quiet yesterday, and so far this morning. My men are resting, they need 
it much. Forage for our horses is being brought up. Our cavalry is completely 
broken down, so that there are not five horses to a company that can raise a trot. 
The consequence is that I am forced to keep considerable infantry along the roads in 
my rear to make them secure, and even then it is difficult to keep the enemy's cavalry 
off the roads. I shall attack again to-morrow if I can ; the next day certainly. I 
think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of 
many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Penin- 
sula. Every word, and act, and intention is discouraging, and calculated to break 
down the spirits of the men and produce disaster. One commander of a corps who 
was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join me near Grovetou, although he 
was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all — worse still, fell back to Manassas 
without a fight, and in plain hearing, at less than three miles distance, of a furious 
battle which raged all day. It was only in consequence of peremptory orders that he 
joined me the next day. One of his brigades, the brigadier-general of which professed 
to be looking for liis division, absolutely remained all day at Centreville in plain view 
of the battle, and made no attempt to join. What renders the whole matter worse, 



83 

these are botli officers of the regular army, who do not hold back from ignorance or 
fear. Their constant talk, indulged in puhliclj^ and in promiscuous company, is that 
the Army of the Potomac will not fight ; that they are demoralized by withdrawal 
from the Peninsula, etc. When such example is set by officers of high rank, the in- 
fluence is very bad amongst those in subordinate stations. You have hardly an idea 
of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all 
instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander-in-chief and others. 
These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is producing, and must nec- 
essarily produce, very disastrous results. You should know these things, as you alone 
can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its effects are very perceptible and 
very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them 
where they shall fight or run away. My advice to you — I give it with freedom as I 
know you will not misunderstand it — is that, in view of any satisfactory results, you 
draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in 
that secure place to organize and re-arrange it. You may avoid great disaster by doing 
so. I do not consider the matter except in a purely military light, and it is bad enough 
and grave enough to make some action very necessary. When there is no heart in 
their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the 
men. 

Please hurry forward cavalry horses to me under strong escort. I need them badly- 
worse than I can tell you. 

JNO. POPE, 
Major- General. 

Major-General Halleck, 

General-in-Chief. 



The 5th Corps, also Sumner's, SigePs, Banks', Franklin's and Eeno's 
Corps were held at or near Centreville till the night of September 1st. 
It was reported early on the 31st to General Pope that the enemy, avoid- 
ing our strong position, was moving to our right and rear towards Mary- 
land and WashiugtoD. Yet, despite the loss of time. General Pope held 
to this useless position, not, as he asserted, from his own free will, but 
by reason of orders from Washiugion, ^' a political in opposition to a 
military necessity controlling." 

Near 3 p. m., September 1st, General Pope came to me and candidly 
stating his enforced position, asked my opinion and suggestions. As 
we then held a worthless position (the enemy not daring to strike us, 
and as we were in no condition to go after him), I urged an immediate 
withdrawal from Centreville for the protection of Washington and Mary- 
land, towards which for two days in plain sight the enemy had been 
moving. I said that I believed it was wrong to have stopped at Centre- 
ville so long. Every reason required it to be abandoned, and our troops 
were dispirited and without food. He would be held responsible for the 
safety of the Capital and the proper use of the army. Our condition 
could not be understood at Washington, and no orders from distant au- 
thority should compel him to submit to and maintain a manifestly wrong 
course from every proper point of view. I said I had had no talk with 
others, but I suggested that he should confer with those general officers 
present, whose opinion he had a right to have, and which opinion he 
should respect. At my solicitation, we sought General Franklin, at 
whose tent were called Generals W. F. Smith, Newton, Hancock, Slo- 
cum, Bartlett, and others, all of whom gave about the same advice I had 
given, and General Pope then issued verbal orders withdrawing the 
troops to Fairfax Court House. 

Just at this time, General Kelton, aid to General-in-Chief Halleck, 
entered the tent, and was informed of the orders and the reasons for 
them. He expressed surprise at receiving an unfavorable report of the 
situation, and said, from official reports received in Washington, he ex- 
pected to find General Pope with a very large force, in good condition, 



84 

cheerful after great successes, though rumors had been for some time in 
circulation stating the contrarj^, which he now found to be the truth. He 
had come prepared, if the rumors were correct, to direct General Pope 
"to do what he had just done. 

While this conference was being held, the enemy, in large force and 
.unknown to ns, had struck our right and rear, inflicting heavy losses. 
- My command that night withdrew towards Fairfax Court House, 
whence it by order the next day marched via Chain Bridge to subse- 
quently occupy the almost vacated defenses of Washington City from 
Eort Corcoran to Hunting Creek, the security of which was confided 
entirely to me. 

My arrangements in this direction rendered the line secure, and so 
quieted the alarms of the Secretary of War and General Halleck as to 
induce them to send a large part of my command, now numbering some 
^5,000 men, to the Army of the Potomac, then moving against General 
Lee at Frederick. 

This force, as the regiments arrived, I had organized into divisions 
and brigades, and had so x^laced them that large bodies could be used 
quickly at any point on the defenses, or selected for active operations in 
thefitdd. 

ISTear midnight on the 12th September, I received orders to rejoin the 
Army of the Potomac. Early on the 13th, while passing through Wash- 
ington with Morell's division, about 6,000 strong, all I had any right to 
take, the remainder of my corps, Sykes' having preceded me, I was 
offered , by General Halleck, under direction of the Secretary of War, an 
additional division from the southern defenses of Washington. At my 
request. General Humphreys was assigned to command this division. 

General Humphreys hastened to join me. Detained in the vicinity of 
Frederick City at the earnest request of the Secretary of War and Gen- 
eral Halleck, "to allay fears that the enemy might evade us and capture 
Washington, General Humphreys, much to his regret and mortification, 
to mine and to that of his command, as affecting the result and honor of 
the day, was prevented from arriving in time to take part in the battle 
of Antietam. 

I mention these facts to counteract the effect of a report to which one 
of General Halleck's dispatches gave circulation, that I left Washington 
City with at least 20,000 men. General Halleck knew that Humphreys^ 
division had been retained in the vicinity of Washington with his ap- 
proval, and that its commander had in vain endeavored to provide it 
with serviceable arms, equipments, and transportation. 

My official report of these events in the War Department shows the 
condition of my command at the time and the service to which it was 
put. I will, however, repeat, in this connection, that my command was 
as early as any on the field at Antietam, and consisted of Morell and 
Sykes' divisions, about 9,000 strong. Of these, all except some 2,000 
were detached at critical moments by my orders or General McClellan's 
to the assistance of others, or were in action in my front at the time, 
when it has been asserted my corps (erroneously said to have been idle) 
could ha\'e decided the fate of the day. 

In regard to a report freely circulated that I refused assistance to 
General Burnside during that battle, I repeat that General Burnside 
officially denied that he had applied to me for aid, and I am assured that 
no application reached General McClellan before darkness had closed the 
contest between the weary combatants. Of my own free will that day 
I sent Warren's brigade to secure Burnside's right flank, and posted 
batteries to aid in clearing- his front as he advanced to the attack. 



85 

My report of tlie services ot the corps at the battle of Antietam, and 
ot the engagement at the Sharpsbiirg crossing of the Potomac is in the 
War Department. 

Up to I^ovember 12th, 1862, I remained in command of the corps, 
getting it in a condition not excelled by any other command for the 
effective service soon to be required of it. On that day I was relieved 
at Warrenton, Ya., on the eve of an attack designed by General Mc- 
Olellan upon the right wing of the Confederate army, then widely sepa- 
rated from its left. 



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